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DELIVERING HIS DELAYED NOBEL LECTURE
- MIKHAIL GORBACHEV 1991
Gorbachev's Nobel Lecture
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Mikhail Gorbachev.
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Gorbachev's Nobel Lecture.
It follows the English
translation of the full text transcript of
Mikhail Gorbachev's Nobel Lecture, delivered at
Oslo, Norway - June 5, 1991.
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Mr. Chairman,
Ladies and
Gentlemen, |
This moment is no
less emotional for me than the one when I first
learned about the decision of the Nobel
Committee. For on similar occasions great men
addressed humankind, men famous for their
courage in working to bring together morality
and politics. Among them were my compatriots.
The award of the Nobel Peace Prize makes one
think once again about a seemingly simple and
clear question: What is peace?
Preparing for my address I found in an old
Russian encyclopedia a definition of "peace" as
a "commune" - the traditional cell of Russian
peasant life. I saw in that definition the
people's profound understanding of peace as
harmony, concord, mutual help, and cooperation.
This understanding is embodied in the canons of
world religions and in the works of philosophers
from antiquity to our time. The names of many of
them have been mentioned here before. Let me add
another one to them. Peace "propagates wealth
and justice, which constitute the prosperity of
nations;" a peace which is "just a respite from
wars ... is not worthy of the name;" peace
implies "general counsel". This was written
almost 200 years ago by Vasiliy Fyodorovich
Malinovskiy - the dean of the Tsarskoye Selo
Lyceum at which the great Pushkin was educated.
Since then, of course, history has added a great
deal to the specific content of the concept of
peace. In this nuclear age it also means a
condition for the survival of the human race.
But the essence, as understood both by the
popular wisdom and by intellectual leaders, is
the same.
Today, peace means the ascent from simple
coexistence to cooperation and common creativity
among countries and nations.
Peace is movement towards globality and
universality of civilization. Never before has
the idea that peace is indivisible been so true
as it is now.
Peace is not unity in similarity but unity in
diversity, in the comparison and conciliation of
differences.
And, ideally, peace means the absence of
violence. It is an ethical value. And here we
have to recall Rajiv Gandhi, who died so
tragically a few days ago.
I consider the decision of your Committee as a
recognition of the great international
importance of the changes now under way in the
Soviet Union, and as an expression of confidence
in our policy of new thinking, which is based on
the conviction that at the end of the twentieth
century force and arms will have to give way as
a major instrument in world politics.
I see the decision to award me the Nobel Peace
Prize also as an act of solidarity with the
monumental undertaking which has already placed
enormous demands on the Soviet people in terms
of efforts, costs, hardships, willpower, and
character. And solidarity is a universal value
which is becoming indispensable for progress and
for the survival of humankind.
But a modern state has to be worthy of
solidarity, in other words, it should pursue, in
both domestic and international affairs,
policies that bring together the interests of
its people and those of the world community.
This task, however obvious, is not a simple one.
Life is much richer and more complex than even
the most perfect plans to make it better. It
ultimately takes vengeance for attempts to
impose abstract schemes, even with the best of
intentions. Perestroika has made us understand
this about our past, and the actual experience
of recent years has taught us to reckon with the
most general laws of civilization.
This, however, came later. But back in
March-April 1985 we found ourselves facing a
crucial, and I confess, agonizing choice. When I
agreed to assume the office of the General
Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union Central Committee, in effect the highest
State office at that time, I realized that we
could no longer live as before and that I would
not want to remain in that office unless I got
support in undertaking major reforms. It was
clear to me that we had a long way to go. But of
course, I could not imagine how immense were our
problems and difficulties. I believe no one at
that time could foresee or predict them.
Those who were then governing the country knew
what was really happening to it and what we
later called zastoi, roughly translated
as "stagnation". They saw that our society was
marking time, that it was running the risk of
falling hopelessly behind the technologically
advanced part of the world. Total domination of
centrally-managed state property, the pervasive
authoritarian-bureaucratic system, ideology's
grip on politics, monopoly in social thought and
sciences, militarized industries that siphoned
off our best, including the best intellectual
resources, the unbearable burden of military
expenditures that suffocated civilian industries
and undermined the social achievements of the
period since the Revolution which were real and
of which we used to be proud - such was the
actual situation in the country.
