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NELSON MANDELA SENTENCED TO LIFE,
PRETORIA, SOUTH AFRICA
I Am Prepared to Die
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Nelson Mandela.
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Nelson Mandela's I Am Prepared to Die
Speech.
It follows the full text transcript of
Nelson Mandela's I Am Prepared to Die speech, delivered
from the dock at the Palace of Justice, Pretoria, South
Africa - April 20, 1964.
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I am the First
Accused.
I hold a Bachelor's Degree in Arts and practiced
as an attorney in Johannesburg for a number of
years in partnership with Oliver Tambo. I am a
convicted prisoner serving five years for
leaving the country without a permit and for
inciting people to go on strike at the end of
May 1961. |
At the outset, I
want to say that the suggestion made by the
State in its opening that the struggle in South
Africa is under the influence of foreigners or
communists is wholly incorrect. I have done
whatever I did, both as an individual and as a
leader of my people, because of my experience in
South Africa and my own proudly felt African
background, and not because of what any outsider
might have said.
In my youth in the Transkei I listened to the
elders of my tribe telling stories of the old
days. Amongst the tales they related to me were
those of wars fought by our ancestors in defence
of the fatherland. The names of Dingane and
Bambata, Hintsa and Makana, Squngthi and
Dalasile, Moshoeshoe and Sekhukhuni, were
praised as the glory of the entire African
nation. I hoped then that life might offer me
the opportunity to serve my people and make my
own humble contribution to their freedom
struggle. This is what has motivated me in all
that I have done in relation to the charges made
against me in this case.
Having said this, I must deal immediately and at
some length with the question of violence. Some
of the things so far told to the Court are true
and some are untrue. I do not, however, deny
that I planned sabotage. I did not plan it in a
spirit of recklessness, nor because I have any
love of violence. I planned it as a result of a
calm and sober assessment of the political
situation that had arisen after many years of
tyranny, exploitation, and oppression of my
people by the Whites.
I admit immediately that I was one of the
persons who helped to form Umkhonto we Sizwe,
and that I played a prominent role in its
affairs until I was arrested in August 1962.
In the statement which I am about to make I
shall correct certain false impressions which
have been created by State witnesses. Amongst
other things, I will demonstrate that certain of
the acts referred to in the evidence were not
and could not have been committed by Umkhonto. I
will also deal with the relationship between the
African National Congress and Umkhonto, and with
the part which I personally have played in the
affairs of both organizations. I shall deal also
with the part played by the Communist Party. In
order to explain these matters properly, I will
have to explain what Umkhonto set out to
achieve; what methods it prescribed for the
achievement of these objects, and why these
methods were chosen. I will also have to explain
how I became involved in the activities of these
organizations.
I deny that Umkhonto was responsible for a
number of acts which clearly fell outside the
policy of the organization, and which have been
charged in the indictment against us. I do not
know what justification there was for these
acts, but to demonstrate that they could not
have been authorized by Umkhonto, I want to
refer briefly to the roots and policy of the
organization.
I have already mentioned that I was one of the
persons who helped to form Umkhonto. I, and the
others who started the organization, did so for
two reasons. Firstly, we believed that as a
result of Government policy, violence by the
African people had become inevitable, and that
unless responsible leadership was given to
canalize and control the feelings of our people,
there would be outbreaks of terrorism which
would produce an intensity of bitterness and
hostility between the various races of this
country which is not produced even by war.
Secondly, we felt that without violence there
would be no way open to the African people to
succeed in their struggle against the principle
of white supremacy. All lawful modes of
expressing opposition to this principle had been
closed by legislation, and we were placed in a
position in which we had either to accept a
permanent state of inferiority, or to defy the
Government. We chose to defy the law. We first
broke the law in a way which avoided any
recourse to violence; when this form was
legislated against, and then the Government
resorted to a show of force to crush opposition
to its policies, only then did we decide to
answer violence with violence.
But the violence which we chose to adopt was not
terrorism. We who formed Umkhonto were all
members of the African National Congress, and
had behind us the ANC tradition of non-violence
and negotiation as a means of solving political
disputes. We believe that South Africa belongs
to all the people who live in it, and not to one
group, be it black or white. We did not want an
interracial war, and tried to avoid it to the
last minute. If the Court is in doubt about
this, it will be seen that the whole history of
our organization bears out what I have said, and
what I will subsequently say, when I describe
the tactics which Umkhonto decided to adopt. I
want, therefore, to say something about the
African National Congress.
The African National Congress was formed in 1912
to defend the rights of the African people which
had been seriously curtailed by the South Africa
Act, and which were then being threatened by the
Native Land Act. For thirty-seven years - that
is until 1949 - it adhered strictly to a
constitutional struggle. It put forward demands
and resolutions; it sent delegations to the
Government in the belief that African grievances
could be settled through peaceful discussion and
that Africans could advance gradually to full
political rights. But White Governments remained
unmoved, and the rights of Africans became less
instead of becoming greater. In the words of my
leader, Chief Lutuli, who became President of
the ANC in 1952, and who was later awarded the
Nobel Peace Prize:
"who will deny that thirty years of my life have
been spent knocking in vain, patiently,
moderately, and modestly at a closed and barred
door? What have been the fruits of moderation?
The past thirty years have seen the greatest
number of laws restricting our rights and
progress, until today we have reached a stage
where we have almost no rights at all".
Even after 1949, the ANC remained determined to
avoid violence. At this time, however, there was
a change from the strictly constitutional means
of protest which had been employed in the past.
The change was embodied in a decision which was
taken to protest against apartheid legislation
by peaceful, but unlawful, demonstrations
against certain laws. Pursuant to this policy
the ANC launched the Defiance Campaign, in which
I was placed in charge of volunteers. This
campaign was based on the principles of passive
resistance. More than 8,500 people defied
apartheid laws and went to jail. Yet there was
not a single instance of violence in the course
of this campaign on the part of any defier. I
and nineteen colleagues were convicted for the
role which we played in organizing the campaign,
but our sentences were suspended mainly because
the Judge found that discipline and non-violence
had been stressed throughout. This was the time
when the volunteer section of the ANC was
established, and when the word 'Amadelakufa' was
first used: this was the time when the
volunteers were asked to take a pledge to uphold
certain principles. Evidence dealing with
volunteers and their pledges has been introduced
into this case, but completely out of context.
