Here is the audio clip of Nixon's speech. Scroll down for
the transcript.
It follows the full text transcript of
Richard Nixon's The Great Silent Majority
speech, broadcast from Washington D.C. - November 3, 1969.
Good evening, my
fellow Americans:
Tonight I want to
talk to you on a subject of deep concern to all
Americans and to many people in all parts of the
world - the war in Vietnam.
I believe that one
of the reasons for the deep division about
Vietnam is that many Americans have lost
confidence in what their Government has told
them about our policy. The American people
cannot and should not be asked to support a
policy which involves the overriding issues of
war and peace unless they know the truth about
that policy.
Tonight,
therefore, I would like to answer some of the
questions that I know are on the minds of many
of you listening to me. How and why did America
get involved in Vietnam in the first place? How
has this administration changed the policy of
the previous administration? What has really
happened in the negotiations in Paris and on the
battlefront in Vietnam? What choices do we have
if we are to end the war? What are the prospects
for peace?
Now, let me begin
by describing the situation I found when I was
inaugurated on January 20. The war had been
going on for 4 years. Thirty-one thousand
Americans had been killed in action. The
training program for the South Vietnamese was
behind schedule. Five hundred and forty thousand
Americans were in Vietnam with no plans to
reduce the number. No progress had been made at
the negotiations in Paris and the United States
had not put forth a comprehensive peace
proposal. The war was causing deep division at
home and criticism from many of our friends as
well as our enemies abroad.
In view of these
circumstances there were some who urged that I
end the war at once by ordering the immediate
withdrawal of all American forces. From a
political standpoint this would have been a
popular and easy course to follow. After all, we
became involved in the war while my predecessor
was in office. I could blame the defeat which
would be the result of my action on him and come
out as a peacemaker.
Some put it to me
quite bluntly: This was the only way to avoid
allowing Johnson’s war to become Nixon’s war.
But I had a greater obligation than to think
only of the years of my administration and of
the next election. I had to think of the effect
of my decision on the next generation and on the
future of peace and freedom in American and in
the world.
Let us all
understand that the question before us is not
whether some Americans are for peace and some
are against peace. The question at issue is not
whether Johnson’s war becomes Nixon’s war. The
great question is: How can we win America’s
peace?
Well, let us turn
now to the fundamental issue. Why and how did
the United States become involved in Vietnam in
the first place? Fifteen years ago North
Vietnam, with the logistical support of
Communist China and the Soviet Union, launched a
campaign to impose a Communist government on
South Vietnam by instigating and supporting a
revolution.
In response to the
request of the Government of South Vietnam,
President Eisenhower sent economic aid and
military equipment to assist the people of South
Vietnam in their efforts to prevent a Communist
takeover. Seven years ago, President Kennedy
sent 16,000 military personnel to Vietnam as
combat advisers. Four years ago, President
Johnson sent American combat forces to South
Vietnam.
Now, many believe
that President Johnson’s decision to send
American combat forces to South Vietnam was
wrong. And many others, I among them, have been
strongly critical of the way the war has been
conducted. But the question facing us today is:
Now that we are in the war, what is the best way
to end it?
In January I could
only conclude that the precipitate withdrawal of
American forces from Vietnam would be a disaster
not only for South Vietnam but for the United
States and the cause of peace. For the South
Vietnamese, our precipitate withdrawal would
inevitably allow the Communists to repeat the
massacres which followed their takeover in the
North 15 years before.
They then murdered
more than 50,000 people and hundreds of
thousands more died in slave labor camps. We saw
a prelude of what would happen in South Vietnam
when the Communists entered the city of Hue last
year. During their brief rule there, there was a
bloody reign of terror in which 3,000 civilians
were clubbed, shot to death, and buried in mass
graves.
With the sudden
collapse of our support, these atrocities of Hue
would become the nightmare of the entire nation,
and particularly for the million and a half
Catholic refugees who fled to South Vietnam when
the Communists took over in the North. For the
United States, this first defeat in our Nation’s
history would result in a collapse of confidence
in American leadership, not only in Asia but
throughout the world.