As a result, one of the richest countries in the
world, endowed with immense overall potential,
was already sliding downwards. Our society was
declining, both economically and intellectually.
And yet, to a casual observer the country seemed
to present a picture of relative well-being,
stability and order. The misinformed society
under the spell of propaganda was hardly aware
of what was going on and what the immediate
future had in store for it. The slightest
manifestations of protest were suppressed. Most
people considered them heretical, slanderous and
counter-revolutionary.
Such was the situation in the spring of 1985,
and there was a great temptation to leave things
as they were, to make only cosmetic changes.
This, however, meant continuing to deceive
ourselves and the people.
This was the domestic aspect of the dilemma then
before us. As for the foreign policy aspect,
there was the East-West confrontation, a rigid
division into friends and foes, the two hostile
camps with a corresponding set of Cold War
attributes. Both the East and the West were
constrained by the logic of military
confrontation, wearing themselves down more and
more by the arms race.
The mere thought of dismantling the existing
structures did not come easily. However, the
realization that we faced inevitable disaster,
both domestically and internationally, gave us
the strength to make a historic choice, which I
have never since regretted.
Perestroika, which once again is returning our
people to commonsense, has enabled us to open up
to the world, and has restored a normal
relationship between the country's internal
development and its foreign policy. But all this
takes a lot of hard work. To a people which
believed that its government's policies had
always been true to the cause of peace, we
proposed what was in many ways a different
policy, which would genuinely serve the cause of
peace, while differing from the prevailing view
of what it meant and particularly from the
established stereotypes as to how one should
protect it. We proposed new thinking in foreign
policy.
Thus, we embarked on a path of major changes
which may turn out to be the most significant in
the twentieth century, for our country and for
its peoples. But we also did this for the entire
world.
I began my book about perestroika and the new
thinking with the following words: "We want to
be understood". After a while I felt that it was
already happening. But now I would like once
again to repeat those words here, from this
world rostrum. Because to understand us really -
to understand so as to believe us - proved to be
not at all easy, owing to the immensity of the
changes under way in our country. Their
magnitude and character are such as to require
in-depth analysis. Applying conventional wisdom
to perestroika is unproductive. It is also
futile and dangerous to set conditions, to say:
We'll understand and believe you, as soon as
you, the Soviet Union, come completely to
resemble "us", the West.
No one is in a position to describe in detail
what perestroika will finally produce. But it
would certainly be a self-delusion to expect
that perestroika will produce "a copy" of
anything.
Of course, learning from the experience of
others is something we have been doing and will
continue to do. But this does not mean that we
will come to be exactly like others. Our State
will preserve its own identity within the
international community. A country like ours,
with its uniquely close-knit ethnic composition,
cultural diversity and tragic past, the
greatness of its historic endeavors and the
exploits of its peoples - such a country will
find its own path to the civilization of the
twenty-first century and its own place in it.
Perestroika has to be conceived solely in this
context, otherwise it will fail and will be
rejected. After all, it is impossible to "shed"
the country's thousand-year history - a history,
which, we still have to subject to serious
analysis in order to find the truth that we
shall take into the future.
We want to be an integral part of modern
civilization, to live in harmony with mankind's
universal values, abide by the norms of
international law, follow the "rules of the
game" in our economic relations with the outside
world. We want to share with all other peoples
the burden of responsibility for the future of
our common house.
A period of transition to a new quality in all
spheres of society's life is accompanied by
painful phenomena. When we were initiating
perestroika we failed to properly assess and
foresee everything. Our society turned out to be
hard to move off the ground, not ready for major
changes which affect people's vital interests
and make them leave behind everything to which
they had become accustomed over many years. In
the beginning we imprudently generated great
expectations, without taking into account the
fact that it takes time for people to realize
that all have to live and work differently, to
stop expecting that new life would be given from
above.