The volunteers were not, and are not, the
soldiers of a black army pledged to fight a
civil war against the whites. They were, and
are. dedicated workers who are prepared to lead
campaigns initiated by the ANC to distribute
leaflets, to organize strikes, or do whatever
the particular campaign required. They are
called volunteers because they volunteer to face
the penalties of imprisonment and whipping which
are now prescribed by the legislature for such
acts.
During the Defiance Campaign, the Public Safety
Act and the Criminal Law Amendment Act were
passed. These Statutes provided harsher
penalties for offences committed by way of
protests against laws. Despite this, the
protests continued and the ANC adhered to its
policy of non-violence. In 1956, 156 leading
members of the Congress Alliance, including
myself, were arrested on a charge of high
treason and charges under the Suppression of
Communism Act. The non-violent policy of the ANC
was put in issue by the State, but when the
Court gave judgment some five years later, it
found that the ANC did not have a policy of
violence. We were acquitted on all counts, which
included a count that the ANC sought to set up a
communist state in place of the existing regime.
The Government has always sought to label all
its opponents as communists. This allegation has
been repeated in the present case, but as I will
show, the ANC is not, and never has been, a
communist organization.
In 1960 there was the shooting at Sharpeville,
which resulted in the proclamation of a state of
emergency and the declaration of the ANC as an
unlawful organization. My colleagues and I,
after careful consideration, decided that we
would not obey this decree. The African people
were not part of the Government and did not make
the laws by which they were governed. We
believed in the words of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, that 'the will of
the people shall be the basis of authority of
the Government', and for us to accept the
banning was equivalent to accepting the
silencing of the Africans for all time. The ANC
refused to dissolve, but instead went
underground. We believed it was our duty to
preserve this organization which had been built
up with almost fifty years of unremitting toil.
I have no doubt that no self-respecting White
political organization would disband itself if
declared illegal by a government in which it had
no say.
In 1960 the Government held a referendum which
led to the establishment of the Republic.
Africans, who constituted approximately 70 per
cent of the population of South Africa, were not
entitled to vote, and were not even consulted
about the proposed constitutional change. All of
us were apprehensive of our future under the
proposed White Republic, and a resolution was
taken to hold an All-In African Conference to
call for a National Convention, and to organize
mass demonstrations on the eve of the unwanted
Republic, if the Government failed to call the
Convention. The conference was attended by
Africans of various political persuasions. I was
the Secretary of the conference and undertook to
be responsible for organizing the national
stay-at-home which was subsequently called to
coincide with the declaration of the Republic.
As all strikes by Africans are illegal, the
person organizing such a strike must avoid
arrest. I was chosen to be this person, and
consequently I had to leave my home and family
and my practice and go into hiding to avoid
arrest.
The stay-at-home, in accordance with ANC policy,
was to be a peaceful demonstration. Careful
instructions were given to organizers and
members to avoid any recourse to violence. The
Government's answer was to introduce new and
harsher laws, to mobilize its armed forces, and
to send Saracens, armed vehicles, and soldiers
into the townships in a massive show of force
designed to intimidate the people. This was an
indication that the Government had decided to
rule by force alone, and this decision was a
milestone on the road to Umkhonto.
Some of this may appear irrelevant to this
trial. In fact, I believe none of it is
irrelevant because it will, I hope, enable the
Court to appreciate the attitude eventually
adopted by the various persons and bodies
concerned in the National Liberation Movement.
When I went to jail in 1962, the dominant idea
was that loss of life should be avoided. I now
know that this was still so in 1963.
I must return to June 1961. What were we, the
leaders of our people, to do? Were we to give in
to the show of force and the implied threat
against future action, or were we to fight it
and, if so, how?
We had no doubt that we had to continue the
fight. Anything else would have been abject
surrender. Our problem was not whether to fight,
but was how to continue the fight. We of the ANC
had always stood for a non-racial democracy, and
we shrank from any action which might drive the
races further apart than they already were. But
the hard facts were that fifty years of
non-violence had brought the African people
nothing but more and more repressive
legislation, and fewer and fewer rights. It may
not be easy for this Court to understand, but it
is a fact that for a long time the people had
been talking of violence - of the day when they
would fight the White man and win back their
country - and we, the leaders of the ANC, had
nevertheless always prevailed upon them to avoid
violence and to pursue peaceful methods. When
some of us discussed this in May and June of
1961, it could not be denied that our policy to
achieve a nonracial State by non-violence had
achieved nothing, and that our followers were
beginning to lose confidence in this policy and
were developing disturbing ideas of terrorism.
It must not be forgotten that by this time
violence had, in fact, become a feature of the
South African political scene. There had been
violence in 1957 when the women of Zeerust were
ordered to carry passes; there was violence in
1958 with the enforcement of cattle culling in
Sekhukhuniland; there was violence in 1959 when
the people of Cato Manor protested against pass
raids; there was violence in 1960 when the
Government attempted to impose Bantu Authorities
in Pondoland. Thirty-nine Africans died in these
disturbances. In 1961 there had been riots in
Warmbaths, and all this time the Transkei had
been a seething mass of unrest. Each disturbance
pointed clearly to the inevitable growth among
Africans of the belief that violence was the
only way out - it showed that a Government which
uses force to maintain its rule teaches the
oppressed to use force to oppose it. Already
small groups had arisen in the urban areas and
were spontaneously making plans for violent
forms of political struggle. There now arose a
danger that these groups would adopt terrorism
against Africans, as well as Whites, if not
properly directed. Particularly disturbing was
the type of violence engendered in places such
as Zeerust, Sekhukhuniland, and Pondoland
amongst Africans. It was increasingly taking the
form, not of struggle against the Government -
though this is what prompted it - but of civil
strife amongst themselves, conducted in such a
way that it could not hope to achieve anything
other than a loss of life and bitterness.
At the beginning of June 1961, after a long and
anxious assessment of the South African
situation, I, and some colleagues, came to the
conclusion that as violence in this country was
inevitable, it would be unrealistic and wrong
for African leaders to continue preaching peace
and non-violence at a time when the Government
met our peaceful demands with force.
