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The History of the Peloponnesian War
Book 8 - Chapter XXVI
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Twenty-first Year of the War - Recall of Alcibiades to Samos -
Revolt of Euboea and Downfall of the Four Hundred -
Battle of Cynossema
In the same summer, immediately after this, the Peloponnesians
having refused to fight with their fleet united, through not
thinking themselves a match for the enemy, and being at a loss where
to look for money for such a number of ships, especially as
Tissaphernes proved so bad a paymaster, sent off Clearchus, son of
Ramphias, with forty ships to Pharnabazus, agreeably to the original
instructions from Peloponnese; Pharnabazus inviting them and being
prepared to furnish pay, and Byzantium besides sending offers to
revolt to them. These Peloponnesian ships accordingly put out into the
open sea, in order to escape the observation of the Athenians, and
being overtaken by a storm, the majority with Clearchus got into
Delos, and afterwards returned to Miletus, whence Clearchus
proceeded by land to the Hellespont to take the command: ten, however,
of their number, under the Megarian Helixus, made good their passage
to the Hellespont, and effected the revolt of Byzantium. After this,
the commanders at Samos were informed of it, and sent a squadron
against them to guard the Hellespont; and an encounter took place
before Byzantium between eight vessels on either side.
Meanwhile the chiefs at Samos, and especially Thrasybulus, who
from the moment that he had changed the government had remained firmly
resolved to recall Alcibiades, at last in an assembly brought over the
mass of the soldiery, and upon their voting for his recall and
amnesty, sailed over to Tissaphernes and brought Alcibiades to
Samos, being convinced that their only chance of salvation lay in
his bringing over Tissaphernes from the Peloponnesians to themselves.
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An assembly was then held in which Alcibiades complained of and
deplored his private misfortune in having been banished, and
speaking at great length upon public affairs, highly incited their
hopes for the future, and extravagantly magnified his own influence
with Tissaphernes. His object in this was to make the oligarchical
government at Athens afraid of him, to hasten the dissolution of the
clubs, to increase his credit with the army at Samos and heighten
their own confidence, and lastly to prejudice the enemy as strongly as
possible against Tissaphernes, and blast the hopes which they
entertained. Alcibiades accordingly held out to the army such
extravagant promises as the following: that Tissaphernes had
solemnly assured him that if he could only trust the Athenians they
should never want for supplies while he had anything left, no, not
even if he should have to coin his own silver couch, and that he would
bring the Phoenician fleet now at Aspendus to the Athenians instead of
to the Peloponnesians; but that he could only trust the Athenians if
Alcibiades were recalled to be his security for them.
Upon hearing this and much more besides, the Athenians at once
elected him general together with the former ones, and put all their
affairs into his hands. There was now not a man in the army who
would have exchanged his present hopes of safety and vengeance upon
the Four Hundred for any consideration whatever; and after what they
had been told they were now inclined to disdain the enemy before them,
and to sail at once for Piraeus. To the plan of sailing for Piraeus,
leaving their more immediate enemies behind them, Alcibiades opposed
the most positive refusal, in spite of the numbers that insisted
upon it, saying that now that he had been elected general he would
first sail to Tissaphernes and concert with him measures for
carrying on the war. Accordingly, upon leaving this assembly, he
immediately took his departure in order to have it thought that
there was an entire confidence between them, and also wishing to
increase his consideration with Tissaphernes, and to show that he
had now been elected general and was in a position to do him good or
evil as he chose; thus managing to frighten the Athenians with
Tissaphernes and Tissaphernes with the Athenians.
Meanwhile the Peloponnesians at Miletus heard of the recall of
Alcibiades and, already distrustful of Tissaphernes, now became far
more disgusted with him than ever. Indeed after their refusal to go
out and give battle to the Athenians when they appeared before
Miletus, Tissaphernes had grown slacker than ever in his payments; and
even before this, on account of Alcibiades, his unpopularity had
been on the increase. Gathering together, just as before, the soldiers
and some persons of consideration besides the soldiery began to reckon
up how they had never yet received their pay in full; that what they
did receive was small in quantity, and even that paid irregularly, and
that unless they fought a decisive battle or removed to some station
where they could get supplies, the ships' crews would desert; and that
it was all the fault of Astyochus, who humoured Tissaphernes for his
own private advantage.