Perestroika has now entered its most dramatic
phase. Following the transformation of the
philosophy of perestroika into real policy,
which began literally to explode the old way of
life, difficulties began to mount. Many took
fright and wanted to return to the past. It was
not only those who used to hold the levers of
power in the administration, the army and
various government agencies and who had to make
room, but also many people whose interests and
way of life was put to a severe test and who,
during the preceding decades, had forgotten how
to take the initiative and to be independent,
enterprising and self-reliant.
Hence the discontent, the outbursts of protest
and the exorbitant, though understandable,
demands which, if satisfied right away, would
lead to complete chaos. Hence, the rising
political passions and, instead of a
constructive opposition which is only normal in
a democratic system, one that is often
destructive and unreasonable, not to mention the
extremist forces which are especially cruel and
inhuman in areas of inter-ethnic conflict.
During the last six years we have discarded and
destroyed much that stood in the way of a
renewal and transformation of our society. But
when society was given freedom it could not
recognize itself, for it had lived too long, as
it were, "beyond the looking glass".
Contradictions and vices rose to the surface,
and even blood has been shed, although we have
been able to avoid a bloodbath. The logic of
reform has clashed with the logic of rejection,
and with the logic of impatience which breeds
intolerance.
In this situation, which is one of great
opportunity and of major risks, at a high point
of perestroika's crisis, our task is to stay the
course while also addressing current everyday
problems - which are literally tearing this
policy apart - and to do it in such a way as to
prevent a social and political explosion.
Now about my position. As to the fundamental
choice, I have long ago made a final and
irrevocable decision. Nothing and no one, no
pressure, cither from the right or from the
left, will make me abandon the positions of
perestroika and new thinking. I do not intend to
change my views or convictions. My choice is a
final one.
It is my profound conviction that the problems
arising in the course of our transformations can
be solved solely by constitutional means. That
is why I make every effort to keep this process
within the confines of democracy and reforms.
This applies also to the problem of
self-determination of nations, which is a
challenging one for us. We are looking for
mechanisms to solve that problem within the
framework of a constitutional process; we
recognize the peoples' legitimate choice, with
the understanding that if a people really
decides, through a fair referendum, to withdraw
from the Soviet Union, a certain agreed
transition period will then be needed.
Steering a peaceful course is not easy in a
country where generation after generation of
people were led to believe that those who have
power or force could throw those who dissent or
disagree out of politics or even in jail. For
centuries all the country's problems used to be
finally resolved by violent means. All this has
left an almost indelible mark on our entire
"political culture", if the term is at all
appropriate in this case.
Our democracy is being born in pain. A political
culture is emerging - one that presupposes
debate and pluralism, but also legal order and,
if democracy is to work, strong government
authority based on one law for all. This process
is gaining strength. Being resolute in the
pursuit of perestroika, a subject of much debate
these days, must be measured by the commitment
to democratic change. Being resolute does not
mean a return to repression, diktat or the
suppression of rights and freedoms. I will never
agree to having our society split once again
into Reds and Whites, into those who claim to
speak and act "on behalf of the people" and
those who are "enemies of the people". Being
resolute today means to act within the framework
of political and social pluralism and the rule
of law to provide conditions for continued
reform and prevent a breakdown of the state and
economic collapse, prevent the elements of chaos
from becoming catastrophic.
All this requires taking certain tactical steps,
to search for various ways of addressing both
short- and long-term tasks. Such efforts and
political and economic steps, agreements based
on reasonable compromise, are there for everyone
to see. I am convinced that the One-Plus-Nine
Statement will go down in history as one such
step, as a great opportunity. [On April 23,
1991, nine presidents of Soviet republics plus
Gorbachev, President of the Soviet Union, (1+9),
agreed that within six months a new union treaty
and constitution would be formulated to
restructure the Soviet Union.]