This conclusion was not easily arrived at. It
was only when all else had failed, when all
channels of peaceful protest had been barred to
us, that the decision was made to embark on
violent forms of political struggle, and to form
Umkhonto we Sizwe. We did so not because we
desired such a course, but solely because the
Government had left us with no other choice. In
the Manifesto of Umkhonto published on 16
December 1961, which is Exhibit AD, we said:
"The time comes in the life of any nation when
there remain only two choices - submit or fight.
That time has now come to South Africa. We shall
not submit and we have no choice but to hit back
by all means in our power in defense of our
people, our future, and our freedom".
This was our feeling in June of 1961 when we
decided to press for a change in the policy of
the National Liberation Movement. I can only say
that I felt morally obliged to do what I did.
We who had taken this decision started to
consult leaders of various organizations,
including the ANC. I will not say whom we spoke
to, or what they said, but I wish to deal with
the role of the African National Congress in
this phase of the struggle, and with the policy
and objectives of Umkhonto we Sizwe.
As far as the ANC was concerned, it formed a
clear view which can be summarized as follows:
It was a mass political organization with a
political function to fulfill. Its members had
joined on the express policy of non-violence.
Because of all this, it could not and would not
undertake violence. This must be stressed. One
cannot turn such a body into the small, closely
knit organization required for sabotage. Nor
would this be politically correct, because it
would result in members ceasing to carry out
this essential activity: political propaganda
and organization. Nor was it permissible to
change the whole nature of the organization. On
the other hand, in view of this situation I have
described, the ANC was prepared to depart from
its fifty-year-old policy of non-violence to
this extent that it would no longer disapprove
of properly controlled violence. Hence members
who undertook such activity would not be subject
to disciplinary action by the ANC. I say
'properly controlled violence' because I made it
clear that if I formed the organization I would
at all times subject it to the political
guidance of the ANC and would not undertake any
different form of activity from that
contemplated without the consent of the ANC. And
I shall now tell the Court how that form of
violence came to be determined.
As a result of this decision, Umkhonto was
formed in November 1961. When we took this
decision, and subsequently formulated our plans,
the ANC heritage of non-violence and racial
harmony was very much with us. We felt that the
country was drifting towards a civil war in
which Blacks and Whites would fight each other.
We viewed the situation with alarm. Civil war
could mean the destruction of what the ANC stood
for; with civil war, racial peace would be more
difficult than ever to achieve. We already have
examples in South African history of the results
of war. It has taken more than fifty years for
the scars of the South African War to disappear.
How much longer would it take to eradicate the
scars of inter-racial civil war, which could not
be fought without a great loss of life on both
sides?
The avoidance of civil war had dominated our
thinking for many years, but when we decided to
adopt violence as part of our policy, we
realized that we might one day have to face the
prospect of such a war. This had to be taken
into account in formulating our plans. We
required a plan which was flexible and which
permitted us to act in accordance with the needs
of the times; above all, the plan had to be one
which recognized civil war as the last resort,
and left the decision on this question to the
future. We did not want to be committed to civil
war, but we wanted to be ready if it became
inevitable.
Four forms of violence were possible. There is
sabotage, there is guerrilla warfare, there is
terrorism, and there is open revolution. We
chose to adopt the first method and to exhaust
it before taking any other decision.
In the light of our political background the
choice was a logical one. Sabotage did not
involve loss of life, and it offered the best
hope for future race relations. Bitterness would
be kept to a minimum and, if the policy bore
fruit, democratic government could become a
reality. This is what we felt at the time, and
this is what we said in our Manifesto (Exhibit
AD):
"We of Umkhonto we Sizwe have always sought to
achieve liberation without bloodshed and civil
clash. We hope, even at this late hour, that our
first actions will awaken everyone to a
realization of the disastrous situation to which
the Nationalist policy is leading. We hope that
we will bring the Government and its supporters
to their senses before it is too late, so that
both the Government and its policies can be
changed before matters reach the desperate state
of civil war."
The initial plan was based on a careful analysis
of the political and economic situation of our
country. We believed that South Africa depended
to a large extent on foreign capital and foreign
trade. We felt that planned destruction of power
plants, and interference with rail and telephone
communications, would tend to scare away capital
from the country, make it more difficult for
goods from the industrial areas to reach the
seaports on schedule, and would in the long run
be a heavy drain on the economic life of the
country, thus compelling the voters of the
country to reconsider their position.
Attacks on the economic life lines of the
country were to be linked with sabotage on
Government buildings and other symbols of
apartheid. These attacks would serve as a source
of inspiration to our people. In addition, they
would provide an outlet for those people who
were urging the adoption of violent methods and
would enable us to give concrete proof to our
followers that we had adopted a stronger line
and were fighting back against Government
violence.
In addition, if mass action were successfully
organized, and mass reprisals taken, we felt
that sympathy for our cause would be roused in
other countries, and that greater pressure would
be brought to bear on the South African
Government.
This then was the plan. Umkhonto was to perform
sabotage, and strict instructions were given to
its members right from the start, that on no
account were they to injure or kill people in
planning or carrying out operations. These
instructions have been referred to in the
evidence of 'Mr. X' and 'Mr. Z'.
The affairs of the Umkhonto were controlled and
directed by a National High Command, which had
powers of co-option and which could, and did,
appoint Regional Commands. The High Command was
the body which determined tactics and targets
and was in charge of training and finance. Under
the High Command there were Regional Commands
which were responsible for the direction of the
local sabotage groups. Within the framework of
the policy laid down by the National High
Command, the Regional Commands had authority to
select the targets to be attacked. They had no
authority to go beyond the prescribed framework
and thus had no authority to embark upon acts
which endangered life, or which did not fit into
the overall plan of sabotage. For instance,
Umkhonto members were forbidden ever to go armed
into operation. Incidentally, the terms High
Command and Regional Command were an importation
from the Jewish national underground
organization Irgun Zvai Leumi, which operated in
Israel between 1944 and 1948.