Three American
Presidents have recognized the great stakes
involved in Vietnam and understood what had to
be done. In 1963, President Kennedy, with his
characteristic eloquence and clarity, said, "We
want to see a stable government there, carrying
on a struggle to maintain its national
independence. We believe strongly in that. We
are not going to withdraw from that effort. In
my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort
would mean a collapse not only of South Vietnam,
but Southeast Asia. So we are going to stay
there."
President
Eisenhower and President Johnson expressed the
same conclusion during their terms in office.
For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal
would thus be a disaster of immense magnitude. A
nation cannot remain great if it betrays its
allied and lets down its friends. Our defeat and
humiliation in South Vietnam without question
would promote recklessness in the councils of
those great powers who have not yet abandoned
their goals of world conquest. This would spark
violence wherever our commitments help maintain
the peace - in the Middle East, in Berlin,
eventually even in the Western Hemisphere.
Ultimately, this would cost more lives. It would
not bring peace; it would bring more war.
For these reasons,
I rejected the recommendation that I should end
the war by immediately withdrawing all of our
forces. I chose instead to change American
policy on both the negotiating front and
battlefront.
In order to end a
war fought on many fronts, I initiated a pursuit
for peace on many fronts.
In a television
speech on May 14, in a speech before the United
Nations, and on a number of other occasion I set
forth our peace proposals in great detail. We
have offered the complete withdrawal of all
outside forces within 1 year. We have proposed a
cease fire within 1 year. We have offered free
elections under international supervision with
the Communists participating in the organization
and conduct of the elections as an organized
political force. And the Saigon Government has
pledged to accept the result of the elections.
We have not put forth our proposals on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis. We have indicated
that we are willing to discuss the proposals
that have been put forth by the other side. We
have declared that anything is negotiable except
the right of the people of South Vietnam to
determine their own future. At the Paris peace
conference, Ambassador Lodge has demonstrated
our flexibility and good faith in 40 public
meetings.
Hanoi has refused
even to discuss our proposals. They demand our
unconditional acceptance of their terms, which
are that we withdraw all American forces
immediately and unconditionally and that we
overthrow the Government of South Vietnam as we
leave.
We have not
limited our peace initiatives to public forums
and public statements. I recognized, in January,
that a long and bitter war like this usually
cannot be settled in a public forum. That is why
in addition to the public statements and
negotiations I have explored every possible
private avenue that might lead to a settlement.
Tonight I am
taking the unprecedented step of disclosing to
you some of our other initiatives for peace, initiatives
we undertook privately and secretly because we
thought we thereby might open a door which
publicly would be closed. I did not wait for my
inauguration to begin my quest for peace.
Soon after my
election, through an individual who is directly
in contact on a personal basis with the leaders
of North Vietnam, I made two private offers for
a rapid, comprehensive settlement. Hanoi’s
replies called in effect for our surrender
before negotiations.
Since the Soviet
Union furnishes most of the military equipment
for North Vietnam, Secretary of State Rogers, my
Assistant for National Security Affairs, Dr.
Kissinger, Ambassador Lodge, and I, personally
have met on a number of occasions with
representatives of the Soviet Government to
enlist their assistance in getting meaningful
negotiations started. In addition, we have had
extended discussions directed toward that same
end with representatives of other governments
which have diplomatic relations with North
Vietnam. None of these initiatives have to date
produced results.
In mid-July, I
became convinced that it was necessary to make a
major move to break the deadlock in the Paris
talks. I spoke directly in this office, where I
am now sitting, with an individual who had known
Ho Chi Minh on a personal basis for 25 years.
Through him I sent a letter to Ho Chi Minh. I
did this outside of the usual diplomatic
channels with the hope that with the necessity
of making statements for propaganda removed,
there might be constructive progress toward
bringing the war to an end. Let me read from
that letter to you now.
Dear Mr.
President:
I realize that
it is difficult to communicate meaningfully
across the gulf of four years of war. But
precisely because of this gulf, I wanted to
take this opportunity to reaffirm in all
solemnity my desire to work for a just
peace. I deeply believe that the war in
Vietnam has gone on too long and delay in
bringing it to an end can benefit no
one—least of all the people of Vietnam.
The time has
come to move forward at the conference table
toward an early resolution of this tragic
war. You will find us forthcoming and
open-minded in a common effort to bring the
blessings of peace to the brave people of
Vietnam. Let history record that at this
critical juncture, both sides turned their
face toward peace rather than toward
conflict and war.