Not all parts of
our decisions are readily accepted or correctly
understood. For the most part, our decisions are
unpopular; they arouse waves of criticism. But
life has many more surprises in store for us,
just as we will sometimes surprise it. Jumping
to conclusions after every step taken by the
Soviet leadership, after every decree by the
President, trying to figure out whether he is
moving left or right, backward or forward, would
be an exercise in futility and would not lead to
understanding.
We will seek answers to the questions we face
only by moving forward, only by continuing and
even radicalizing reforms, by consistently
democratizing our society. But we will proceed
prudently, carefully weighing each step we take.
There is already a consensus in our society that
we have to move towards a mixed market economy.
There are still differences as to how to do it
and how fast we should move. Some are in favor
of rushing through a transitional period as fast
as possible, no matter what. Although this may
smack of adventurism we should not overlook the
fact that such views enjoy support. People are
tired and are easily swayed by populism. So it
would be just as dangerous to move too slowly,
to keep people waiting in suspense. For them,
life today is difficult, a life of considerable
hardship.
Work on a new Union Treaty has entered its final
stage. Its adoption will open a new chapter in
the history of our multinational state.
After a time of rampant separatism and euphoria,
when almost every village proclaimed
sovereignty, a centripetal force is beginning to
gather momentum, based on a more sensible view
of existing realities and the risks involved.
And this is what counts most now. There is a
growing will to achieve consensus, and a growing
understanding that we have a State, a country, a
common life. This is what must be preserved
first of all. Only then can we afford to start
figuring out which party or club to join and
what God to worship.
The stormy and contradictory process of
perestroika, particularly in the past two years,
has made us face squarely the problem of
criteria to measure the effectiveness of State
leadership. In the new environment of a
multiparty system, freedom of thought,
rediscovered ethnic identity and sovereignty of
the republics, the interests of society must
absolutely be put above those of various parties
or groups, or any other sectoral, parochial or
private interests, even though they also have
the right to exist and to be represented in the
political process and in public life, and, of
course, they must be taken into account in the
policies of the State.
Ladies and gentlemen, international politics is
another area where a great deal depends on the
correct interpretation of what is now happening
in the Soviet Union. This is true today, and it
will remain so in the future.
We are now approaching what might be the crucial
point when the world community and, above all,
the States with the greatest potential to
influence world developments will have to decide
on their stance with regard to the Soviet Union,
and to act on that basis.
The more I reflect on the current world
developments, the more I become convinced that
the world needs perestroika no less than the
Soviet Union needs it. Fortunately, the present
generation of policy-makers, for the most part,
are becoming increasingly aware of this
interrelationship, and also of the fact that now
that perestroika has entered its critical phase
the Soviet Union is entitled to expect
large-scale support to assure its success.
Recently, we have been seriously rethinking the
substance and the role of our economic
cooperation with other countries, above all
major Western nations. We realize, of course,
that we have to carry out measures that would
enable us really to open up to the world economy
and become its organic part. But at the same
time we come to the conclusion that there is a
need for a kind of synchronization of our
actions towards that end with those of the Group
of Seven and of the European Community. [The
Group of Seven industrialized states include the
United States, Great Britain, France, Germany,
Japan, Canada and Italy. The European Community
is the economic and political association of
European nations.]
In other words, we
are thinking of a fundamentally new phase in our
international cooperation.
In these months much is being decided and will
be decided in our country to create the
prerequisites for overcoming the systemic crisis
and gradually recovering to a normal life.
The multitude of specific tasks to be addressed
in this context may be summarized within three
main areas:
- Stabilizing
the democratic process on the basis of a
broad social consensus and a new
constitutional structure of our Union as a
genuine, free, and voluntary federation.
- Intensifying
economic reform to establish a mixed market
economy based on a new system of property
relations.
- Taking
vigorous steps to open the country up to the
world economy through ruble convertibility
and acceptance of civilized "rules of the
game" adopted in the world market, and
through membership in the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund.
These three areas are closely interrelated.
Therefore, there is a need for discussion in the
Group of Seven and in the European Community. We
need a joint program of action to be implemented
over a number of years.