Umkhonto had its first operation on 16 December
1961, when Government buildings in Johannesburg,
Port Elizabeth and Durban were attacked. The
selection of targets is proof of the policy to
which I have referred. Had we intended to attack
life we would have selected targets where people
congregated and not empty buildings and power
stations. The sabotage which was committed
before 16 December 1961 was the work of isolated
groups and had no connection whatever with
Umkhonto. In fact, some of these and a number of
later acts were claimed by other organizations.
The Manifesto of Umkhonto was issued on the day
that operations commenced. The response to our
actions and Manifesto among the white population
was characteristically violent. The Government
threatened to take strong action, and called
upon its supporters to stand firm and to ignore
the demands of the Africans. The Whites failed
to respond by suggesting change; they responded
to our call by suggesting the laager.
In contrast, the response of the Africans was
one of encouragement. Suddenly there was hope
again. Things were happening. People in the
townships became eager for political news. A
great deal of enthusiasm was generated by the
initial successes, and people began to speculate
on how soon freedom would be obtained.
But we in Umkhonto weighed up the white response
with anxiety. The lines were being drawn. The
whites and blacks were moving into separate
camps, and the prospects of avoiding a civil war
were made less. The white newspapers carried
reports that sabotage would be punished by
death. If this was so, how could we continue to
keep Africans away from terrorism?
Already scores of Africans had died as a result
of racial friction. In 1920 when the famous
leader, Masabala, was held in Port Elizabeth
jail, twenty-four of a group of Africans who had
gathered to demand his release were killed by
the police and white civilians. In 1921, more
than one hundred Africans died in the Bulhoek
affair. In 1924 over two hundred Africans were
killed when the Administrator of South-West
Africa led a force against a group which had
rebelled against the imposition of dog tax. On 1
May 1950, eighteen Africans died as a result of
police shootings during the strike. On 21 March
1960, sixty-nine unarmed Africans died at
Sharpeville.
How many more Sharpevilles would there be in the
history of our country? And how many more
Sharpevilles could the country stand without
violence and terror becoming the order of the
day? And what would happen to our people when
that stage was reached? In the long run we felt
certain we must succeed, but at what cost to
ourselves and the rest of the country? And if
this happened, how could black and white ever
live together again in peace and harmony? These
were the problems that faced us, and these were
our decisions.
Experience convinced us that rebellion would
offer the Government limitless opportunities for
the indiscriminate slaughter of our people. But
it was precisely because the soil of South
Africa is already drenched with the blood of
innocent Africans that we felt it our duty to
make preparations as a long-term undertaking to
use force in order to defend ourselves against
force. If war were inevitable, we wanted the
fight to be conducted on terms most favorable to
our people. The fight which held out prospects
best for us and the least risk of life to both
sides was guerrilla warfare. We decided,
therefore, in our preparations for the future,
to make provision for the possibility of
guerrilla warfare.
All whites undergo compulsory military training,
but no such training was given to Africans. It
was in our view essential to build up a nucleus
of trained men who would be able to provide the
leadership which would be required if guerrilla
warfare started. We had to prepare for such a
situation before it became too late to make
proper preparations. It was also necessary to
build up a nucleus of men trained in civil
administration and other professions, so that
Africans would be equipped to participate in the
government of this country as soon as they were
allowed to do so.
At this stage it was decided that I should
attend the Conference of the Pan-African Freedom
Movement for Central, East, and Southern Africa,
which was to be held early in 1962 in Addis
Ababa, and, because of our need for preparation,
it was also decided that, after the conference,
I would undertake a tour of the African States
with a view to obtaining facilities for the
training of soldiers, and that I would also
solicit scholarships for the higher education of
matriculated Africans. Training in both fields
would be necessary, even if changes came about
by peaceful means. Administrators would be
necessary who would be willing and able to
administer a non-racial State and so would men
be necessary to control the army and police
force of such a State.
It was on this note that I left South Africa to
proceed to Addis Ababa as a delegate of the ANC.
My tour was a success. Wherever I went I met
sympathy for our cause and promises of help. All
Africa was united against the stand of White
South Africa, and even in London I was received
with great sympathy by political leaders, such
as Mr. Gaitskell and Mr. Grimond. In Africa I
was promised support by such men as Julius
Nyerere, now President of Tanganyika; Mr. Kawawa,
then Prime Minister of Tanganyika; Emperor Haile
Selassie of Ethiopia; General Abboud, President
of the Sudan; Habib Bourguiba, President of
Tunisia; Ben Bella, now President of Algeria;
Modibo Keita, President of Mali; Leopold
Senghor, President of Senegal; Sekou Toure,
President of Guinea; President Tubman of
Liberia; and Milton Obote, Prime Minister of
Uganda. It was Ben Bella who invited me to visit
Oujda, the Headquarters of the Algerian Army of
National Liberation, the visit which is
described in my diary, one of the Exhibits.
I started to make a study of the art of war and
revolution and, whilst abroad, underwent a
course in military training. If there was to be
guerrilla warfare, I wanted to be able to stand
and fight with my people and to share the
hazards of war with them. Notes of lectures
which I received in Algeria are contained in
Exhibit 16, produced in evidence. Summaries of
books on guerrilla warfare and military strategy
have also been produced. I have already admitted
that these documents are in my writing, and I
acknowledge that I made these studies to equip
myself for the role which I might have to play
if the struggle drifted into guerrilla warfare.
I approached this question as every African
Nationalist should do. I was completely
objective. The Court will see that I attempted
to examine all types of authority on the subject
- from the East and from the West, going back to
the classic work of Clausewitz, and covering
such a variety as Mao Tse Tung and Che Guevara
on the one hand, and the writings on the
Anglo-Boer War on the other. Of course, these
notes are merely summaries of the books I read
and do not contain my personal views.
I also made arrangements for our recruits to
undergo military training. But here it was
impossible to organize any scheme without the
co-operation of the ANC offices in Africa. I
consequently obtained the permission of the ANC
in South Africa to do this. To this extent then
there was a departure from the original decision
of the ANC, but it applied outside South Africa
only. The first batch of recruits actually
arrived in Tanganyika when I was passing through
that country on my way back to South Africa.