I received Ho Chi Minh’s reply on August 30, 3
days before his death. It simply reiterated the
public position North Vietnam had taken at Paris
and flatly rejected my initiative. The full text
of both letters is being released to the press.
In addition to the
public meetings that I have referred to,
Ambassador Lodge has met with Vietnam’s chief
negotiator in Paris in 11 private sessions. We
have taken other significant initiatives which
must remain secret to keep open some channels of
communication which may still prove to be
productive. But the effect of all the public,
private, and secret negotiations which have been
undertaken since the bombing halt a year ago and
since this administration came into office
January 20, can be summed up in one sentence: No
progress whatever has been made except agreement
on the shape of the bargaining table. Well now,
who is at fault?
It has become
clear that the obstacle in negotiating an end to
the war is not the President of the United
States. It is not the South Vietnamese
Government.
The obstacle is the other side's absolute
refusal to show the least willingness to join us
in seeking a just peace. And it will not do so
while it is convinced that all it has to do is
to wait for our next concession, and our next
concession after that one, until it gets
everything it wants.
There can now be
no longer any questions that progress in
negotiation depends only on Hanoi’s deciding to
negotiate, to negotiate seriously.
I realize that
this report on our efforts on the diplomatic
front is discouraging to the American people,
but the American people are entitled to know the
truth—the bad news as well as the good
news—where the lives of our young men are
involved.
Now let me turn,
however, to a more encouraging report on another
front.
At the time we launched our search for peace I
recognized we might not succeed in bringing an
end to the war through negotiation. I,
therefore, put into effect another plan to bring
peace, a plan which will bring the war to an end
regardless of what happens on the negotiating
front.
It is in line with
a major shift in U.S. foreign policy which I
described in my press conference at Guam on July
25. Let me briefly explain what has been
described as the Nixon Doctrine, a policy which
not only will help end the war in Vietnam, but
which is an essential element of our program to
prevent future Vietnams.
We Americans are a
do-it-yourself people. We are an impatient
people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a
job, we like to do it ourselves. And this trait
has been carried over into our foreign policy.
In Korea and again
in Vietnam, the United States furnished most of
the money, most of the arms, and most of the men
to help the people of those countries defend
their freedom against Communist aggression.
Before any American troops were committed to
Vietnam, a leader of another Asian country
expressed this opinion to me when I was
traveling in Asia as a private citizen. He said:
"When you are trying to assist another nation
defend its freedom, U.S. policy should be to
help them fight the war but not to fight the war
for them."
Well, in
accordance with this wise counsel, I laid down
in Guam three principles as guidelines for
future American policy toward Asia. First, the
United States will keep all of its treaty
commitments. Second, we shall provide a shield
if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a
nation allied with us or of a nation whose
survival we consider vital to our security.
Third, in cases involving other types of
aggression, we shall furnish military and
economic assistance when requested in accordance
with our treaty commitments. But we shall look
to the nation directly threatened to assume the
primary responsibility of providing the manpower
for its defense.
After I announced
this policy, I found that the leaders of the
Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea, and
other nations which might be threatened by
Communist aggression, welcomed this new
direction in American foreign policy.
The defense of
freedom is everybody’s business, not just
America’s business. And it is particularly the
responsibility of the people whose freedom is
threatened. In the previous administration, we
Americanized the war in Vietnam. In this
administration, we are Vietnamizing the search
for peace.
The policy of the
previous administration not only resulted in our
assuming the primary responsibility for fighting
the war, but even more significantly did not
adequately stress the goal of strengthening the
South Vietnamese so that they could defend
themselves when we left.
The Vietnamization
plan was launched following Secretary Laird’s
visit to Vietnam in March. Under the plan, I
ordered first a substantial increase in training
and equipment of South Vietnamese forces.
In July, on my
visit to Vietnam, I changed General Abrams'
orders so that they were consistent with the
objectives of our new policies. Under the new
orders, the primary mission of our troops is to
enable the South Vietnamese forces to assume the
full responsibility for the security of South
Vietnam. Our air operations have been reduced by
over 20 percent. And now we have begun to see
the results of this long overdue change in
American policy in Vietnam.