If we fail to reach an understanding regarding a
new phase of cooperation, we will have to look
for other ways, for time is of the essence. But
if we are to move to that new phase, those who
participate in and even shape world politics
also must continue to change, to review their
philosophic perception of the changing realities
of the world and of its imperatives. Otherwise,
there is no point in drawing up a joint program
of practical action.
The Soviet leadership, both in the center and in
the republics, as well as a large part of the
Soviet public, understand this need, although in
some parts of our society not everyone is
receptive to such ideas. There are some
flag-wavers who claim a monopoly of patriotism
and think that it means "not getting entangled"
with the outside world. Next to them are those
who would like to reserve the course altogether.
That kind of patriotism is nothing but a
self-serving pursuit of one's own interests.
Clearly, as the Soviet Union proceeds with
perestroika, its contribution to building a new
world will become more constructive and
significant. What we have done on the basis of
new thinking has made it possible to channel
international cooperation along new, peaceful
lines. Over these years we have come a long way
in the general political cooperation with the
West. It stood a difficult test at a time of
momentous change in Eastern Europe and of the
search for a solution to the German problem. It
has withstood the crushing stress of the crisis
in the Persian Gulf. There is no doubt that this
cooperation, which all of us need, will become
more effective and indispensable if our
economies become more integrated and start
working more or less in synchronized rhythm.
To me, it is self-evident that if Soviet
perestroika succeeds, there will be a real
chance of building a new world order. And if
perestroika fails, the prospect of entering a
new peaceful period in history will vanish, at
least for the foreseeable future.
I believe that the movement that we have
launched towards that goal has fairly good
prospects of success. After all, mankind has
already benefited greatly in recent years, and
this has created a certain positive momentum.
The Cold War is over. The risk of a global
nuclear war has practically disappeared. The
Iron Curtain is gone. Germany has united, which
is a momentous milestone in the history of
Europe. There is not a single country on our
continent which would not regard itself as fully
sovereign and independent.
The USSR and the USA, the two nuclear
superpowers, have moved from confrontation to
interaction and, in some important cases,
partnership. This has had a decisive effect on
the entire international climate. This should be
preserved and filled with new substance. The
climate of Soviet-US trust should be protected,
for it is a common asset of the world community.
Any revision of the direction and potential of
the Soviet-US relationship would have grave
consequences for the entire global process.
The ideas of the Helsinki Final Act have begun
to acquire real significance, they are being
transformed into real policies and have found a
more specific and topical expression in the
Charter of Paris for a New Europe. [At the
meeting in Helsinki, Finland, in 1975, the final
acts were ratified of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In the
Helsinki accords, signed by 34 states, including
all European states except Albania, as well as
the United States and Canada, the signatories
settled European border problems and agreed to
respect the human rights of their citizens and
to take certain steps to promote international
cooperation. Subsequent meetings were held, the
last in Vienna, which ended in 1990. In November
1990 CSCE statesmen signed the Charter of Paris
for a New Europe, committing their countries to
democracy and human rights and recognizing no
East-West divisions.]
Institutional
forms of European security are beginning to take
shape. Real disarmament has begun. Its first
phase is nearing completion, and following the
signing, I hope shortly, of the START Treaty
[The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks between the
United States and the USSR led to the START
treaty, which was signed at a Bush-Gorbachev
summit meeting in Moscow, July 30-31, 1991.],
the time will come to give practical
consideration to the ideas which have already
been put forward for the future.
There seems,
however, to be a need to develop a general
concept for this new phase, which would embrace
all negotiations concerning the principal
components of the problem of disarmament and new
ideas reflecting the changes in Europe, the
Middle East, Africa and Asia, a concept that
would incorporate recent major initiatives of
President Bush and President Mitterand.
[Francois Maurice Mitterand was then President
of France, George Bush President of the United
States.] We are now thinking about it.
Armed forces and military budgets are being
reduced. Foreign troops are leaving the
territories of other countries. Their strength
is diminishing and their composition is becoming
more defense-oriented. First steps have been
taken in the conversion of military industries,
and what seemed inconceivable is happening:
recent Cold War adversaries are establishing
cooperation in this area. Their military
officials exchange visits, show each other
military facilities that only recently used to
be top secret and together consider ways to
achieve demilitarization.