I returned to South Africa and reported to my
colleagues on the results of my trip. On my
return I found that there had been little
alteration in the political scene save that the
threat of a death penalty for sabotage had now
become a fact. The attitude of my colleagues in
Umkhonto was much the same as it had been before
I left. They were feeling their way cautiously
and felt that it would be a long time before the
possibilities of sabotage were exhausted. In
fact, the view was expressed by some that the
training of recruits was premature. This is
recorded by me in the document which is Exhibit
R.14. After a full discussion, however, it was
decided to go ahead with the plans for military
training because of the fact that it would take
many years to build up a sufficient nucleus of
trained soldiers to start a guerrilla campaign,
and whatever happened the training would be of
value.
I wish to turn now to certain general
allegations made in this case by the State. But
before doing so, I wish to revert to certain
occurrences said by witnesses to have happened
in Port Elizabeth and East London. I am
referring to the bombing of private houses of
pro-Government persons during September, October
and November 1962. I do not know what
justification there was for these acts, nor what
provocation had been given. But if what I have
said already is accepted, then it is clear that
these acts had nothing to do with the carrying
out of the policy of Umkhonto.
One of the chief allegations in the indictment
is that the ANC was a party to a general
conspiracy to commit sabotage. I have already
explained why this is incorrect but how,
externally, there was a departure from the
original principle laid down by the ANC. There
has, of course, been overlapping of functions
internally as well, because there is a
difference between a resolution adopted in the
atmosphere of a committee room and the concrete
difficulties that arise in the field of
practical activity. At a later stage the
position was further affected by bannings and
house arrests, and by persons leaving the
country to take up political work abroad. This
led to individuals having to do work in
different capacities. But though this may have
blurred the distinction between Umkhonto and the
ANC, it by no means abolished that distinction.
Great care was taken to keep the activities of
the two organizations in South Africa distinct.
The ANC remained a mass political body of
Africans only carrying on the type of political
work they had conducted prior to 1961. Umkhonto
remained a small organization recruiting its
members from different races and organizations
and trying to achieve its own particular object.
The fact that members of Umkhonto were recruited
from the ANC, and the fact that persons served
both organizations, like Solomon Mbanjwa, did
not, in our view, change the nature of the ANC
or give it a policy of violence. This
overlapping of officers, however, was more the
exception than the rule. This is why persons
such as 'Mr. X' and 'Mr. Z', who were on the
Regional Command of their respective areas, did
not participate in any of the ANC committees or
activities, and why people such as Mr. Bennett
Mashiyana and Mr. Reginald Ndubi did not hear of
sabotage at their ANC meetings.
Another of the allegations in the indictment is
that Rivonia was the headquarters of Umkhonto.
This is not true of the time when I was there. I
was told, of course, and knew that certain of
the activities of the Communist Party were
carried on there. But this is no reason (as I
shall presently explain) why I should not use
the place.
I came there in the following manner:
As already indicated, early in April 1961 I went
underground to organize the May general strike.
My work entailed travelling throughout the
country, living now in African townships, then
in country villages and again in cities. During
the second half of the year I started visiting
the Parktown home of Arthur Goldreich, where I
used to meet my family privately. Although I had
no direct political association with him, I had
known Arthur Goldreich socially since 1958.
In October, Arthur Goldreich informed me that he
was moving out of town and offered me a hiding
place there. A few days thereafter, he arranged
for Michael Harmel to take me to Rivonia. I
naturally found Rivonia an ideal place for the
man who lived the life of an outlaw. Up to that
time I had been compelled to live indoors during
the daytime and could only venture out under
cover of darkness. But at Liliesleaf [farm,
Rivonia,] I could live differently and work far
more efficiently. For obvious reasons, I had to
disguise myself and I assumed the fictitious
name of David. In December, Arthur Goldreich and
his family moved in. I stayed there until I went
abroad on 11 January 1962. As already indicated,
I returned in July 1962 and was arrested in
Natal on 5 August. Up to the time of my arrest,
Liliesleaf farm was the headquarters of neither
the African National Congress nor Umkhonto. With
the exception of myself, none of the officials
or members of these bodies lived there, no
meetings of the governing bodies were ever held
there, and no activities connected with them
were either organized or directed from there. On
numerous occasions during my stay at Liliesleaf
farm I met both the Executive Committee of the
ANC, as well as the NHC, but such meetings were
held elsewhere and not on the farm. Whilst
staying at Liliesleaf farm, I frequently visited
Arthur Goldreich in the main house and he also
paid me visits in my room. We had numerous
political discussions covering a variety of
subjects. We discussed ideological and practical
questions, the Congress Alliance, Umkhonto and
its activities generally, and his experiences as
a soldier in the Palmach, the military wing of
the Haganah. Haganah was the political authority
of the Jewish National Movement in Palestine.
Because of what I had got to know of Goldreich,
I recommended on my return to South Africa that
he should be recruited to Umkhonto. I do not
know of my personal knowledge whether this was
done.
Another of the allegations made by the State is
that the aims and objects of the ANC and the
Communist Party are the same. I wish to deal
with this and with my own political position,
because I must assume that the State may try to
argue from certain Exhibits that I tried to
introduce Marxism into the ANC. The allegation
as to the ANC is false. This is an old
allegation which was disproved at the Treason
Trial and which has again reared its head. But
since the allegation has been made again, I
shall deal with it as well as with the
relationship between the ANC and the Communist
Party and Umkhonto and that party.
The ideological creed of the ANC is, and always
has been, the creed of African Nationalism. It
is not the concept of African Nationalism
expressed in the cry, 'Drive the White man into
the sea'. The African Nationalism for which the
ANC stands is the concept of freedom and
fulfillment for the African people in their own
land. The most important political document ever
adopted by the ANC is the 'Freedom Charter'. It
is by no means a blueprint for a socialist
state. It calls for redistribution, but not
nationalization, of land; it provides for
nationalization of mines, banks, and monopoly
industry, because big monopolies are owned by
one race only, and without such nationalization
racial domination would be perpetuated despite
the spread of political power. It would be a
hollow gesture to repeal the Gold Law
prohibitions against Africans when all gold
mines are owned by European companies. In this
respect the ANC's policy corresponds with the
old policy of the present Nationalist Party
which, for many years, had as part of its
program the nationalization of the gold mines
which, at that time, were controlled by foreign
capital. Under the Freedom Charter,
nationalization would take place in an economy
based on private enterprise. The realization of
the Freedom Charter would open up fresh fields
for a prosperous African population of all
classes, including the middle class. The ANC has
never at any period of its history advocated a
revolutionary change in the economic structure
of the country, nor has it, to the best of my
recollection, ever condemned capitalist society.
As far as the Communist Party is concerned, and
if I understand its policy correctly, it stands
for the establishment of a State based on the
principles of Marxism. Although it is prepared
to work for the Freedom Charter, as a short term
solution to the problems created by white
supremacy, it regards the Freedom Charter as the
beginning, and not the end, of its program.
The ANC, unlike the Communist Party, admitted
Africans only as members. Its chief goal was,
and is, for the African people to win unity and
full political rights. The Communist Party's
main aim, on the other hand, was to remove the
capitalists and to replace them with a
working-class government. The Communist Party
sought to emphasize class distinctions whilst
the ANC seeks to harmonize them. This is a vital
distinction.
It is true that there has often been close
co-operation between the ANC and the Communist
Party. But co-operation is merely proof of a
common goal - in this case the removal of white
supremacy - and is not proof of a complete
community of interests.
The history of the world is full of similar
examples. Perhaps the most striking illustration
is to be found in the co-operation between Great
Britain, the United States of America, and the
Soviet Union in the fight against Hitler. Nobody
but Hitler would have dared to suggest that such
co-operation turned Churchill or Roosevelt into
communists or communist tools, or that Britain
and America were working to bring about a
communist world.
Another instance of such co-operation is to be
found precisely in Umkhonto. Shortly after
Umkhonto was constituted, I was informed by some
of its members that the Communist Party would
support Umkhonto, and this then occurred. At a
later stage the support was made openly.
I believe that communists have always played an
active role in the fight by colonial countries
for their freedom, because the short-term
objects of communism would always correspond
with the long-term objects of freedom movements.
Thus communists have played an important role in
the freedom struggles fought in countries such
as Malaya, Algeria, and Indonesia, yet none of
these States today are communist countries.
Similarly in the underground resistance
movements which sprung up in Europe during the
last World War, communists played an important
role. Even General Chiang Kai-Shek, today one of
the bitterest enemies of communism, fought
together with the communists against the ruling
class in the struggle which led to his
assumption of power in China in the 1930s.
This pattern of co-operation between communists
and non-communists has been repeated in the
National Liberation Movement of South Africa.
Prior to the banning of the Communist Party,
joint campaigns involving the Communist Party
and the Congress movements were accepted
practice. African communists could, and did,
become members of the ANC, and some served on
the National, Provincial, and local committees.
Amongst those who served on the National
Executive are Albert Nzula, a former Secretary
of the Communist Party, Moses Kotane, another
former Secretary, and J. B. Marks, a former
member of the Central Committee.
I joined the ANC in 1944, and in my younger days
I held the view that the policy of admitting
communists to the ANC, and the close
co-operation which existed at times on specific
issues between the ANC and the Communist Party,
would lead to a watering down of the concept of
African Nationalism. At that stage I was a
member of the African National Congress Youth
League, and was one of a group which moved for
the expulsion of communists from the ANC. This
proposal was heavily defeated. Amongst those who
voted against the proposal were some of the most
conservative sections of African political
opinion. They defended the policy on the ground
that from its inception the ANC was formed and
built up, not as a political party with one
school of political thought, but as a Parliament
of the African people, accommodating people of
various political convictions, all united by the
common goal of national liberation. I was
eventually won over to this point of view and I
have upheld it ever since.
It is perhaps difficult for white South
Africans, with an ingrained prejudice against
communism, to understand why experienced African
politicians so readily accept communists as
their friends. But to us the reason is obvious.
Theoretical differences amongst those fighting
against oppression is a luxury we cannot afford
at this stage. What is more, for many decades
communists were the only political group in
South Africa who were prepared to treat Africans
as human beings and their equals; who were
prepared to eat with us; talk with us, live with
us, and work with us. They were the only
political group which was prepared to work with
the Africans for the attainment of political
rights and a stake in society. Because of this,
there are many Africans who, today, tend to
equate freedom with communism. They are
supported in this belief by a legislature which
brands all exponents of democratic government
and African freedom as communists and bans many
of them (who are not communists) under the
Suppression of Communism Act. Although I have
never been a member of the Communist Party, I
myself have been named under that pernicious Act
because of the role I played in the Defiance
Campaign. I have also been banned and imprisoned
under that Act.
It is not only in internal politics that we
count communists as amongst those who support
our cause. In the international field, communist
countries have always come to our aid. In the
United Nations and other Councils of the world
the communist bloc has supported the Afro-Asian
struggle against colonialism and often seems to
be more sympathetic to our plight than some of
the Western powers. Although there is a
universal condemnation of apartheid, the
communist bloc speaks out against it with a
louder voice than most of the white world. In
these circumstances, it would take a brash young
politician, such as I was in 1949, to proclaim
that the Communists are our enemies.
I turn now to my own position. I have denied
that I am a communist, and I think that in the
circumstances I am obliged to state exactly what
my political beliefs are.
I have always regarded myself, in the first
place, as an African patriot. After all, I was
born in Umtata, forty-six years ago. My guardian
was my cousin, who was the acting paramount
chief of Tembuland, and I am related both to the
present paramount chief of Tembuland, Sabata
Dalindyebo, and to Kaizer Matanzima, the Chief
Minister of the Transkei.
Today I am attracted by the idea of a classless
society, an attraction which springs in part
from Marxist reading and, in part, from my
admiration of the structure and organization of
early African societies in this country. The
land, then the main means of production,
belonged to the tribe. There were no rich or
poor and there was no exploitation.
It is true, as I have already stated, that I
have been influenced by Marxist thought. But
this is also true of many of the leaders of the
new independent States. Such widely different
persons as Gandhi, Nehru, Nkrumah, and Nasser
all acknowledge this fact. We all accept the
need for some form of socialism to enable our
people to catch up with the advanced countries
of this world and to overcome their legacy of
extreme poverty. But this does not mean we are
Marxists.