The army was engaged in these reflections, when the following
disturbance took place about the person of Astyochus. Most of the
Syracusan and Thurian sailors were freemen, and these the freest crews
in the armament were likewise the boldest in setting upon Astyochus
and demanding their pay. The latter answered somewhat stiffly and
threatened them, and when Dorieus spoke up for his own sailors even
went so far as to lift his baton against him; upon seeing which the
mass of men, in sailor fashion, rushed in a fury to strike
Astyochus. He, however, saw them in time and fled for refuge to an
altar; and they were thus parted without his being struck. Meanwhile
the fort built by Tissaphernes in Miletus was surprised and taken by
the Milesians, and the garrison in it turned out--an act which met
with the approval of the rest of the allies, and in particular of the
Syracusans, but which found no favour with Lichas, who said moreover
that the Milesians and the rest in the King's country ought to show
a reasonable submission to Tissaphernes and to pay him court, until
the war should be happily settled. The Milesians were angry with him
for this and for other things of the kind, and upon his afterwards
dying of sickness, would not allow him to be buried where the
Lacedaemonians with the army desired.
The discontent of the army with Astyochus and Tissaphernes had
reached this pitch, when Mindarus arrived from Lacedaemon to succeed
Astyochus as admiral, and assumed the command. Astyochus now set
sail for home; and Tissaphernes sent with him one of his confidants,
Gaulites, a Carian, who spoke the two languages, to complain of the
Milesians for the affair of the fort, and at the same time to defend
himself against the Milesians, who were, as he was aware, on their way
to Sparta chiefly to denounce his conduct, and had with them
Hermocrates, who was to accuse Tissaphernes of joining with Alcibiades
to ruin the Peloponnesian cause and of playing a double game. Indeed
Hermocrates had always been at enmity with him about the pay not being
restored in full; and eventually when he was banished from Syracuse,
and new commanders--Potamis, Myscon, and Demarchus--had come out to
Miletus to the ships of the Syracusans, Tissaphernes, pressed harder
than ever upon him in his exile, and among other charges against him
accused him of having once asked him for money, and then given himself
out as his enemy because he failed to obtain it.
While Astyochus and the Milesians and Hermocrates made sail for
Lacedaemon, Alcibiades had now crossed back from Tissaphernes to
Samos. After his return the envoys of the Four Hundred sent, as has
been mentioned above, to pacify and explain matters to the forces at
Samos, arrived from Delos; and an assembly was held in which they
attempted to speak. The soldiers at first would not hear them, and
cried out to put to death the subverters of the democracy, but at
last, after some difficulty, calmed down and gave them a hearing. Upon
this the envoys proceeded to inform them that the recent change had
been made to save the city, and not to ruin it or to deliver it over
to the enemy, for they had already had an opportunity of doing this
when he invaded the country during their government; that all the Five
Thousand would have their proper share in the government; and that
their hearers' relatives had neither outrage, as Chaereas had
slanderously reported, nor other ill treatment to complain of, but
were all in undisturbed enjoyment of their property just as they had
left them. Besides these they made a number of other statements
which had no better success with their angry auditors; and amid a host
of different opinions the one which found most favour was that of
sailing to Piraeus. Now it was that Alcibiades for the first time
did the state a service, and one of the most signal kind. For when the
Athenians at Samos were bent upon sailing against their countrymen, in
which case Ionia and the Hellespont would most certainly at once
have passed into possession of the enemy, Alcibiades it was who
prevented them. At that moment, when no other man would have been able
to hold back the multitude, he put a stop to the intended
expedition, and rebuked and turned aside the resentment felt, on
personal grounds, against the envoys; he dismissed them with an answer
from himself, to the effect that he did not object to the government
of the Five Thousand, but insisted that the Four Hundred should be
deposed and the Council of Five Hundred reinstated in power: meanwhile
any retrenchments for economy, by which pay might be better found
for the armament, met with his entire approval. Generally, he bade
them hold out and show a bold face to the enemy, since if the city
were saved there was good hope that the two parties might some day
be reconciled, whereas if either were once destroyed, that at Samos,
or that at Athens, there would no longer be any one to be reconciled
to. Meanwhile arrived envoys from the Argives, with offers of
support to the Athenian commons at Samos: these were thanked by
Alcibiades, and dismissed with a request to come when called upon. The
Argives were accompanied by the crew of the Paralus, whom we left
placed in a troopship by the Four Hundred with orders to cruise
round Euboea, and who being employed to carry to Lacedaemon some
Athenian envoys sent by the Four Hundred--Laespodias, Aristophon, and
Melesias--as they sailed by Argos laid hands upon the envoys, and
delivering them over to the Argives as the chief subverters of the
democracy, themselves, instead of returning to Athens, took the Argive
envoys on board, and came to Samos in the galley which had been
confided to them.