The information environment has changed beyond
recognition throughout Europe and in most of the
world, and with it, the scale and intensity and
the psychological atmosphere of communication
among people of various countries.
De-ideologizing relations among States, which we
proclaimed as one of the principles of the new
thinking, has brought down many prejudices,
biased attitudes and suspicions and has cleared
and improved the international atmosphere. I
have to note, however, that this process has
been more intensive and frank on our part than
on the part of the West.
I dare say that the European process has already
acquired elements of irreversibility, or at
least that conflicts of a scale and nature that
were typical of Europe for many centuries and
particularly in the twentieth century have been
ruled out.
Should it gain the necessary momentum, every
nation and every country will have at their
disposal in the foreseeable future the potential
of a community of unprecedented strength,
encompassing the entire upper tier of the globe,
provided they make their own contribution.
In such a context, in the process of creating a
new Europe, in which erstwhile "curtains" and
"walls" will be forever relegated to the past
and borders between States will lose their
"divisive" purpose, self-determination of
sovereign nations will be realized in a
completely different way.
However, our vision of the European space from
the Atlantic to the Urals is not that of a
closed system. Since it includes the Soviet
Union, which reaches to the shores of the
Pacific, and the transatlantic USA and Canada
with inseparable links to the Old World, it goes
beyond its nominal geographical boundaries.
The idea is not at all to consolidate a part of
our civilization on, so to say, a European
platform versus the rest of the world.
Suspicions of that kind do exist. But, on the
contrary, the idea is to develop and build upon
the momentum of integration in Europe, embodied
politically in the Charter of Paris for the
whole of Europe. This should be done in the
context of common movement towards a new and
peaceful period in world history, towards new
interrelationship and integrity of mankind. As
my friend Giulio Andreotti [Giulio Andreotti was
then Prime Minister of Italy] so aptly remarked
recently in Moscow, "East-West rapprochement
alone is not enough for progress of the entire
world towards peace. However, agreement between
them is a great contribution to the common
cause". Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Near
and Middle East, all of them, are to play a
great role in this common cause whose prospects
are difficult to forecast today.
The new integrity of the world, in our view, can
be built only on the principles of the freedom
of choice and balance of interests. Every State,
and now also a number of existing or emerging
regional interstate groups, have their own
interests. They are all equal and deserve
respect.
We consider it dangerously outdated when
suspicions are aroused by, for instance,
improved Soviet-Chinese or Soviet-German,
German-French, Soviet- US or US-Indian
relations, etc. In our times, good relations
benefit all. Any worsening of relations anywhere
is a common loss.
Progress towards the civilization of the 21st
century will certainly not be simple or easy.
One cannot get rid overnight of the heavy legacy
of the past or the dangers created in the
post-war years. We are experiencing a turning
point in international affairs and are only at
the beginning of a new, and I hope mostly
peaceful, lengthy period in the history of
civilization.
With less East-West confrontation, or even none
at all, old contradictions resurface, which
seemed of secondary importance compared to the
threat of nuclear war. The melting ice of the
Cold War reveals old conflicts and claims, and
entirely new problems accumulate rapidly.
We can already see many obstacles and dangers on
the road to a lasting peace, including:
- Increased
nationalism, separatism, and
disintegrational processes in a number of
countries and regions.
- The growing
gap in the level and quality of
socio-economic development between "rich"
and "poor" countries; dire consequences of
the poverty of hundreds of millions of
people, to whom informational transparency
makes it possible to see how people live in
developed countries. Hence, the
unprecedented passions and brutality and
even fanaticism of mass protests. Poverty is
also the breeding ground for the spread of
terrorism and the emergence and persistence
of dictatorial regimes with their
unpredictable behavior in relations among
States.
- The
dangerously rapid accumulation of the
"costs" of previous forms of progress, such
as the threat of environmental catastrophe
and of the depletion of energy and primary
resources, uncontrollable overpopulation,
pandemics, drug abuse, and so on.
- The gap
between basically peaceful policies and
selfish economies bent on achieving a kind
of "technological hegemony". Unless those
two vectors are brought together,
civilization will tend to break down into
incompatible sectors.
- Further
improvements in modern weaponry, even if
under the pretext of strengthening security.
This may result not only in a new spiral of
the arms race and a perilous overabundance
of arms in many States, but also in a final
divorce between the process of disarmament
and development, and, what is more, in an
erosion of the foundations and criteria of
the emerging new world politics.
How can the world community cope with all this?
All these tasks are enormously complex. They
cannot be postponed. Tomorrow may be too late.
I am convinced that in order to solve these
problems there is no other way but to seek and
implement entirely new forms of interaction. We
are simply doomed to such interaction, or we
shall be unable to consolidate positive trends
which have emerged and are gaining strength, and
which we simply must not sacrifice.
However, to accomplish this all members of the
world community should resolutely discard old
stereotypes and motivations nurtured by the Cold
War, and give up the habit of seeking each
other's weak spots and exploiting them in their
own interests. We have to respect the
peculiarities and differences which will always
exist, even when human rights and freedoms are
observed throughout the world. I keep repeating
that with the end of confrontation differences
can be made a source of healthy competition, an
important factor for progress. This is an
incentive to study each other, to engage in
exchanges, a prerequisite for the growth of
mutual trust.
For knowledge and trust are the foundations of a
new world order. Hence the necessity, in my
view, to learn to forecast the course of events
in various regions of the globe, by pooling the
efforts of scientists, philosophers and
humanitarian thinkers within the UN framework.
Policies, even the most prudent and precise, are
made by man. We need maximum insurance to
guarantee that decisions taken by members of the
world community should not affect the security,
sovereignty and vital interests of its other
members or damage the natural environment and
the moral climate of the world.
I am an optimist and I believe that together we
shall be able now to make the right historical
choice so as not to miss the great chance at the
turn of centuries and millennia and make the
current extremely difficult transition to a
peaceful world order. A balance of interests
rather than a balance of power, a search for
compromise and concord rather than a search for
advantages at other people's expense, and
respect for equality rather than claims to
leadership - such are the elements which can
provide the groundwork for world progress and
which should be readily acceptable for
reasonable people informed by the experience of
the twentieth century.
The future prospect of truly peaceful global
politics lies in the creation through joint
efforts of a single international democratic
space in which States shall be guided by the
priority of human rights and welfare for their
own citizens and the promotion of the same
rights and similar welfare elsewhere. This is an
imperative of the growing integrity of the
modern world and of the interdependence of its
components.
I have been suspected of utopian thinking more
than once, and particularly when five years ago
I proposed the elimination of nuclear weapons by
the year 2000 and joint efforts to create a
system of international security. It may well be
that by that date it will not have happened. But
look, merely five years have passed and have we
not actually and noticeably moved in that
direction? Have we not been able to cross the
threshold of mistrust, though mistrust has not
completely disappeared? Has not the political
thinking in the world changed substantially?
Does not most of the world community already
regard weapons of mass destruction as
unacceptable for achieving political objectives?
Ladies and gentlemen, two weeks from today it
will be exactly fifty years since the beginning
of the Nazi invasion of my country. And in
another six months we shall mark fifty years
since Pearl Harbor, after which the war turned
into a global tragedy. [The European war became
World War II in 1941, when Germany invaded the
Soviet Union on June 22 and Japan attacked the
American naval base in Hawaii on December 7.]
Memories of it
still hurt. But they also urge us to value the
chance given to the present generations.
In conclusion, let me say again that I view the
award of the Nobel Prize to me as an expression
of understanding of my intentions, my
aspirations, the objectives of the profound
transformation we have begun in our country, and
the ideas of new thinking. I see it as your
acknowledgment of my commitment to peaceful
means of implementing the objectives of
perestroika.
I am grateful for this to the members of the
Committee and wish to assure them that if I
understand correctly their motives, they are not
mistaken.
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