Indeed, for my own part, I believe that it is
open to debate whether the Communist Party has
any specific role to play at this particular
stage of our political struggle. The basic task
at the present moment is the removal of race
discrimination and the attainment of democratic
rights on the basis of the Freedom Charter. In
so far as that Party furthers this task, I
welcome its assistance. I realize that it is one
of the means by which people of all races can be
drawn into our struggle.
From my reading of Marxist literature and from
conversations with Marxists, I have gained the
impression that communists regard the
parliamentary system of the West as undemocratic
and reactionary. But, on the contrary, I am an
admirer of such a system.
The Magna Carta, the Petition of Rights, and the
Bill of Rights are documents which are held in
veneration by democrats throughout the world. I
have great respect for British political
institutions, and for the country's system of
justice. I regard the British Parliament as the
most democratic institution in the world, and
the independence and impartiality of its
judiciary never fail to arouse my admiration.
The American Congress, that country's doctrine
of separation of powers, as well as the
independence of its judiciary, arouses in me
similar sentiments.
I have been influenced in my thinking by both
West and East. All this has led me to feel that
in my search for a political formula, I should
be absolutely impartial and objective. I should
tie myself to no particular system of society
other than of socialism. I must leave myself
free to borrow the best from the West and from
the East . . .
There are certain Exhibits which suggest that we
received financial support from abroad, and I
wish to deal with this question.
Our political struggle has always been financed
from internal sources - from funds raised by our
own people and by our own supporters. Whenever
we had a special campaign or an important
political case - for example, the Treason Trial
- we received financial assistance from
sympathetic individuals and organizations in the
Western countries. We had never felt it
necessary to go beyond these sources.
But when in 1961 the Umkhonto was formed, and a
new phase of struggle introduced, we realized
that these events would make a heavy call on our
slender resources, and that the scale of our
activities would be hampered by the lack of
funds. One of my instructions, as I went abroad
in January 1962, was to raise funds from the
African states.
I must add that, whilst abroad, I had
discussions with leaders of political movements
in Africa and discovered that almost every
single one of them, in areas which had still not
attained independence, had received all forms of
assistance from the socialist countries, as well
as from the West, including that of financial
support. I also discovered that some well-known
African states, all of them non-communists, and
even anti-communists, had received similar
assistance.
On my return to the Republic, I made a strong
recommendation to the ANC that we should not
confine ourselves to Africa and the Western
countries, but that we should also send a
mission to the socialist countries to raise the
funds which we so urgently needed.
I have been told that after I was convicted such
a mission was sent, but I am not prepared to
name any countries to which it went, nor am I at
liberty to disclose the names of the
organizations and countries which gave us
support or promised to do so.
As I understand the State case, and in
particular the evidence of 'Mr. X', the
suggestion is that Umkhonto was the inspiration
of the Communist Party which sought by playing
upon imaginary grievances to enroll the African
people into an army which ostensibly was to
fight for African freedom, but in reality was
fighting for a communist state. Nothing could be
further from the truth. In fact the suggestion
is preposterous. Umkhonto was formed by Africans
to further their struggle for freedom in their
own land. Communists and others supported the
movement, and we only wish that more sections of
the community would join us.
Our fight is against real, and not imaginary,
hardships or, to use the language of the State
Prosecutor, 'so-called hardships'. Basically, we
fight against two features which are the
hallmarks of African life in South Africa and
which are entrenched by legislation which we
seek to have repealed. These features are
poverty and lack of human dignity, and we do not
need communists or so-called 'agitators' to
teach us about these things.
South Africa is the richest country in Africa,
and could be one of the richest countries in the
world. But it is a land of extremes and
remarkable contrasts. The whites enjoy what may
well be the highest standard of living in the
world, whilst Africans live in poverty and
misery. Forty per cent of the Africans live in
hopelessly overcrowded and, in some cases,
drought-stricken Reserves, where soil erosion
and the overworking of the soil makes it
impossible for them to live properly off the
land. Thirty per cent are laborers, labor
tenants, and squatters on white farms and work
and live under conditions similar to those of
the serfs of the Middle Ages. The other 30 per
cent live in towns where they have developed
economic and social habits which bring them
closer in many respects to white standards. Yet
most Africans, even in this group, are
impoverished by low incomes and high cost of
living.
The highest-paid and the most prosperous section
of urban African life is in Johannesburg. Yet
their actual position is desperate. The latest
figures were given on 25 March 1964 by Mr. Carr,
Manager of the Johannesburg Non-European Affairs
Department. The poverty datum line for the
average African family in Johannesburg
(according to Mr. Carr's department) is R42.84
per month. He showed that the average monthly
wage is R32.24 and that 46 per cent of all
African families in Johannesburg do not earn
enough to keep them going.
Poverty goes hand in hand with malnutrition and
disease. The incidence of malnutrition and
deficiency diseases is very high amongst
Africans. Tuberculosis, pellagra, kwashiorkor,
gastro-enteritis, and scurvy bring death and
destruction of health. The incidence of infant
mortality is one of the highest in the world.
According to the Medical Officer of Health for
Pretoria, tuberculosis kills forty people a day
(almost all Africans), and in 1961 there were
58,491 new cases reported. These diseases not
only destroy the vital organs of the body, but
they result in retarded mental conditions and
lack of initiative, and reduce powers of
concentration. The secondary results of such
conditions affect the whole community and the
standard of work performed by African laborers.
The complaint of Africans, however, is not only
that they are poor and the whites are rich, but
that the laws which are made by the whites are
designed to preserve this situation. There are
two ways to break out of poverty. The first is
by formal education, and the second is by the
worker acquiring a greater skill at his work and
thus higher wages. As far as Africans are
concerned, both these avenues of advancement are
deliberately curtailed by legislation.
The present Government has always sought to
hamper Africans in their search for education.
One of their early acts, after coming into
power, was to stop subsidies for African school
feeding. Many African children who attended
schools depended on this supplement to their
diet. This was a cruel act.