The same summer at the time that the return of Alcibiades coupled
with the general conduct of Tissaphernes had carried to its height the
discontent of the Peloponnesians, who no longer entertained any
doubt of his having joined the Athenians, Tissaphernes wishing, it
would seem, to clear himself to them of these charges, prepared to
go after the Phoenician fleet to Aspendus, and invited Lichas to go
with him; saying that he would appoint Tamos as his lieutenant to
provide pay for the armament during his own absence. Accounts
differ, and it is not easy to ascertain with what intention he went to
Aspendus, and did not bring the fleet after all. That one hundred
and forty-seven Phoenician ships came as far as Aspendus is certain;
but why they did not come on has been variously accounted for. Some
think that he went away in pursuance of his plan of wasting the
Peloponnesian resources, since at any rate Tamos, his lieutenant,
far from being any better, proved a worse paymaster than himself:
others that he brought the Phoenicians to Aspendus to exact money from
them for their discharge, having never intended to employ them: others
again that it was in view of the outcry against him at Lacedaemon,
in order that it might be said that he was not in fault, but that
the ships were really manned and that he had certainly gone to fetch
them. To myself it seems only too evident that he did not bring up the
fleet because he wished to wear out and paralyse the Hellenic
forces, that is, to waste their strength by the time lost during his
journey to Aspendus, and to keep them evenly balanced by not
throwing his weight into either scale. Had he wished to finish the
war, he could have done so, assuming of course that he made his
appearance in a way which left no room for doubt; as by bringing up
the fleet he would in all probability have given the victory to the
Lacedaemonians, whose navy, even as it was, faced the Athenian more as
an equal than as an inferior. But what convicts him most clearly, is
the excuse which he put forward for not bringing the ships. He said
that the number assembled was less than the King had ordered; but
surely it would only have enhanced his credit if he spent little of
the King's money and effected the same end at less cost. In any
case, whatever was his intention, Tissaphernes went to Aspendus and
saw the Phoenicians; and the Peloponnesians at his desire sent a
Lacedaemonian called Philip with two galleys to fetch the fleet.
Alcibiades finding that Tissaphernes had gone to Aspendus, himself
sailed thither with thirteen ships, promising to do a great and
certain service to the Athenians at Samos, as he would either bring
the Phoenician fleet to the Athenians, or at all events prevent its
joining the Peloponnesians. In all probability he had long known
that Tissaphernes never meant to bring the fleet at all, and wished to
compromise him as much as possible in the eyes of the Peloponnesians
through his apparent friendship for himself and the Athenians, and
thus in a manner to oblige him to join their side.
While Alcibiades weighed anchor and sailed eastward straight for
Phaselis and Caunus, the envoys sent by the Four Hundred to Samos
arrived at Athens. Upon their delivering the message from
Alcibiades, telling them to hold out and to show a firm front to the
enemy, and saying that he had great hopes of reconciling them with the
army and of overcoming the Peloponnesians, the majority of the members
of the oligarchy, who were already discontented and only too much
inclined to be quit of the business in any safe way that they could,
were at once greatly strengthened in their resolve. These now banded
together and strongly criticized the administration, their leaders
being some of the principal generals and men in office under the
oligarchy, such as Theramenes, son of Hagnon, Aristocrates, son of
Scellias, and others; who, although among the most prominent members
of the government (being afraid, as they said, of the army at Samos,
and most especially of Alcibiades, and also lest the envoys whom
they had sent to Lacedaemon might do the state some harm without the
authority of the people), without insisting on objections to the
excessive concentration of power in a few hands, yet urged that the
Five Thousand must be shown to exist not merely in name but in
reality, and the constitution placed upon a fairer basis. But this was
merely their political cry; most of them being driven by private
ambition into the line of conduct so surely fatal to oligarchies
that arise out of democracies. For all at once pretend to be not
only equals but each the chief and master of his fellows; while
under a democracy a disappointed candidate accepts his defeat more
easily, because he has not the humiliation of being beaten by his
equals. But what most clearly encouraged the malcontents was the power
of Alcibiades at Samos, and their own disbelief in the stability of
the oligarchy; and it was now a race between them as to which should
first become the leader of the commons.
Meanwhile the leaders and members of the Four Hundred most opposed
to a democratic form of government--Phrynichus who had had the
quarrel with Alcibiades during his command at Samos, Aristarchus the
bitter and inveterate enemy of the commons, and Pisander and
Antiphon and others of the chiefs who already as soon as they
entered upon power, and again when the army at Samos seceded from them
and declared for a democracy, had sent envoys from their own body to
Lacedaemon and made every effort for peace, and had built the wall
in Eetionia--now redoubled their exertions when their envoys returned
from Samos, and they saw not only the people but their own most
trusted associates turning against them. Alarmed at the state of
things at Athens as at Samos, they now sent off in haste Antiphon
and Phrynichus and ten others with injunctions to make peace with
Lacedaemon upon any terms, no matter what, that should be at all
tolerable. Meanwhile they pushed on more actively than ever with the
wall in Eetionia. Now the meaning of this wall, according to
Theramenes and his supporters, was not so much to keep out the army of
Samos, in case of its trying to force its way into Piraeus, as to be
able to let in, at pleasure, the fleet and army of the enemy. For
Eetionia is a mole of Piraeus, close alongside of the entrance of
the harbour, and was now fortified in connection with the wall already
existing on the land side, so that a few men placed in it might be
able to command the entrance; the old wall on the land side and the
new one now being built within on the side of the sea, both ending
in one of the two towers standing at the narrow mouth of the
harbour. They also walled off the largest porch in Piraeus which was
in immediate connection with this wall, and kept it in their own
hands, compelling all to unload there the corn that came into the
harbour, and what they had in stock, and to take it out from thence
when they sold it.
These measures had long provoked the murmurs of Theramenes, and when
the envoys returned from Lacedaemon without having effected any
general pacification, he affirmed that this wall was like to prove the
ruin of the state. At this moment forty-two ships from Peloponnese,
including some Siceliot and Italiot vessels from Locri and Tarentum,
had been invited over by the Euboeans and were already riding off
Las in Laconia preparing for the voyage to Euboea, under the command
of Agesandridas, son of Agesander, a Spartan. Theramenes now
affirmed that this squadron was destined not so much to aid Euboea
as the party fortifying Eetionia, and that unless precautions were
speedily taken the city would be surprised and lost. This was no
mere calumny, there being really some such plan entertained by the
accused. Their first wish was to have the oligarchy without giving
up the empire; failing this to keep their ships and walls and be
independent; while, if this also were denied them, sooner than be
the first victims of the restored democracy, they were resolved to
call in the enemy and make peace, give up their walls and ships, and
at all costs retain possession of the government, if their lives
were only assured to them.
For this reason they pushed forward the construction of their work
with posterns and entrances and means of introducing the enemy,
being eager to have it finished in time. Meanwhile the murmurs against
them were at first confined to a few persons and went on in secret,
until Phrynichus, after his return from the embassy to Lacedaemon, was
laid wait for and stabbed in full market by one of the Peripoli,
falling down dead before he had gone far from the council chamber. The
assassin escaped; but his accomplice, an Argive, was taken and put
to the torture by the Four Hundred, without their being able to
extract from him the name of his employer, or anything further than
that he knew of many men who used to assemble at the house of the
commander of the Peripoli and at other houses. Here the matter was
allowed to drop. This so emboldened Theramenes and Aristocrates and
the rest of their partisans in the Four Hundred and out of doors, that
they now resolved to act. For by this time the ships had sailed
round from Las, and anchoring at Epidaurus had overrun Aegina; and
Theramenes asserted that, being bound for Euboea, they would never
have sailed in to Aegina and come back to anchor at Epidaurus,
unless they had been invited to come to aid in the designs of which he
had always accused the government. Further inaction had therefore
now become impossible. In the end, after a great many seditious
harangues and suspicions, they set to work in real earnest. The
heavy infantry in Piraeus building the wall in Eetionia, among whom
was Aristocrates, a colonel, with his own tribe, laid hands upon
Alexicles, a general under the oligarchy and the devoted adherent of
the cabal, and took him into a house and confined him there. In this
they were assisted by one Hermon, commander of the Peripoli in
Munychia, and others, and above all had with them the great bulk of
the heavy infantry. As soon as the news reached the Four Hundred,
who happened to be sitting in the council chamber, all except the
disaffected wished at once to go to the posts where the arms were, and
menaced Theramenes and his party. Theramenes defended himself, and
said that he was ready immediately to go and help to rescue Alexicles;
and taking with him one of the generals belonging to his party, went
down to Piraeus, followed by Aristarchus and some young men of the
cavalry. All was now panic and confusion. Those in the city imagined
that Piraeus was already taken and the prisoner put to death, while
those in Piraeus expected every moment to be attacked by the party
in the city. The older men, however, stopped the persons running up
and down the town and making for the stands of arms; and Thucydides
the Pharsalian, proxenus of the city, came forward and threw himself
in the way of the rival factions, and appealed to them not to ruin the
state, while the enemy was still at hand waiting for his
opportunity, and so at length succeeded in quieting them and in
keeping their hands off each other. Meanwhile Theramenes came down
to Piraeus, being himself one of the generals, and raged and stormed
against the heavy infantry, while Aristarchus and the adversaries of
the people were angry in right earnest. Most of the heavy infantry,
however, went on with the business without faltering, and asked
Theramenes if he thought the wall had been constructed for any good
purpose, and whether it would not be better that it should be pulled
down. To this he answered that if they thought it best to pull it
down, he for his part agreed with them. Upon this the heavy infantry
and a number of the people in Piraeus immediately got up on the
fortification and began to demolish it. Now their cry to the multitude
was that all should join in the work who wished the Five Thousand to
govern instead of the Four Hundred. For instead of saying in so many
words "all who wished the commons to govern," they still disguised
themselves under the name of the Five Thousand; being afraid that
these might really exist, and that they might be speaking to one of
their number and get into trouble through ignorance. Indeed this was
why the Four Hundred neither wished the Five Thousand to exist, nor to
have it known that they did not exist; being of opinion that to give
themselves so many partners in empire would be downright democracy,
while the mystery in question would make the people afraid of one
another.
The next day the Four Hundred, although alarmed, nevertheless
assembled in the council chamber, while the heavy infantry in Piraeus,
after having released their prisoner Alexicles and pulled down the
fortification, went with their arms to the theatre of Dionysus,
close to Munychia, and there held an assembly in which they decided to
march into the city, and setting forth accordingly halted in the
Anaceum. Here they were joined by some delegates from the Four
Hundred, who reasoned with them one by one, and persuaded those whom
they saw to be the most moderate to remain quiet themselves, and to
keep in the rest; saying that they would make known the Five Thousand,
and have the Four Hundred chosen from them in rotation, as should be
decided by the Five Thousand, and meanwhile entreated them not to ruin
the state or drive it into the arms of the enemy. After a great many
had spoken and had been spoken to, the whole body of heavy infantry
became calmer than before, absorbed by their fears for the country
at large, and now agreed to hold upon an appointed day an assembly
in the theatre of Dionysus for the restoration of concord.
When the day came for the assembly in the theatre, and they were
upon the point of assembling, news arrived that the forty-two ships
under Agesandridas were sailing from Megara along the coast of
Salamis. The people to a man now thought that it was just what
Theramenes and his party had so often said, that the ships were
sailing to the fortification, and concluded that they had done well to
demolish it. But though it may possibly have been by appointment
that Agesandridas hovered about Epidaurus and the neighbourhood, he
would also naturally be kept there by the hope of an opportunity
arising out of the troubles in the town. In any case the Athenians, on
receipt of the news immediately ran down in mass to Piraeus, seeing
themselves threatened by the enemy with a worse war than their war
among themselves, not at a distance, but close to the harbour of
Athens. Some went on board the ships already afloat, while others
launched fresh vessels, or ran to defend the walls and the mouth of
the harbour.
Meanwhile the Peloponnesian vessels sailed by, and rounding Sunium
anchored between Thoricus and Prasiae, and afterwards arrived at
Oropus. The Athenians, with revolution in the city, and unwilling to
lose a moment in going to the relief of their most important
possession (for Euboea was everything to them now that they were
shut out from Attica), were compelled to put to sea in haste and
with untrained crews, and sent Thymochares with some vessels to
Eretria. These upon their arrival, with the ships already in Euboea,
made up a total of thirty-six vessels, and were immediately forced
to engage. For Agesandridas, after his crews had dined, put out from
Oropus, which is about seven miles from Eretria by sea; and the
Athenians, seeing him sailing up, immediately began to man their
vessels. The sailors, however, instead of being by their ships, as
they supposed, were gone away to purchase provisions for their
dinner in the houses in the outskirts of the town; the Eretrians
having so arranged that there should be nothing on sale in the
marketplace, in order that the Athenians might be a long time in
manning their ships, and, the enemy's attack taking them by
surprise, might be compelled to put to sea just as they were. A signal
also was raised in Eretria to give them notice in Oropus when to put
to sea. The Athenians, forced to put out so poorly prepared, engaged
off the harbour of Eretria, and after holding their own for some
little while notwithstanding, were at length put to flight and
chased to the shore. Such of their number as took refuge in Eretria,
which they presumed to be friendly to them, found their fate in that
city, being butchered by the inhabitants; while those who fled to
the Athenian fort in the Eretrian territory, and the vessels which got
to Chalcis, were saved. The Peloponnesians, after taking twenty-two
Athenian ships, and killing or making prisoners of the crews, set up a
trophy, and not long afterwards effected the revolt of the whole of
Euboea (except Oreus, which was held by the Athenians themselves), and
made a general settlement of the affairs of the island.
When the news of what had happened in Euboea reached Athens, a panic
ensued such as they had never before known. Neither the disaster in
Sicily, great as it seemed at the time, nor any other had ever so much
alarmed them. The camp at Samos was in revolt; they had no more
ships or men to man them; they were at discord among themselves and
might at any moment come to blows; and a disaster of this magnitude
coming on the top of all, by which they lost their fleet, and worst of
all Euboea, which was of more value to them than Attica, could not
occur without throwing them into the deepest despondency. Meanwhile
their greatest and most immediate trouble was the possibility that the
enemy, emboldened by his victory, might make straight for them and
sail against Piraeus, which they had no longer ships to defend; and
every moment they expected him to arrive. This, with a little more
courage, he might easily have done, in which case he would either have
increased the dissensions of the city by his presence, or, if he had
stayed to besiege it, have compelled the fleet from Ionia, although
the enemy of the oligarchy, to come to the rescue of their country and
of their relatives, and in the meantime would have become master of
the Hellespont, Ionia, the islands, and of everything as far as
Euboea, or, to speak roundly, of the whole Athenian empire. But
here, as on so many other occasions, the Lacedaemonians proved the
most convenient people in the world for the Athenians to be at war
with. The wide difference between the two characters, the slowness and
want of energy of the Lacedaemonians as contrasted with the dash and
enterprise of their opponents, proved of the greatest service,
especially to a maritime empire like Athens. Indeed this was shown
by the Syracusans, who were most like the Athenians in character,
and also most successful in combating them.
Nevertheless, upon receipt of the news, the Athenians manned
twenty ships and called immediately a first assembly in the Pnyx,
where they had been used to meet formerly, and deposed the Four
Hundred and voted to hand over the government to the Five Thousand, of
which body all who furnished a suit of armour were to be members,
decreeing also that no one should receive pay for the discharge of any
office, or if he did should be held accursed. Many other assemblies
were held afterwards, in which law-makers were elected and all other
measures taken to form a constitution. It was during the first
period of this constitution that the Athenians appear to have
enjoyed the best government that they ever did, at least in my time.
For the fusion of the high and the low was effected with judgment, and
this was what first enabled the state to raise up her head after her
manifold disasters. They also voted for the recall of Alcibiades and
of other exiles, and sent to him and to the camp at Samos, and urged
them to devote themselves vigorously to the war.
Upon this revolution taking place, the party of Pisander and
Alexicles and the chiefs of the oligarchs immediately withdrew to
Decelea, with the single exception of Aristarchus, one of the
generals, who hastily took some of the most barbarian of the archers
and marched to Oenoe. This was a fort of the Athenians upon the
Boeotian border, at that moment besieged by the Corinthians, irritated
by the loss of a party returning from Decelea, who had been cut off by
the garrison. The Corinthians had volunteered for this service, and
had called upon the Boeotians to assist them. After communicating with
them, Aristarchus deceived the garrison in Oenoe by telling them
that their countrymen in the city had compounded with the
Lacedaemonians, and that one of the terms of the capitulation was that
they must surrender the place to the Boeotians. The garrison
believed him as he was general, and besides knew nothing of what had
occurred owing to the siege, and so evacuated the fort under truce. In
this way the Boeotians gained possession of Oenoe, and the oligarchy
and the troubles at Athens ended.
To return to the Peloponnesians in Miletus. No pay was forthcoming
from any of the agents deputed by Tissaphernes for that purpose upon
his departure for Aspendus; neither the Phoenician fleet nor
Tissaphernes showed any signs of appearing, and Philip, who had been
sent with him, and another Spartan, Hippocrates, who was at
Phaselis, wrote word to Mindarus, the admiral, that the ships were not
coming at all, and that they were being grossly abused by
Tissaphernes. Meanwhile Pharnabazus was inviting them to come, and
making every effort to get the fleet and, like Tissaphernes, to
cause the revolt of the cities in his government still subject to
Athens, founding great hopes on his success; until at length, at about
the period of the summer which we have now reached, Mindarus yielded
to his importunities, and, with great order and at a moment's
notice, in order to elude the enemy at Samos, weighed anchor with
seventy-three ships from Miletus and set sail for the Hellespont.
Thither sixteen vessels had already preceded him in the same summer,
and had overrun part of the Chersonese. Being caught in a storm,
Mindarus was compelled to run in to Icarus and, after being detained
five or six days there by stress of weather, arrived at Chios.
Meanwhile Thrasyllus had heard of his having put out from Miletus,
and immediately set sail with fifty-five ships from Samos, in haste to
arrive before him in the Hellespont. But learning that he was at
Chios, and expecting that he would stay there, he posted scouts in
Lesbos and on the continent opposite to prevent the fleet moving
without his knowing it, and himself coasted along to Methymna, and
gave orders to prepare meal and other necessaries, in order to
attack them from Lesbos in the event of their remaining for any length
of time at Chios. Meanwhile he resolved to sail against Eresus, a town
in Lesbos which had revolted, and, if he could, to take it. For some
of the principal Methymnian exiles had carried over about fifty
heavy infantry, their sworn associates, from Cuma, and hiring others
from the continent, so as to make up three hundred in all, chose
Anaxander, a Theban, to command them, on account of the community of
blood existing between the Thebans and the Lesbians, and first
attacked Methymna. Balked in this attempt by the advance of the
Athenian guards from Mitylene, and repulsed a second time in a
battle outside the city, they then crossed the mountain and effected
the revolt of Eresus. Thrasyllus accordingly determined to go there
with all his ships and to attack the place. Meanwhile Thrasybulus
had preceded him thither with five ships from Samos, as soon as he
heard that the exiles had crossed over, and coming too late to save
Eresus, went on and anchored before the town. Here they were joined
also by two vessels on their way home from the Hellespont, and by
the ships of the Methymnians, making a grand total of sixty-seven
vessels; and the forces on board now made ready with engines and every
other means available to do their utmost to storm Eresus.
In the meantime Mindarus and the Peloponnesian fleet at Chios, after
taking provisions for two days and receiving three Chian pieces of
money for each man from the Chians, on the third day put out in
haste from the island; in order to avoid falling in with the ships
at Eresus, they did not make for the open sea, but keeping Lesbos on
their left, sailed for the continent. After touching at the port of
Carteria, in the Phocaeid, and dining, they went on along the
Cumaean coast and supped at Arginusae, on the continent over against
Mitylene. From thence they continued their voyage along the coast,
although it was late in the night, and arriving at Harmatus on the
continent opposite Methymna, dined there; and swiftly passing
Lectum, Larisa, Hamaxitus, and the neighbouring towns, arrived a
little before midnight at Rhoeteum. Here they were now in the
Hellespont. Some of the ships also put in at Sigeum and at other
places in the neighbourhood.
Meanwhile the warnings of the fire signals and the sudden increase
in the number of fires on the enemy's shore informed the eighteen
Athenian ships at Sestos of the approach of the Peloponnesian fleet.
That very night they set sail in haste just as they were, and, hugging
the shore of the Chersonese, coasted along to Elaeus, in order to sail
out into the open sea away from the fleet of the enemy.
After passing unobserved the sixteen ships at Abydos, which had
nevertheless been warned by their approaching friends to be on the
alert to prevent their sailing out, at dawn they sighted the fleet
of Mindarus, which immediately gave chase. All had not time to get
away; the greater number however escaped to Imbros and Lemnos, while
four of the hindmost were overtaken off Elaeus. One of these was
stranded opposite to the temple of Protesilaus and taken with its
crew, two others without their crews; the fourth was abandoned on
the shore of Imbros and burned by the enemy.
After this the Peloponnesians were joined by the squadron from
Abydos, which made up their fleet to a grand total of eighty-six
vessels; they spent the day in unsuccessfully besieging Elaeus, and
then sailed back to Abydos. Meanwhile the Athenians, deceived by their
scouts, and never dreaming of the enemy's fleet getting by undetected,
were tranquilly besieging Eresus. As soon as they heard the news
they instantly abandoned Eresus, and made with all speed for the
Hellespont, and after taking two of the Peloponnesian ships which
had been carried out too far into the open sea in the ardour of the
pursuit and now fell in their way, the next day dropped anchor at
Elaeus, and, bringing back the ships that had taken refuge at
Imbros, during five days prepared for the coming engagement.
After this they engaged in the following way. The Athenians formed in
column and sailed close alongshore to Sestos; upon perceiving which
the Peloponnesians put out from Abydos to meet them. Realizing that
a battle was now imminent, both combatants extended their flank; the
Athenians along the Chersonese from Idacus to Arrhiani with
seventy-six ships; the Peloponnesians from Abydos to Dardanus with
eighty-six. The Peloponnesian right wing was occupied by the
Syracusans, their left by Mindarus in person with the best sailers
in the navy; the Athenian left by Thrasyllus, their right by
Thrasybulus, the other commanders being in different parts of the
fleet. The Peloponnesians hastened to engage first, and outflanking
with their left the Athenian right sought to cut them off, if
possible, from sailing out of the straits, and to drive their centre
upon the shore, which was not far off. The Athenians perceiving
their intention extended their own wing and outsailed them, while
their left had by this time passed the point of Cynossema. This,
however, obliged them to thin and weaken their centre, especially as
they had fewer ships than the enemy, and as the coast round Point
Cynossema formed a sharp angle which prevented their seeing what was
going on on the other side of it.