After 5 years of
Americans going into Vietnam, we are finally
bringing American men home. By December 15, over
60,000 men will have been withdrawn from South
Vietnam, including 20 percent of all of our
combat forces. The South Vietnamese have
continued to gain strength. As a result they
have been able to take over combat
responsibilities for our American troops.
Two other
significant developments have occurred since
this administration took office. Enemy
infiltration, infiltration which is essential if
they are to launch a major attack, over the last
3 months is less than 20 percent of what it was
over the same period last year. Most important,
United States casualties have declined during
the last 2 months to the lowest point in 3
years.
Let me now turn to
our program for the future.
We have adopted a
plan which we have worked out in cooperation
with the South Vietnamese for the complete
withdrawal of all U.S. combat ground forces, and
their replacement by South Vietnamese forces on
an orderly scheduled timetable. This withdrawal
will be made from strength and not from
weakness. As South Vietnamese forces become
stronger, the rate of American withdrawal can
become greater.
I have not and do
not intend to announce the timetable for our
program. And there are obvious reasons for this
decision which I am sure you will understand. As
I have indicated on several occasions, the rate
of withdrawal will depend on developments on
three fronts.
One of these is
the progress which can be or might be made in
the Paris talks. An announcement of a fixed
timetable for our withdrawal would completely
remove any incentive for the enemy to negotiate
an agreement. They would simply wait until our
forces had withdrawn and then move in.
The other factors
on which we will base our withdrawal decisions
are the level of enemy activity and the progress
of the training programs of the South Vietnamese
forces. And I am glad to be able to report
tonight progress on both of these fronts has
been greater than we anticipated when we started
the program in June for withdrawal. As a result,
our timetable for withdrawal is more optimistic
now than when we made our first estimates in
June. Now, this clearly demonstrates why it is
not wise to be frozen in on a fixed timetable.
We must retain the flexibility to base each
withdrawal decision on the situation as it is at
that time rather than on estimates that are no
longer valid.
Along with this
optimistic estimate, I must in all candor leave
one note of caution.
If the level of enemy activity significantly
increases we might have to adjust our timetable
accordingly. However, I want the record to be
completely clear on one point.
At the time of the
bombing halt just a year ago, there was some
confusion as to whether there was an
understanding on the part of the enemy that if
we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam they
would stop the shelling of cities in South
Vietnam. I want to be sure that there is no
misunderstanding on the part of the enemy with
regard to our withdrawal program.
We have noted the
reduced level of infiltration, the reduction of
our casualties, and our basing our withdrawal
decisions partially on those factors. If the
level of infiltration or our casualties increase
while we are trying to scale down the fighting,
it will be the result of a conscious decision by
the enemy.
Hanoi could make
no greater mistake than to assume that an
increase in violence will be to its advantage.
If I conclude that increased enemy action
jeopardized our remaining forces in Vietnam, I
shall not hesitate to take strong and effective
measures to deal with that situation.
This is not a
threat. This is a statement of policy, which as
Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces, I am
making in meeting my responsibility for the
protection of American fighting men wherever
they may be.
My fellow
Americans, I am sure you can recognize from what
I have said that we really only have two choices
open to us if we want to end this war. I can
order an immediate, precipitate withdrawal of
all Americans from Vietnam without regard to the
effects of that action. Or we can persist in our
search for a just peace through a negotiated
settlement if possible, or through continued
implementation of our plan for Vietnamization if
necessary, a plan in which we will withdraw all
our forces from Vietnam on a schedule in
accordance with our program, as the South
Vietnamese become strong enough to defend their
own freedom.
I have chosen the
second course.
It is not the easy
way. It is the right way. It is a plan which
will end the war and serve the cause of peace,
not just in Vietnam but in the Pacific and in
the world.
In speaking of the
consequences of a precipitate withdrawal, I
mentioned that our allies would lose confidence
in America. Far more dangerous, we would lose
confidence in ourselves. Oh, the immediate
reaction would be a sense of relief that our men
were coming home. But as we saw the consequences
of what we had done, inevitable remorse and
divisive recrimination would scar our spirit as
a people.
We have faced
other crises in our history and have become
stronger be rejecting the easy way out and
taking the right way in meeting our challenges.