There is compulsory education for all white
children at virtually no cost to their parents,
be they rich or poor. Similar facilities are not
provided for the African children, though there
are some who receive such assistance. African
children, however, generally have to pay more
for their schooling than whites. According to
figures quoted by the South African Institute of
Race Relations in its 1963 journal,
approximately 40 per cent of African children in
the age group between seven to fourteen do not
attend school. For those who do attend school,
the standards are vastly different from those
afforded to white children. In 1960-61 the per
capita Government spending on African students
at State-aided schools was estimated at R12.46.
In the same years, the per capita spending on
white children in the Cape Province (which are
the only figures available to me) was R144.57.
Although there are no figures available to me,
it can be stated, without doubt, that the white
children on whom R144.57 per head was being
spent all came from wealthier homes than African
children on whom R12.46 per head was being
spent.
The quality of education is also different.
According to the Bantu Educational Journal, only
5,660 African children in the whole of South
Africa passed their Junior Certificate in 1962,
and in that year only 362 passed matric. This is
presumably consistent with the policy of Bantu
education about which the present Prime Minister
said, during the debate on the Bantu Education
Bill in 1953:
"When I have control of Native education I will
reform it so that Natives will be taught from
childhood to realize that equality with
Europeans is not for them . . . People who
believe in equality are not desirable teachers
for Natives. When my Department controls Native
education it will know for what class of higher
education a Native is fitted, and whether he
will have a chance in life to use his
knowledge."
The other main obstacle to the economic
advancement of the African is the industrial
color-bar under which all the better jobs of
industry are reserved for Whites only. Moreover,
Africans who do obtain employment in the
unskilled and semi-skilled occupations which are
open to them are not allowed to form trade
unions which have recognition under the
Industrial Conciliation Act. This means that
strikes of African workers are illegal, and that
they are denied the right of collective
bargaining which is permitted to the better-paid
White workers. The discrimination in the policy
of successive South African Governments towards
African workers is demonstrated by the so-called
'civilized labor policy' under which sheltered,
unskilled Government jobs are found for those
white workers who cannot make the grade in
industry, at wages which far exceed the earnings
of the average African employee in industry.
The Government often answers its critics by
saying that Africans in South Africa are
economically better off than the inhabitants of
the other countries in Africa. I do not know
whether this statement is true and doubt whether
any comparison can be made without having regard
to the cost-of-living index in such countries.
But even if it is true, as far as the African
people are concerned it is irrelevant. Our
complaint is not that we are poor by comparison
with people in other countries, but that we are
poor by comparison with the white people in our
own country, and that we are prevented by
legislation from altering this imbalance.
The lack of human dignity experienced by
Africans is the direct result of the policy of
white supremacy. White supremacy implies black
inferiority. Legislation designed to preserve
white supremacy entrenches this notion. Menial
tasks in South Africa are invariably performed
by Africans. When anything has to be carried or
cleaned the white man will look around for an
African to do it for him, whether the African is
employed by him or not. Because of this sort of
attitude, whites tend to regard Africans as a
separate breed. They do not look upon them as
people with families of their own; they do not
realize that they have emotions - that they fall
in love like white people do; that they want to
be with their wives and children like white
people want to be with theirs; that they want to
earn enough money to support their families
properly, to feed and clothe them and send them
to school. And what 'house-boy' or 'garden-boy'
or laborer can ever hope to do this?
Pass laws, which to the Africans are among the
most hated bits of legislation in South Africa,
render any African liable to police surveillance
at any time. I doubt whether there is a single
African male in South Africa who has not at some
stage had a brush with the police over his pass.
Hundreds and thousands of Africans are thrown
into jail each year under pass laws. Even worse
than this is the fact that pass laws keep
husband and wife apart and lead to the breakdown
of family life.
Poverty and the breakdown of family life have
secondary effects. Children wander about the
streets of the townships because they have no
schools to go to, or no money to enable them to
go to school, or no parents at home to see that
they go to school, because both parents (if
there be two) have to work to keep the family
alive. This leads to a breakdown in moral
standards, to an alarming rise in illegitimacy,
and to growing violence which erupts not only
politically, but everywhere. Life in the
townships is dangerous. There is not a day that
goes by without somebody being stabbed or
assaulted. And violence is carried out of the
townships in the white living areas. People are
afraid to walk alone in the streets after dark.
Housebreakings and robberies are increasing,
despite the fact that the death sentence can now
be imposed for such offences. Death sentences
cannot cure the festering sore.
Africans want to be paid a living wage. Africans
want to perform work which they are capable of
doing, and not work which the Government
declares them to be capable o Africans want to
be allowed to live where they obtain work, and
not be endorsed out of an area because they were
not born there. Africans want to be allowed to
own land in places where they work, and not to
be obliged to live in rented houses which they
can never call their own. Africans want to be
part of the general population, and not confined
to living in their own ghettoes. African men
want to have their wives and children to live
with them where they work, and not be forced
into an unnatural existence in men's hostels.
African women want to be with their men folk and
not be left permanently widowed in the Reserves.
Africans want to be allowed out after eleven
o'clock at night and not to be confined to their
rooms like little children. Africans want to be
allowed
to travel in their own country and to seek work
where they want to and not where the Labor
Bureau tells them to. Africans want a just share
in the whole of South Africa; they want security
and a stake in society.
Above all, we want equal political rights,
because without them our disabilities will be
permanent. I know this sounds revolutionary to
the whites in this country, because the majority
of voters will be Africans. This makes the white
man fear democracy.
But this fear cannot be allowed to stand in the
way of the only solution which will guarantee
racial harmony and freedom for all. It is not
true that the enfranchisement of all will result
in racial domination. Political division, based
on color, is entirely artificial and, when it
disappears, so will the domination of one color
group by another. The ANC has spent half a
century fighting against racialism. When it
triumphs it will not change that policy.
This then is what the ANC is fighting. Their
struggle is a truly national one. It is a
struggle of the African people, inspired by
their own suffering and their own experience. It
is a struggle for the right to live.
During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to
this struggle of the African people. I have
fought against white domination, and I have
fought against black domination. I have
cherished the ideal of a democratic and free
society in which all persons live together in
harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an
ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve.
But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am
prepared to die.
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