The Peloponnesians now attacked their centre and drove ashore the
ships of the Athenians, and disembarked to follow up their victory. No
help could be given to the centre either by the squadron of
Thrasybulus on the right, on account of the number of ships
attacking him, or by that of Thrasyllus on the left, from whom the
point of Cynossema hid what was going on, and who was also hindered by
his Syracusan and other opponents, whose numbers were fully equal to
his own. At length, however, the Peloponnesians in the confidence of
victory began to scatter in pursuit of the ships of the enemy, and
allowed a considerable part of their fleet to get into disorder. On
seeing this the squadron of Thrasybulus discontinued their lateral
movement and, facing about, attacked and routed the ships opposed to
them, and next fell roughly upon the scattered vessels of the
victorious Peloponnesian division, and put most of them to flight
without a blow. The Syracusans also had by this time given way
before the squadron of Thrasyllus, and now openly took to flight
upon seeing the flight of their comrades.
The rout was now complete. Most of the Peloponnesians fled for
refuge first to the river Midius, and afterwards to Abydos. Only a few
ships were taken by the Athenians; as owing to the narrowness of the
Hellespont the enemy had not far to go to be in safety. Nevertheless
nothing could have been more opportune for them than this victory.
Up to this time they had feared the Peloponnesian fleet, owing to a
number of petty losses and to the disaster in Sicily; but they now
ceased to mistrust themselves or any longer to think their enemies
good for anything at sea. Meanwhile they took from the enemy eight
Chian vessels, five Corinthian, two Ambraciot, two Boeotian, one
Leucadian, Lacedaemonian, Syracusan, and Pellenian, losing fifteen
of their own. After setting up a trophy upon Point Cynossema, securing
the wrecks, and restoring to the enemy his dead under truce, they sent
off a galley to Athens with the news of their victory. The arrival
of this vessel with its unhoped-for good news, after the recent
disasters of Euboea, and in the revolution at Athens, gave fresh
courage to the Athenians, and caused them to believe that if they
put their shoulders to the wheel their cause might yet prevail.
On the fourth day after the sea-fight the Athenians in Sestos having
hastily refitted their ships sailed against Cyzicus, which had
revolted. Off Harpagium and Priapus they sighted at anchor the eight
vessels from Byzantium, and, sailing up and routing the troops on
shore, took the ships, and then went on and recovered the town of
Cyzicus, which was unfortified, and levied money from the citizens. In
the meantime the Peloponnesians sailed from Abydos to Elaeus, and
recovered such of their captured galleys as were still uninjured,
the rest having been burned by the Elaeusians, and sent Hippocrates
and Epicles to Euboea to fetch the squadron from that island.
About the same time Alcibiades returned with his thirteen ships from
Caunus and Phaselis to Samos, bringing word that he had prevented
the Phoenician fleet from joining the Peloponnesians, and had made
Tissaphernes more friendly to the Athenians than before. Alcibiades
now manned nine more ships, and levied large sums of money from the
Halicarnassians, and fortified Cos. After doing this and placing a
governor in Cos, he sailed back to Samos, autumn being now at hand.
Meanwhile Tissaphernes, upon hearing that the Peloponnesian fleet
had sailed from Miletus to the Hellespont, set off again back from
Aspendus, and made all sail for Ionia. While the Peloponnesians were
in the Hellespont, the Antandrians, a people of Aeolic extraction,
conveyed by land across Mount Ida some heavy infantry from Abydos, and
introduced them into the town; having been ill-treated by Arsaces, the
Persian lieutenant of Tissaphernes. This same Arsaces had, upon
pretence of a secret quarrel, invited the chief men of the Delians
to undertake military service (these were Delians who had settled at
Atramyttium after having been driven from their homes by the Athenians
for the sake of purifying Delos); and after drawing them out from
their town as his friends and allies, had laid wait for them at
dinner, and surrounded them and caused them to be shot down by his
soldiers. This deed made the Antandrians fear that he might some day
do them some mischief; and as he also laid upon them burdens too heavy
for them to bear, they expelled his garrison from their citadel.
Tissaphernes, upon hearing of this act of the Peloponnesians in
addition to what had occurred at Miletus and Cnidus, where his
garrisons had been also expelled, now saw that the breach between them
was serious; and fearing further injury from them, and being also
vexed to think that Pharnabazus should receive them, and in less
time and at less cost perhaps succeed better against Athens than he
had done, determined to rejoin them in the Hellespont, in order to
complain of the events at Antandros and excuse himself as best he
could in the matter of the Phoenician fleet and of the other charges
against him. Accordingly he went first to Ephesus and offered
sacrifice to Artemis. . . .
[When the winter after this summer is over the twenty-first year
of this war will be completed. ]
THE END
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