Our greatness as a nation has been our capacity
to do what had to be done when we knew our
course was right.
I recognize that
some of my fellow citizens disagree with the
plan for peace I have chosen. Honest and
patriotic Americans have reached different
conclusions as to how peace should be achieved.
In San Francisco a few weeks ago, I saw
demonstrators carrying signs reading, "Lose in
Vietnam, bring the boys home." Well, one of the
strengths of our free society is that any
American has a right to reach that conclusion
and to advocate that point of view. But as
President of the United States, I would be
untrue to my oath of office if I allowed the
policy of this Nation to be dictated by the
minority who hold the point of view and who try
to impose it on the Nation by mounting
demonstration in the street.
For almost 200
years, the policy of this Nation has been made
under our Constitution by those leaders in the
Congress and the White House elected by all of
the people. If a vocal minority, however fervent
its cause, prevails over reason and the will of
the majority, this Nation has no future as a
free society.
And now I would
like to address a word, if I may, to the young
people of this Nation who are particularly
concerned, and I understand why they are
concerned about this war.
I respect your
idealism. I share your concern for peace. I want
peace as much as you do. There are powerful
personal reasons I want to end this war. This
week I will have to sign 83 letters to mothers,
fathers, wives, and loved ones of men who have
given their lives for America in Vietnam. It is
very little satisfaction to me that this is only
one-third as many letters as I signed the first
week in office. There is nothing I want more
than to see the day come when I do not have to
write any of those letters.
I want to end the
war to save the lives of those brave young men
in Vietnam. But I want to end it in a way which
will increase the chance that their younger
brothers and their sons will not have to fight
in some future Vietnam someplace in the world.
And I want to end the war for another reason. I
want to end it so that the energy and dedication
of you, our young people, now too often directed
into bitter hatred against those responsible for
the war, can be turned to the great challenges
of peace, a better life for all Americans, a
better life for all people on this earth.
I have chosen a
plan for peace. I believe it will succeed. If it
does not succeed, what the critics say now won’t
matter. If it does not succeed, anything I say
then won’t matter. I know it may not be
fashionable to speak of patriotism or national
destiny these days. But I feel it is appropriate
to do so on this occasion.
Two hundred years
ago this Nation was weak and poor. But even
then, America was the hope of millions in the
world. Today we have become the strongest and
richest nation in the world. And the wheel of
destiny has turned so that any hope the world
has for the survival of peace and freedom will
be determined by whether the American people
have the moral stamina and the courage to meet
the challenge of free world leadership.
Let historians not
record that when America was the most powerful
nation in the world we passed on the other side
of the road and allowed the last hopes for peace
and freedom of millions of people to be
suffocated by the forces of totalitarianism.
And so tonight, to
you, the great silent majority of my fellow
Americans, I ask for your support. I pledged in
my campaign for the Presidency to end the war in
a way that we could win the peace. I have
initiated a plan of action which will enable me
to keep that pledge.
The more support I
can have from the American people, the sooner
that pledge can be redeemed; for the more
divided we are at home, the less likely the
enemy is to negotiate in Paris.
Let us be united
for peace. Let us also be united against defeat.
Because let us understand: North Vietnam cannot
defeat or humiliate the United States. Only
Americans can do that.
Fifty years ago,
in this room and at this very desk, President
Woodrow Wilson spoke words which caught the
imagination of a war-weary world. He said, "This
is the war to end war." His dream for peace
after World War I was shattered on the hard
realities of great power politics and Woodrow
Wilson died a broken man.
Tonight I do not
tell you that the war in Vietnam is the war to
end war. But I do say this: I have initiated a
plan which will end this war in a way that will
bring us closer to that great goal to which
Woodrow Wilson and every American President in
our history has been dedicated, the goal of a
just and lasting peace.
As President I
hold the responsibility for choosing the best
path to that goal and then leading the Nation
along it.
I pledge to you
tonight that I shall meet this responsibility
with all of the strength and wisdom I can
command in accordance with your hopes, mindful
of your concerns, sustained by your prayers.
Also called the
Persian Wars, the Greco-Persian Wars were
fought for almost half a century from 492 BC -
449 BC. Greece won against enormous odds. Here
is more:
