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The History of the Peloponnesian War
Book 1 - Chapter V
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Second Congress at Lacedaemon - Preparations for War and
Diplomatic Skirmishes - Cylon - Pausanias - Themistocles
After this, though not many years later, we at length come to what
has been already related, the affairs of Corcyra and Potidaea, and the
events that served as a pretext for the present war. All these actions
of the Hellenes against each other and the barbarian occurred in the
fifty years' interval between the retreat of Xerxes and the
beginning of the present war. During this interval the Athenians
succeeded in placing their empire on a firmer basis, and advanced
their own home power to a very great height. The Lacedaemonians,
though fully aware of it, opposed it only for a little while, but
remained inactive during most of the period, being of old slow to go
to war except under the pressure of necessity, and in the present
instance being hampered by wars at home; until the growth of the
Athenian power could be no longer ignored, and their own confederacy
became the object of its encroachments. They then felt that they could
endure it no longer, but that the time had come for them to throw
themselves heart and soul upon the hostile power, and break it, if
they could, by commencing the present war. And though the
Lacedaemonians had made up their own minds on the fact of the breach
of the treaty and the guilt of the Athenians, yet they sent to
Delphi and inquired of the God whether it would be well with them if
they went to war; and, as it is reported, received from him the answer
that if they put their whole strength into the war, victory would be
theirs, and the promise that he himself would be with them, whether
invoked or uninvoked. Still they wished to summon their allies
again, and to take their vote on the propriety of making war. After
the ambassadors from the confederates had arrived and a congress had
been convened, they all spoke their minds, most of them denouncing the
Athenians and demanding that the war should begin. In particular the
Corinthians.
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They had before on their own account canvassed the cities in detail
to induce them to vote for the war, in the fear that it might come
too late to save Potidaea; they were present also on this occasion,
and came forward the last, and made the following speech:
"Fellow allies, we can no longer accuse the Lacedaemonians of having
failed in their duty: they have not only voted for war themselves, but
have assembled us here for that purpose. We say their duty, for
supremacy has its duties. Besides equitably administering private
interests, leaders are required to show a special care for the
common welfare in return for the special honours accorded to them by
all in other ways. For ourselves, all who have already had dealings
with the Athenians require no warning to be on their guard against
them. The states more inland and out of the highway of communication
should understand that, if they omit to support the coast powers,
the result will be to injure the transit of their produce for
exportation and the reception in exchange of their imports from the
sea; and they must not be careless judges of what is now said, as if
it had nothing to do with them, but must expect that the sacrifice
of the powers on the coast will one day be followed by the extension
of the danger to the interior, and must recognize that their own
interests are deeply involved in this discussion. For these reasons
they should not hesitate to exchange peace for war. If wise men remain
quiet, while they are not injured, brave men abandon peace for war
when they are injured, returning to an understanding on a favourable
opportunity: in fact, they are neither intoxicated by their success in
war, nor disposed to take an injury for the sake of the delightful
tranquillity of peace. Indeed, to falter for the sake of such delights
is, if you remain inactive, the quickest way of losing the sweets of
repose to which you cling; while to conceive extravagant pretensions
from success in war is to forget how hollow is the confidence by which
you are elated. For if many ill-conceived plans have succeeded through
the still greater fatuity of an opponent, many more, apparently well
laid, have on the contrary ended in disgrace. The confidence with
which we form our schemes is never completely justified in their
execution; speculation is carried on in safety, but, when it comes
to action, fear causes failure.
"To apply these rules to ourselves, if we are now kindling war it is
under the pressure of injury, with adequate grounds of complaint;
and after we have chastised the Athenians we will in season desist. We
have many reasons to expect success--first, superiority in numbers
and in military experience, and secondly our general and unvarying
obedience in the execution of orders. The naval strength which they
possess shall be raised by us from our respective antecedent
resources, and from the moneys at Olympia and Delphi. A loan from
these enables us to seduce their foreign sailors by the offer of
higher pay. For the power of Athens is more mercenary than national;
while ours will not be exposed to the same risk, as its strength
lies more in men than in money. A single defeat at sea is in all
likelihood their ruin: should they hold out, in that case there will
be the more time for us to exercise ourselves in naval matters; and as
soon as we have arrived at an equality in science, we need scarcely
ask whether we shall be their superiors in courage. For the advantages
that we have by nature they cannot acquire by education; while their
superiority in science must be removed by our practice. The money
required for these objects shall be provided by our contributions:
nothing indeed could be more monstrous than the suggestion that, while
their allies never tire of contributing for their own servitude, we
should refuse to spend for vengeance and self-preservation the
treasure which by such refusal we shall forfeit to Athenian rapacity
and see employed for our own ruin.
"We have also other ways of carrying on the war, such as revolt of
their allies, the surest method of depriving them of their revenues,
which are the source of their strength, and establishment of fortified
positions in their country, and various operations which cannot be
foreseen at present. For war of all things proceeds least upon
definite rules, but draws principally upon itself for contrivances
to meet an emergency; and in such cases the party who faces the
struggle and keeps his temper best meets with most security, and he
who loses his temper about it with correspondent disaster. Let us also
reflect that if it was merely a number of disputes of territory
between rival neighbours, it might be borne; but here we have an enemy
in Athens that is a match for our whole coalition, and more than a
match for any of its members; so that unless as a body and as
individual nationalities and individual cities we make an unanimous
stand against her, she will easily conquer us divided and in detail.
That conquest, terrible as it may sound, would, it must be known, have
no other end than slavery pure and simple; a word which Peloponnese
cannot even hear whispered without disgrace, or without disgrace see
so many states abused by one. Meanwhile the opinion would be either
that we were justly so used, or that we put up with it from cowardice,
and were proving degenerate sons in not even securing for ourselves
the freedom which our fathers gave to Hellas; and in allowing the
establishment in Hellas of a tyrant state, though in individual states
we think it our duty to put down sole rulers. And we do not know how
this conduct can be held free from three of the gravest failings, want
of sense, of courage, or of vigilance. For we do not suppose that
you have taken refuge in that contempt of an enemy which has proved so
fatal in so many instances--a feeling which from the numbers that it
has ruined has come to be called not contemptuous but contemptible.
"There is, however, no advantage in reflections on the past
further than may be of service to the present. For the future we
must provide by maintaining what the present gives us and redoubling
our efforts; it is hereditary to us to win virtue as the fruit of
labour, and you must not change the habit, even though you should have
a slight advantage in wealth and resources; for it is not right that
what was won in want should be lost in plenty; no, we must boldly
advance to the war for many reasons; the god has commanded it and
promised to be with us, and the rest of Hellas will all join in the
struggle, part from fear, part from interest. You will be the first to
break a treaty which the god, in advising us to go to war, judges to
be violated already, but rather to support a treaty that has been
outraged: indeed, treaties are broken not by resistance but by
aggression.
"Your position, therefore, from whatever quarter you may view it,
will amply justify you in going to war; and this step we recommend
in the interests of all, bearing in mind that identity of interest
is the surest of bonds, whether between states or individuals. Delay
not, therefore, to assist Potidaea, a Dorian city besieged by Ionians,
which is quite a reversal of the order of things; nor to assert the
freedom of the rest. It is impossible for us to wait any longer when
waiting can only mean immediate disaster for some of us, and, if it
comes to be known that we have conferred but do not venture to protect
ourselves, like disaster in the near future for the rest. Delay not,
fellow allies, but, convinced of the necessity of the crisis and the
wisdom of this counsel, vote for the war, undeterred by its
immediate terrors, but looking beyond to the lasting peace by which it
will be succeeded. Out of war peace gains fresh stability, but to
refuse to abandon repose for war is not so sure a method of avoiding
danger. We must believe that the tyrant city that has been established
in Hellas has been established against all alike, with a programme
of universal empire, part fulfilled, part in contemplation; let us
then attack and reduce it, and win future security for ourselves and
freedom for the Hellenes who are now enslaved."
Such were the words of the Corinthians. The Lacedaemonians, having
now heard all, give their opinion, took the vote of all the allied
states present in order, great and small alike; and the majority voted
for war. This decided, it was still impossible for them to commence at
once, from their want of preparation; but it was resolved that the
means requisite were to be procured by the different states, and
that there was to be no delay. And indeed, in spite of the time
occupied with the necessary arrangements, less than a year elapsed
before Attica was invaded, and the war openly begun.
This interval was spent in sending embassies to Athens charged
with complaints, in order to obtain as good a pretext for war as
possible, in the event of her paying no attention to them. The first
Lacedaemonian embassy was to order the Athenians to drive out the
curse of the goddess; the history of which is as follows. In former
generations there was an Athenian of the name of Cylon, a victor at
the Olympic games, of good birth and powerful position, who had
married a daughter of Theagenes, a Megarian, at that time tyrant of
Megara. Now this Cylon was inquiring at Delphi; when he was told by
the god to seize the Acropolis of Athens on the grand festival of
Zeus. Accordingly, procuring a force from Theagenes and persuading his
friends to join him, when the Olympic festival in Peloponnese came, he
seized the Acropolis, with the intention of making himself tyrant,
thinking that this was the grand festival of Zeus, and also an
occasion appropriate for a victor at the Olympic games. Whether the
grand festival that was meant was in Attica or elsewhere was a
question which he never thought of, and which the oracle did not offer
to solve. For the Athenians also have a festival which is called the
grand festival of Zeus Meilichios or Gracious, viz., the Diasia. It is
celebrated outside the city, and the whole people sacrifice not real
victims but a number of bloodless offerings peculiar to the country.
However, fancying he had chosen the right time, he made the attempt.
As soon as the Athenians perceived it, they flocked in, one and all,
from the country, and sat down, and laid siege to the citadel. But
as time went on, weary of the labour of blockade, most of them
departed; the responsibility of keeping guard being left to the nine
archons, with plenary powers to arrange everything according to
their good judgment. It must be known that at that time most political
functions were discharged by the nine archons. Meanwhile Cylon and his
besieged companions were distressed for want of food and water.
Accordingly Cylon and his brother made their escape; but the rest
being hard pressed, and some even dying of famine, seated themselves
as suppliants at the altar in the Acropolis. The Athenians who were
charged with the duty of keeping guard, when they saw them at the
point of death in the temple, raised them up on the understanding that
no harm should be done to them, led them out, and slew them. Some
who as they passed by took refuge at the altars of the awful goddesses
were dispatched on the spot. From this deed the men who killed them
were called accursed and guilty against the goddess, they and their
descendants. Accordingly these cursed ones were driven out by the
Athenians, driven out again by Cleomenes of Lacedaemon and an Athenian
faction; the living were driven out, and the bones of the dead were
taken up; thus they were cast out. For all that, they came back
afterwards, and their descendants are still in the city.
This, then was the curse that the Lacedaemonians ordered them to
drive out. They were actuated primarily, as they pretended, by a
care for the honour of the gods; but they also know that Pericles, son
of Xanthippus, was connected with the curse on his mother's side,
and they thought that his banishment would materially advance their
designs on Athens. Not that they really hoped to succeed in
procuring this; they rather thought to create a prejudice against
him in the eyes of his countrymen from the feeling that the war
would be partly caused by his misfortune. For being the most
powerful man of his time, and the leading Athenian statesman, he
opposed the Lacedaemonians in everything, and would have no
concessions, but ever urged the Athenians on to war.
The Athenians retorted by ordering the Lacedaemonians to drive out
the curse of Taenarus. The Lacedaemonians had once raised up some
Helot suppliants from the temple of Poseidon at Taenarus, led them
away and slain them; for which they believe the great earthquake at
Sparta to have been a retribution. The Athenians also ordered them
to drive out the curse of the goddess of the Brazen House; the history
of which is as follows. After Pausanias the Lacedaemonian had been
recalled by the Spartans from his command in the Hellespont (this is
his first recall), and had been tried by them and acquitted, not being
again sent out in a public capacity, he took a galley of Hermione on
his own responsibility, without the authority of the Lacedaemonians,
and arrived as a private person in the Hellespont. He came
ostensibly for the Hellenic war, really to carry on his intrigues with
the King, which he had begun before his recall, being ambitious of
reigning over Hellas. The circumstance which first enabled him to
lay the King under an obligation, and to make a beginning of the whole
design, was this. Some connections and kinsmen of the King had been
taken in Byzantium, on its capture from the Medes, when he was first
there, after the return from Cyprus. These captives he sent off to the
King without the knowledge of the rest of the allies, the account
being that they had escaped from him. He managed this with the help of
Gongylus, an Eretrian, whom he had placed in charge of Byzantium and
the prisoners. He also gave Gongylus a letter for the King, the
contents of which were as follows, as was afterwards discovered:
"Pausanias, the general of Sparta, anxious to do you a favour, sends
you these his prisoners of war. I propose also, with your approval, to
marry your daughter, and to make Sparta and the rest of Hellas subject
to you. I may say that I think I am able to do this, with your
co-operation. Accordingly if any of this please you, send a safe man
to the sea through whom we may in future conduct our correspondence."
This was all that was revealed in the writing, and Xerxes was
pleased with the letter. He sent off Artabazus, son of Pharnaces, to
the sea with orders to supersede Megabates, the previous governor in
the satrapy of Daskylion, and to send over as quickly as possible to
Pausanias at Byzantium a letter which he entrusted to him; to show him
the royal signet, and to execute any commission which he might receive
from Pausanias on the King's matters with all care and fidelity.
Artabazus on his arrival carried the King's orders into effect, and
sent over the letter, which contained the following answer: "Thus
saith King Xerxes to Pausanias. For the men whom you have saved for me
across sea from Byzantium, an obligation is laid up for you in our
house, recorded for ever; and with your proposals I am well pleased.
Let neither night nor day stop you from diligently performing any of
your promises to me; neither for cost of gold nor of silver let them
be hindered, nor yet for number of troops, wherever it may be that
their presence is needed; but with Artabazus, an honourable man whom I
send you, boldly advance my objects and yours, as may be most for
the honour and interest of us both."
Before held in high honour by the Hellenes as the hero of Plataea,
Pausanias, after the receipt of this letter, became prouder than ever,
and could no longer live in the usual style, but went out of Byzantium
in a Median dress, was attended on his march through Thrace by a
bodyguard of Medes and Egyptians, kept a Persian table, and was
quite unable to contain his intentions, but betrayed by his conduct in
trifles what his ambition looked one day to enact on a grander
scale. He also made himself difficult of access, and displayed so
violent a temper to every one without exception that no one could come
near him. Indeed, this was the principal reason why the confederacy
went over to the Athenians.
The above-mentioned conduct, coming to the ears of the
Lacedaemonians, occasioned his first recall. And after his second
voyage out in the ship of Hermione, without their orders, he gave
proofs of similar behaviour. Besieged and expelled from Byzantium by
the Athenians, he did not return to Sparta; but news came that he
had settled at Colonae in the Troad, and was intriguing with the
barbarians, and that his stay there was for no good purpose; and the
ephors, now no longer hesitating, sent him a herald and a scytale with
orders to accompany the herald or be declared a public enemy.
Anxious above everything to avoid suspicion, and confident that he
could quash the charge by means of money, he returned a second time to
Sparta. At first thrown into prison by the ephors (whose powers enable
them to do this to the King), soon compromised the matter and came out
again, and offered himself for trial to any who wished to institute an
inquiry concerning him.
Now the Spartans had no tangible proof against him--neither his
enemies nor the nation--of that indubitable kind required for the
punishment of a member of the royal family, and at that moment in high
office; he being regent for his first cousin King Pleistarchus,
Leonidas's son, who was still a minor. But by his contempt of the laws
and imitation of the barbarians, he gave grounds for much suspicion of
his being discontented with things established; all the occasions on
which he had in any way departed from the regular customs were
passed in review, and it was remembered that he had taken upon himself
to have inscribed on the tripod at Delphi, which was dedicated by
the Hellenes as the first-fruits of the spoil of the Medes, the
following couplet:
The Mede defeated, great Pausanias raised
This monument, that Phoebus might be praised.
At the time the Lacedaemonians had at once erased the couplet, and
inscribed the names of the cities that had aided in the overthrow of
the barbarian and dedicated the offering. Yet it was considered that
Pausanias had here been guilty of a grave offence, which,
interpreted by the light of the attitude which he had since assumed,
gained a new significance, and seemed to be quite in keeping with
his present schemes. Besides, they were informed that he was even
intriguing with the Helots; and such indeed was the fact, for he
promised them freedom and citizenship if they would join him in
insurrection and would help him to carry out his plans to the end.
Even now, mistrusting the evidence even of the Helots themselves,
the ephors would not consent to take any decided step against him;
in accordance with their regular custom towards themselves, namely, to
be slow in taking any irrevocable resolve in the matter of a Spartan
citizen without indisputable proof. At last, it is said, the person
who was going to carry to Artabazus the last letter for the King, a
man of Argilus, once the favourite and most trusty servant of
Pausanias, turned informer. Alarmed by the reflection that none of the
previous messengers had ever returned, having counterfeited the
seal, in order that, if he found himself mistaken in his surmises,
or if Pausanias should ask to make some correction, he might not be
discovered, he undid the letter, and found the postscript that he
had suspected, viz. an order to put him to death.
On being shown the letter, the ephors now felt more certain.
Still, they wished to hear Pausanias commit himself with their own
ears. Accordingly the man went by appointment to Taenarus as a
suppliant, and there built himself a hut divided into two by a
partition; within which he concealed some of the ephors and let them
hear the whole matter plainly. For Pausanias came to him and asked him
the reason of his suppliant position; and the man reproached him
with the order that he had written concerning him, and one by one
declared all the rest of the circumstances, how he who had never yet
brought him into any danger, while employed as agent between him and
the King, was yet just like the mass of his servants to be rewarded
with death. Admitting all this, and telling him not to be angry
about the matter, Pausanias gave him the pledge of raising him up from
the temple, and begged him to set off as quickly as possible, and
not to hinder the business in hand.
The ephors listened carefully, and then departed, taking no action
for the moment, but, having at last attained to certainty, were
preparing to arrest him in the city. It is reported that, as he was
about to be arrested in the street, he saw from the face of one of the
ephors what he was coming for; another, too, made him a secret signal,
and betrayed it to him from kindness. Setting off with a run for the
temple of the goddess of the Brazen House, the enclosure of which
was near at hand, he succeeded in taking sanctuary before they took
him, and entering into a small chamber, which formed part of the
temple, to avoid being exposed to the weather, lay still there. The
ephors, for the moment distanced in the pursuit, afterwards took off
the roof of the chamber, and having made sure that he was inside, shut
him in, barricaded the doors, and staying before the place, reduced
him by starvation. When they found that he was on the point of
expiring, just as he was, in the chamber, they brought him out of
the temple, while the breath was still in him, and as soon as he was
brought out he died. They were going to throw him into the Kaiadas,
where they cast criminals, but finally decided to inter him
somewhere near. But the god at Delphi afterwards ordered the
Lacedaemonians to remove the tomb to the place of his death--where he
now lies in the consecrated ground, as an inscription on a monument
declares--and, as what had been done was a curse to them, to give
back two bodies instead of one to the goddess of the Brazen House.
So they had two brazen statues made, and dedicated them as a
substitute for Pausanias. the Athenians retorted by telling the
Lacedaemonians to drive out what the god himself had pronounced to
be a curse.
To return to the Medism of Pausanias. Matter was found in the course
of the inquiry to implicate Themistocles; and the Lacedaemonians
accordingly sent envoys to the Athenians and required them to punish
him as they had punished Pausanias. The Athenians consented to do
so. But he had, as it happened, been ostracized, and, with a residence
at Argos, was in the habit of visiting other parts of Peloponnese.
So they sent with the Lacedaemonians, who were ready to join in the
pursuit, persons with instructions to take him wherever they found
him. But Themistocles got scent of their intentions, and fled from
Peloponnese to Corcyra, which was under obligations towards him. But
the Corcyraeans alleged that they could not venture to shelter him
at the cost of offending Athens and Lacedaemon, and they conveyed
him over to the continent opposite. Pursued by the officers who hung
on the report of his movements, at a loss where to turn, he was
compelled to stop at the house of Admetus, the Molossian king,
though they were not on friendly terms. Admetus happened not to be
indoors, but his wife, to whom he made himself a suppliant, instructed
him to take their child in his arms and sit down by the hearth. Soon
afterwards Admetus came in, and Themistocles told him who he was,
and begged him not to revenge on Themistocles in exile any
opposition which his requests might have experienced from Themistocles
at Athens. Indeed, he was now far too low for his revenge; retaliation
was only honourable between equals. Besides, his opposition to the
king had only affected the success of a request, not the safety of his
person; if the king were to give him up to the pursuers that he
mentioned, and the fate which they intended for him, he would just
be consigning him to certain death.
The King listened to him and raised him up with his son, as he was
sitting with him in his arms after the most effectual method of
supplication, and on the arrival of the Lacedaemonians not long
afterwards, refused to give him up for anything they could say, but
sent him off by land to the other sea to Pydna in Alexander's
dominions, as he wished to go to the Persian king. There he met with a
merchantman on the point of starting for Ionia. Going on board, he was
carried by a storm to the Athenian squadron which was blockading
Naxos. In his alarm--he was luckily unknown to the people in the
vessel--he told the master who he was and what he was flying for, and
said that, if he refused to save him, he would declare that he was
taking him for a bribe. Meanwhile their safety consisted in letting no
one leave the ship until a favourable time for sailing should arise.
If he complied with his wishes, he promised him a proper recompense.
The master acted as he desired, and, after lying to for a day and a
night out of reach of the squadron, at length arrived at Ephesus.
After having rewarded him with a present of money, as soon as he
received some from his friends at Athens and from his secret hoards at
Argos, Themistocles started inland with one of the coast Persians, and
sent a letter to King Artaxerxes, Xerxes's son, who had just come to
the throne. Its contents were as follows: "I, Themistocles, am come to
you, who did your house more harm than any of the Hellenes, when I was
compelled to defend myself against your father's invasion--harm,
however, far surpassed by the good that I did him during his
retreat, which brought no danger for me but much for him. For the
past, you are a good turn in my debt"--here he mentioned the warning
sent to Xerxes from Salamis to retreat, as well as his finding the
bridges unbroken, which, as he falsely pretended, was due to him--
"for the present, able to do you great service, I am here, pursued
by the Hellenes for my friendship for you. However, I desire a
year's grace, when I shall be able to declare in person the objects of
my coming."
It is said that the King approved his intention, and told him to
do as he said. He employed the interval in making what progress he
could in the study of the Persian tongue, and of the customs of the
country. Arrived at court at the end of the year, he attained to
very high consideration there, such as no Hellene has ever possessed
before or since; partly from his splendid antecedents, partly from the
hopes which he held out of effecting for him the subjugation of
Hellas, but principally by the proof which experience daily gave of
his capacity. For Themistocles was a man who exhibited the most
indubitable signs of genius; indeed, in this particular he has a claim
on our admiration quite extraordinary and unparalleled. By his own
native capacity, alike unformed and unsupplemented by study, he was at
once the best judge in those sudden crises which admit of little or of
no deliberation, and the best prophet of the future, even to its
most distant possibilities. An able theoretical expositor of all
that came within the sphere of his practice, he was not without the
power of passing an adequate judgment in matters in which he had no
experience. He could also excellently divine the good and evil which
lay hid in the unseen future. In fine, whether we consider the
extent of his natural powers, or the slightness of his application,
this extraordinary man must be allowed to have surpassed all others in
the faculty of intuitively meeting an emergency. Disease was the
real cause of his death; though there is a story of his having ended
his life by poison, on finding himself unable to fulfil his promises
to the king. However this may be, there is a monument to him in the
marketplace of Asiatic Magnesia. He was governor of the district,
the King having given him Magnesia, which brought in fifty talents a
year, for bread, Lampsacus, which was considered to be the richest
wine country, for wine, and Myos for other provisions. His bones, it
is said, were conveyed home by his relatives in accordance with his
wishes, and interred in Attic ground. This was done without the
knowledge of the Athenians; as it is against the law to bury in Attica
an outlaw for treason. So ends the history of Pausanias and
Themistocles, the Lacedaemonian and the Athenian, the most famous
men of their time in Hellas.
To return to the Lacedaemonians. The history of their first embassy,
the injunctions which it conveyed, and the rejoinder which it
provoked, concerning the expulsion of the accursed persons, have
been related already. It was followed by a second, which ordered
Athens to raise the siege of Potidaea, and to respect the independence
of Aegina. Above all, it gave her most distinctly to understand that
war might be prevented by the revocation of the Megara decree,
excluding the Megarians from the use of Athenian harbours and of the
market of Athens. But Athens was not inclined either to revoke the
decree, or to entertain their other proposals; she accused the
Megarians of pushing their cultivation into the consecrated ground and
the unenclosed land on the border, and of harbouring her runaway
slaves. At last an embassy arrived with the Lacedaemonian ultimatum.
The ambassadors were Ramphias, Melesippus, and Agesander. Not a word
was said on any of the old subjects; there was simply this:
"Lacedaemon wishes the peace to continue, and there is no reason why
it should not, if you would leave the Hellenes independent." Upon this
the Athenians held an assembly, and laid the matter before their
consideration. It was resolved to deliberate once for all on all their
demands, and to give them an answer. There were many speakers who came
forward and gave their support to one side or the other, urging the
necessity of war, or the revocation of the decree and the folly of
allowing it to stand in the way of peace. Among them came forward
Pericles, son of Xanthippus, the first man of his time at Athens,
ablest alike in counsel and in action, and gave the following advice:
"There is one principle, Athenians, which I hold to through
everything, and that is the principle of no concession to the
Peloponnesians. I know that the spirit which inspires men while they
are being persuaded to make war is not always retained in action; that
as circumstances change, resolutions change. Yet I see that now as
before the same, almost literally the same, counsel is demanded of me;
and I put it to those of you who are allowing yourselves to be
persuaded, to support the national resolves even in the case of
reverses, or to forfeit all credit for their wisdom in the event of
success. For sometimes the course of things is as arbitrary as the
plans of man; indeed this is why we usually blame chance for
whatever does not happen as we expected. Now it was clear before
that Lacedaemon entertained designs against us; it is still more clear
now. The treaty provides that we shall mutually submit our differences
to legal settlement, and that we shall meanwhile each keep what we
have. Yet the Lacedaemonians never yet made us any such offer, never
yet would accept from us any such offer; on the contrary, they wish
complaints to be settled by war instead of by negotiation; and in
the end we find them here dropping the tone of expostulation and
adopting that of command. They order us to raise the siege of
Potidaea, to let Aegina be independent, to revoke the Megara decree;
and they conclude with an ultimatum warning us to leave the Hellenes
independent. I hope that you will none of you think that we shall be
going to war for a trifle if we refuse to revoke the Megara decree,
which appears in front of their complaints, and the revocation of
which is to save us from war, or let any feeling of self-reproach
linger in your minds, as if you went to war for slight cause. Why,
this trifle contains the whole seal and trial of your resolution. If
you give way, you will instantly have to meet some greater demand,
as having been frightened into obedience in the first instance;
while a firm refusal will make them clearly understand that they
must treat you more as equals. Make your decision therefore at once,
either to submit before you are harmed, or if we are to go to war,
as I for one think we ought, to do so without caring whether the
ostensible cause be great or small, resolved against making
concessions or consenting to a precarious tenure of our possessions.
For all claims from an equal, urged upon a neighbour as commands
before any attempt at legal settlement, be they great or be they
small, have only one meaning, and that is slavery.
"As to the war and the resources of either party, a detailed
comparison will not show you the inferiority of Athens. Personally
engaged in the cultivation of their land, without funds either private
or public, the Peloponnesians are also without experience in long wars
across sea, from the strict limit which poverty imposes on their
attacks upon each other. Powers of this description are quite
incapable of often manning a fleet or often sending out an army:
they cannot afford the absence from their homes, the expenditure
from their own funds; and besides, they have not command of the sea.
Capital, it must be remembered, maintains a war more than forced
contributions. Farmers are a class of men that are always more ready
to serve in person than in purse. Confident that the former will
survive the dangers, they are by no means so sure that the latter will
not be prematurely exhausted, especially if the war last longer than
they expect, which it very likely will. In a single battle the
Peloponnesians and their allies may be able to defy all Hellas, but
they are incapacitated from carrying on a war against a power
different in character from their own, by the want of the single
council-chamber requisite to prompt and vigorous action, and the
substitution of a diet composed of various races, in which every state
possesses an equal vote, and each presses its own ends, a condition of
things which generally results in no action at all. The great wish
of some is to avenge themselves on some particular enemy, the great
wish of others to save their own pocket. Slow in assembling, they
devote a very small fraction of the time to the consideration of any
public object, most of it to the prosecution of their own objects.
Meanwhile each fancies that no harm will come of his neglect, that
it is the business of somebody else to look after this or that for
him; and so, by the same notion being entertained by all separately,
the common cause imperceptibly decays.
"But the principal point is the hindrance that they will
experience from want of money. The slowness with which it comes in
will cause delay; but the opportunities of war wait for no man. Again,
we need not be alarmed either at the possibility of their raising
fortifications in Attica, or at their navy. It would be difficult
for any system of fortifications to establish a rival city, even in
time of peace, much more, surely, in an enemy's country, with Athens
just as much fortified against it as it against Athens; while a mere
post might be able to do some harm to the country by incursions and by
the facilities which it would afford for desertion, but can never
prevent our sailing into their country and raising fortifications
there, and making reprisals with our powerful fleet. For our naval
skill is of more use to us for service on land, than their military
skill for service at sea. Familiarity with the sea they will not
find an easy acquisition. If you who have been practising at it ever
since the Median invasion have not yet brought it to perfection, is
there any chance of anything considerable being effected by an
agricultural, unseafaring population, who will besides be prevented
from practising by the constant presence of strong squadrons of
observation from Athens? With a small squadron they might hazard an
engagement, encouraging their ignorance by numbers; but the
restraint of a strong force will prevent their moving, and through
want of practice they will grow more clumsy, and consequently more
timid. It must be kept in mind that seamanship, just like anything
else, is a matter of art, and will not admit of being taken up
occasionally as an occupation for times of leisure; on the contrary,
it is so exacting as to leave leisure for nothing else.
"Even if they were to touch the moneys at Olympia or Delphi, and try
to seduce our foreign sailors by the temptation of higher pay, that
would only be a serious danger if we could not still be a match for
them by embarking our own citizens and the aliens resident among us.
But in fact by this means we are always a match for them; and, best of
all, we have a larger and higher class of native coxswains and sailors
among our own citizens than all the rest of Hellas. And to say nothing
of the danger of such a step, none of our foreign sailors would
consent to become an outlaw from his country, and to take service with
them and their hopes, for the sake of a few days' high pay.
"This, I think, is a tolerably fair account of the position of the
Peloponnesians; that of Athens is free from the defects that I have
criticized in them, and has other advantages of its own, which they
can show nothing to equal. If they march against our country we will
sail against theirs, and it will then be found that the desolation
of the whole of Attica is not the same as that of even a fraction of
Peloponnese; for they will not be able to supply the deficiency except
by a battle, while we have plenty of land both on the islands and
the continent. The rule of the sea is indeed a great matter.
Consider for a moment. Suppose that we were islanders; can you
conceive a more impregnable position? Well, this in future should,
as far as possible, be our conception of our position. Dismissing
all thought of our land and houses, we must vigilantly guard the sea
and the city. No irritation that we may feel for the former must
provoke us to a battle with the numerical superiority of the
Peloponnesians. A victory would only be succeeded by another battle
against the same superiority: a reverse involves the loss of our
allies, the source of our strength, who will not remain quiet a day
after we become unable to march against them. We must cry not over the
loss of houses and land but of men's lives; since houses and land do
not gain men, but men them. And if I had thought that I could persuade
you, I would have bid you go out and lay them waste with your own
hands, and show the Peloponnesians that this at any rate will not make
you submit.
"I have many other reasons to hope for a favourable issue, if you
can consent not to combine schemes of fresh conquest with the
conduct of the war, and will abstain from wilfully involving
yourselves in other dangers; indeed, I am more afraid of our own
blunders than of the enemy's devices. But these matters shall be
explained in another speech, as events require; for the present
dismiss these men with the answer that we will allow Megara the use of
our market and harbours, when the Lacedaemonians suspend their alien
acts in favour of us and our allies, there being nothing in the treaty
to prevent either one or the other: that we will leave the cities
independent, if independent we found them when we made the treaty, and
when the Lacedaemonians grant to their cities an independence not
involving subservience to Lacedaemonian interests, but such as each
severally may desire: that we are willing to give the legal
satisfaction which our agreements specify, and that we shall not
commence hostilities, but shall resist those who do commence them.
This is an answer agreeable at once to the rights and the dignity of
Athens. It must be thoroughly understood that war is a necessity;
but that the more readily we accept it, the less will be the ardour of
our opponents, and that out of the greatest dangers communities and
individuals acquire the greatest glory. Did not our fathers resist the
Medes not only with resources far different from ours, but even when
those resources had been abandoned; and more by wisdom than by
fortune, more by daring than by strength, did not they beat off the
barbarian and advance their affairs to their present height? We must
not fall behind them, but must resist our enemies in any way and in
every way, and attempt to hand down our power to our posterity
unimpaired."
Such were the words of Pericles. The Athenians, persuaded of the
wisdom of his advice, voted as he desired, and answered the
Lacedaemonians as he recommended, both on the separate points and in
the general; they would do nothing on dictation, but were ready to
have the complaints settled in a fair and impartial manner by the
legal method, which the terms of the truce prescribed. So the envoys
departed home and did not return again.
These were the charges and differences existing between the rival
powers before the war, arising immediately from the affair at
Epidamnus and Corcyra. Still intercourse continued in spite of them,
and mutual communication. It was carried on without heralds, but not
without suspicion, as events were occurring which were equivalent to a
breach of the treaty and matter for war.
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