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The History of the Peloponnesian War
Book 8 - Chapter XXV
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Twentieth and Twenty-first Years of the War - Intrigues of
Alcibiades - Withdrawal of the Persian Subsidies - Oligarchical
Coup d'Etat at Athens - Patriotism of the Army at Samos
The Peloponnesians now determined to sail to Rhodes, upon the
invitation of some of the principal men there, hoping to gain an
island powerful by the number of its seamen and by its land forces,
and also thinking that they would be able to maintain their fleet from
their own confederacy, without having to ask for money from
Tissaphernes. They accordingly at once set sail that same winter
from Cnidus, and first put in with ninety-four ships at Camirus in the
Rhodian country, to the great alarm of the mass of the inhabitants,
who were not privy to the intrigue, and who consequently fled,
especially as the town was unfortified. They were afterwards, however,
assembled by the Lacedaemonians together with the inhabitants of the
two other towns of Lindus and Ialysus; and the Rhodians were persuaded
to revolt from the Athenians and the island went over to the
Peloponnesians. Meanwhile the Athenians had received the alarm and set
sail with the fleet from Samos to forestall them, and came within
sight of the island, but being a little too late sailed off for the
moment to Chalce, and from thence to Samos, and subsequently waged war
against Rhodes, issuing from Chalce, Cos, and Samos.
The Peloponnesians now levied a contribution of thirty-two talents
from the Rhodians, after which they hauled their ships ashore and
for eighty days remained inactive. During this time, and even earlier,
before they removed to Rhodes, the following intrigues took place.
After the death of Chalcideus and the battle at Miletus, Alcibiades
began to be suspected by the Peloponnesians; and Astyochus received
from Lacedaemon an order from them to put him to death, he being the
personal enemy of Agis, and in other respects thought unworthy of confidence.
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Alcibiades in his alarm first withdrew to Tissaphernes,
and immediately began to do all he could with him to injure the
Peloponnesian cause. Henceforth becoming his adviser in everything, he
cut down the pay from an Attic drachma to three obols a day, and
even this not paid too regularly; and told Tissaphernes to say to
the Peloponnesians that the Athenians, whose maritime experience was
of an older date than their own, only gave their men three obols,
not so much from poverty as to prevent their seamen being corrupted by
being too well off, and injuring their condition by spending money
upon enervating indulgences, and also paid their crews irregularly
in order to have a security against their deserting in the arrears
which they would leave behind them. He also told Tissaphernes to bribe
the captains and generals of the cities, and so to obtain their
connivance--an expedient which succeeded with all except the
Syracusans, Hermocrates alone opposing him on behalf of the whole
confederacy. Meanwhile the cities asking for money Alcibiades sent
off, by roundly telling them in the name of Tissaphernes that it was
great impudence in the Chians, the richest people in Hellas, not
content with being defended by a foreign force, to expect others to
risk not only their lives but their money as well in behalf of their
freedom; while the other cities, he said, had had to pay largely to
Athens before their rebellion, and could not justly refuse to
contribute as much or even more now for their own selves. He also
pointed out that Tissaphernes was at present carrying on the war at
his own charges, and had good cause for economy, but that as soon as
he received remittances from the king he would give them their pay
in full and do what was reasonable for the cities.
Alcibiades further advised Tissaphernes not to be in too great a
hurry to end the war, or to let himself be persuaded to bring up the
Phoenician fleet which he was equipping, or to provide pay for more
Hellenes, and thus put the power by land and sea into the same
hands; but to leave each of the contending parties in possession of
one element, thus enabling the king when he found one troublesome to
call in the other. For if the command of the sea and land were
united in one hand, he would not know where to turn for help to
overthrow the dominant power; unless he at last chose to stand up
himself, and go through with the struggle at great expense and hazard.
The cheapest plan was to let the Hellenes wear each other out, at a
small share of the expense and without risk to himself. Besides, he
would find the Athenians the most convenient partners in empire as
they did not aim at conquests on shore, and carried on the war upon
principles and with a practice most advantageous to the King; being
prepared to combine to conquer the sea for Athens, and for the King
all the Hellenes inhabiting his country, whom the Peloponnesians, on
the contrary, had come to liberate. Now it was not likely that the
Lacedaemonians would free the Hellenes from the Hellenic Athenians,
without freeing them also from the barbarian Mede, unless overthrown
by him in the meanwhile. Alcibiades therefore urged him to wear them
both out at first, and, after docking the Athenian power as much as he
could, forthwith to rid the country of the Peloponnesians. In the main
Tissaphernes approved of this policy, so far at least as could be
conjectured from his behaviour; since he now gave his confidence to
Alcibiades in recognition of his good advice, and kept the
Peloponnesians short of money, and would not let them fight at sea,
but ruined their cause by pretending that the Phoenician fleet would
arrive, and that they would thus be enabled to contend with the odds
in their favour, and so made their navy lose its efficiency, which had
been very remarkable, and generally betrayed a coolness in the war
that was too plain to be mistaken.
Alcibiades gave this advice to Tissaphernes and the King, with
whom he then was, not merely because he thought it really the best,
but because he was studying means to effect his restoration to his
country, well knowing that if he did not destroy it he might one day
hope to persuade the Athenians to recall him, and thinking that his
best chance of persuading them lay in letting them see that he
possessed the favour of Tissaphernes. The event proved him to be
right. When the Athenians at Samos found that he had influence with
Tissaphernes, principally of their own motion (though partly also
through Alcibiades himself sending word to their chief men to tell the
best men in the army that, if there were only an oligarchy in the
place of the rascally democracy that had banished him, he would be
glad to return to his country and to make Tissaphernes their
friend), the captains and chief men in the armament at once embraced
the idea of subverting the democracy.
The design was first mooted in the camp, and afterwards from
thence reached the city. Some persons crossed over from Samos and
had an interview with Alcibiades, who immediately offered to make
first Tissaphernes, and afterwards the King, their friend, if they
would give up the democracy and make it possible for the King to trust
them. The higher class, who also suffered most severely from the
war, now conceived great hopes of getting the government into their
own hands, and of triumphing over the enemy. Upon their return to
Samos the emissaries formed their partisans into a club, and openly
told the mass of the armament that the King would be their friend, and
would provide them with money, if Alcibiades were restored and the
democracy abolished. The multitude, if at first irritated by these
intrigues, were nevertheless kept quiet by the advantageous prospect
of the pay from the King; and the oligarchical conspirators, after
making this communication to the people, now re-examined the proposals
of Alcibiades among themselves, with most of their associates.
Unlike the rest, who thought them advantageous and trustworthy,
Phrynichus, who was still general, by no means approved of the
proposals. Alcibiades, he rightly thought, cared no more for an
oligarchy than for a democracy, and only sought to change the
institutions of his country in order to get himself recalled by his
associates; while for themselves their one object should be to avoid
civil discord. It was not the King's interest, when the Peloponnesians
were now their equals at sea, and in possession of some of the chief
cities in his empire, to go out of his way to side with the
Athenians whom he did not trust, when he might make friends of the
Peloponnesians who had never injured him. And as for the allied states
to whom oligarchy was now offered, because the democracy was to be put
down at Athens, he well knew that this would not make the rebels
come in any the sooner, or confirm the loyal in their allegiance; as
the allies would never prefer servitude with an oligarchy or democracy
to freedom with the constitution which they actually enjoyed, to
whichever type it belonged. Besides, the cities thought that the
so-called better classes would prove just as oppressive as the
commons, as being those who originated, proposed, and for the most
part benefited from the acts of the commons injurious to the
confederates. Indeed, if it depended on the better classes, the
confederates would be put to death without trial and with violence;
while the commons were their refuge and the chastiser of these men.
This he positively knew that the cities had learned by experience, and
that such was their opinion. The propositions of Alcibiades, and the
intrigues now in progress, could therefore never meet with his
approval.
However, the members of the club assembled, agreeably to their
original determination, accepted what was proposed, and prepared to
send Pisander and others on an embassy to Athens to treat for the
restoration of Alcibiades and the abolition of the democracy in the
city, and thus to make Tissaphernes the friend of the Athenians.
Phrynichus now saw that there would be a proposal to restore
Alcibiades, and that the Athenians would consent to it; and fearing
after what he had said against it that Alcibiades, if restored,
would revenge himself upon him for his opposition, had recourse to the
following expedient. He sent a secret letter to the Lacedaemonian
admiral Astyochus, who was still in the neighbourhood of Miletus, to
tell him that Alcibiades was ruining their cause by making
Tissaphernes the friend of the Athenians, and containing an express
revelation of the rest of the intrigue, desiring to be excused if he
sought to harm his enemy even at the expense of the interests of his
country. However, Astyochus, instead of thinking of punishing
Alcibiades, who, besides, no longer ventured within his reach as
formerly, went up to him and Tissaphernes at Magnesia, communicated to
them the letter from Samos, and turned informer, and, if report may be
trusted, became the paid creature of Tissaphernes, undertaking to
inform him as to this and all other matters; which was also the reason
why he did not remonstrate more strongly against the pay not being
given in full. Upon this Alcibiades instantly sent to the
authorities at Samos a letter against Phrynichus, stating what he
had done, and requiring that he should be put to death. Phrynichus
distracted, and placed in the utmost peril by the denunciation, sent
again to Astyochus, reproaching him with having so ill kept the secret
of his previous letter, and saying that he was now prepared to give
them an opportunity of destroying the whole Athenian armament at
Samos; giving a detailed account of the means which he should
employ, Samos being unfortified, and pleading that, being in danger of
his life on their account, he could not now be blamed for doing this
or anything else to escape being destroyed by his mortal enemies. This
also Astyochus revealed to Alcibiades.
Meanwhile Phrynichus having had timely notice that he was playing
him false, and that a letter on the subject was on the point of
arriving from Alcibiades, himself anticipated the news, and told the
army that the enemy, seeing that Samos was unfortified and the fleet
not all stationed within the harbour, meant to attack the camp, that
he could be certain of this intelligence, and that they must fortify
Samos as quickly as possible, and generally look to their defences. It
will be remembered that he was general, and had himself authority to
carry out these measures. Accordingly they addressed themselves to the
work of fortification, and Samos was thus fortified sooner than it
would otherwise have been. Not long afterwards came the letter from
Alcibiades, saying that the army was betrayed by Phrynichus, and the
enemy about to attack it. Alcibiades, however, gained no credit, it
being thought that he was in the secret of the enemy's designs, and
had tried to fasten them upon Phrynichus, and to make out that he
was their accomplice, out of hatred; and consequently far from hurting
him he rather bore witness to what he had said by this intelligence.
After this Alcibiades set to work to persuade Tissaphernes to become
the friend of the Athenians. Tissaphernes, although afraid of the
Peloponnesians because they had more ships in Asia than the Athenians,
was yet disposed to be persuaded if he could, especially after his
quarrel with the Peloponnesians at Cnidus about the treaty of
Therimenes. The quarrel had already taken place, as the Peloponnesians
were by this time actually at Rhodes; and in it the original
argument of Alcibiades touching the liberation of all the towns by the
Lacedaemonians had been verified by the declaration of Lichas that
it was impossible to submit to a convention which made the King master
of all the states at any former time ruled by himself or by his
fathers.
While Alcibiades was besieging the favour of Tissaphernes with an
earnestness proportioned to the greatness of the issue, the Athenian
envoys who had been dispatched from Samos with Pisander arrived at
Athens, and made a speech before the people, giving a brief summary of
their views, and particularly insisting that, if Alcibiades were
recalled and the democratic constitution changed, they could have
the King as their ally, and would be able to overcome the
Peloponnesians. A number of speakers opposed them on the question of
the democracy, the enemies of Alcibiades cried out against the scandal
of a restoration to be effected by a violation of the constitution,
and the Eumolpidae and Ceryces protested in behalf of the mysteries,
the cause of his banishment, and called upon the gods to avert his
recall; when Pisander, in the midst of much opposition and abuse, came
forward, and taking each of his opponents aside asked him the
following question: In the face of the fact that the Peloponnesians
had as many ships as their own confronting them at sea, more cities in
alliance with them, and the King and Tissaphernes to supply them
with money, of which the Athenians had none left, had he any hope of
saving the state, unless someone could induce the King to come over to
their side? Upon their replying that they had not, he then plainly
said to them: "This we cannot have unless we have a more moderate form
of government, and put the offices into fewer hands, and so gain the
King's confidence, and forthwith restore Alcibiades, who is the only
man living that can bring this about. The safety of the state, not the
form of its government, is for the moment the most pressing
question, as we can always change afterwards whatever we do not like."
The people were at first highly irritated at the mention of an
oligarchy, but upon understanding clearly from Pisander that this
was the only resource left, they took counsel of their fears, and
promised themselves some day to change the government again, and
gave way. They accordingly voted that Pisander should sail with ten
others and make the best arrangement that they could with Tissaphernes
and Alcibiades. At the same time the people, upon a false accusation
of Pisander, dismissed Phrynichus from his post together with his
colleague Scironides, sending Diomedon and Leon to replace them in the
command of the fleet. The accusation was that Phrynichus had
betrayed Iasus and Amorges; and Pisander brought it because he thought
him a man unfit for the business now in hand with Alcibiades. Pisander
also went the round of all the clubs already existing in the city
for help in lawsuits and elections, and urged them to draw together
and to unite their efforts for the overthrow of the democracy; and
after taking all other measures required by the circumstances, so that
no time might be lost, set off with his ten companions on his voyage
to Tissaphernes.
In the same winter Leon and Diomedon, who had by this time joined
the fleet, made an attack upon Rhodes. The ships of the Peloponnesians
they found hauled up on shore, and, after making a descent upon the
coast and defeating the Rhodians who appeared in the field against
them, withdrew to Chalce and made that place their base of
operations instead of Cos, as they could better observe from thence if
the Peloponnesian fleet put out to sea. Meanwhile Xenophantes, a
Laconian, came to Rhodes from Pedaritus at Chios, with the news that
the fortification of the Athenians was now finished, and that,
unless the whole Peloponnesian fleet came to the rescue, the cause
in Chios must be lost. Upon this they resolved to go to his relief. In
the meantime Pedaritus, with the mercenaries that he had with him
and the whole force of the Chians, made an assault upon the work round
the Athenian ships and took a portion of it, and got possession of
some vessels that were hauled up on shore, when the Athenians
sallied out to the rescue, and first routing the Chians, next defeated
the remainder of the force round Pedaritus, who was himself killed,
with many of the Chians, a great number of arms being also taken.
After this the Chians were besieged even more straitly than before
by land and sea, and the famine in the place was great. Meanwhile
the Athenian envoys with Pisander arrived at the court of
Tissaphernes, and conferred with him about the proposed agreement.
However, Alcibiades, not being altogether sure of Tissaphernes (who
feared the Peloponnesians more than the Athenians, and besides
wished to wear out both parties, as Alcibiades himself had
recommended), had recourse to the following stratagem to make the
treaty between the Athenians and Tissaphernes miscarry by reason of
the magnitude of his demands. In my opinion Tissaphernes desired
this result, fear being his motive; while Alcibiades, who now saw that
Tissaphernes was determined not to treat on any terms, wished the
Athenians to think, not that he was unable to persuade Tissaphernes,
but that after the latter had been persuaded and was willing to join
them, they had not conceded enough to him. For the demands of
Alcibiades, speaking for Tissaphernes, who was present, were so
extravagant that the Athenians, although for a long while they
agreed to whatever he asked, yet had to bear the blame of failure:
he required the cession of the whole of Ionia, next of the islands
adjacent, besides other concessions, and these passed without
opposition; at last, in the third interview, Alcibiades, who now
feared a complete discovery of his inability, required them to allow
the King to build ships and sail along his own coast wherever and with
as many as he pleased. Upon this the Athenians would yield no further,
and concluding that there was nothing to be done, but that they had
been deceived by Alcibiades, went away in a passion and proceeded to
Samos.
Tissaphernes immediately after this, in the same winter, proceeded
along shore to Caunus, desiring to bring the Peloponnesian fleet
back to Miletus, and to supply them with pay, making a fresh
convention upon such terms as he could get, in order not to bring
matters to an absolute breach between them. He was afraid that if many
of their ships were left without pay they would be compelled to engage
and be defeated, or that their vessels being left without hands the
Athenians would attain their objects without his assistance. Still
more he feared that the Peloponnesians might ravage the continent in
search of supplies. Having calculated and considered all this,
agreeably to his plan of keeping the two sides equal, he now sent
for the Peloponnesians and gave them pay, and concluded with them a
third treaty in words following:
In the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius, while Alexippidas
was ephor at Lacedaemon, a convention was concluded in the plain of
the Maeander by the Lacedaemonians and their allies with Tissaphernes,
Hieramenes, and the sons of Pharnaces, concerning the affairs of the
King and of the Lacedaemonians and their allies.
1. The country of the King in Asia shall be the King's, and the
King shall treat his own country as he pleases.
2. The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall not invade or
injure the King's country: neither shall the King invade or injure
that of the Lacedaemonians or of their allies. If any of the
Lacedaemonians or of their allies invade or injure the King's country,
the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall prevent it: and if any
from the King's country invade or injure the country of the
Lacedaemonians or of their allies, the King shall prevent it.
3. Tissaphernes shall provide pay for the ships now present,
according to the agreement, until the arrival of the King's vessels:
but after the arrival of the King's vessels the Lacedaemonians and
their allies may pay their own ships if they wish it. If, however,
they choose to receive the pay from Tissaphernes, Tissaphernes shall
furnish it: and the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall repay him at
the end of the war such moneys as they shall have received.
4. After the vessels have arrived, the ships of the Lacedaemonians
and of their allies and those of the King shall carry on the war
jointly, according as Tissaphernes and the Lacedaemonians and their
allies shall think best. If they wish to make peace with the
Athenians, they shall make peace also jointly.
This was the treaty. After this Tissaphernes prepared to bring up
the Phoenician fleet according to agreement, and to make good his
other promises, or at all events wished to make it appear that he
was so preparing.
Winter was now drawing towards its close, when the Boeotians took
Oropus by treachery, though held by an Athenian garrison. Their
accomplices in this were some of the Eretrians and of the Oropians
themselves, who were plotting the revolt of Euboea, as the place was
exactly opposite Eretria, and while in Athenian hands was
necessarily a source of great annoyance to Eretria and the rest of
Euboea. Oropus being in their hands, the Eretrians now came to
Rhodes to invite the Peloponnesians into Euboea. The latter,
however, were rather bent on the relief of the distressed Chians,
and accordingly put out to sea and sailed with all their ships from
Rhodes. Off Triopium they sighted the Athenian fleet out at sea
sailing from Chalce, and, neither attacking the other, arrived, the
latter at Samos, the Peloponnesians at Miletus, seeing that it was
no longer possible to relieve Chios without a battle. And this
winter ended, and with it ended the twentieth year of this war of
which Thucydides is the historian.
Early in the spring of the summer following, Dercyllidas, a Spartan,
was sent with a small force by land to the Hellespont to effect the
revolt of Abydos, which is a Milesian colony; and the Chians, while
Astyochus was at a loss how to help them, were compelled to fight at
sea by the pressure of the siege. While Astyochus was still at
Rhodes they had received from Miletus, as their commander after the
death of Pedaritus, a Spartan named Leon, who had come out with
Antisthenes, and twelve vessels which had been on guard at Miletus,
five of which were Thurian, four Syracusans, one from Anaia, one
Milesian, and one Leon's own. Accordingly the Chians marched out in
mass and took up a strong position, while thirty-six of their ships
put out and engaged thirty-two of the Athenians; and after a tough
fight, in which the Chians and their allies had rather the best of it,
as it was now late, retired to their city.
Immediately after this Dercyllidas arrived by land from Miletus; and
Abydos in the Hellespont revolted to him and Pharnabazus, and
Lampsacus two days later. Upon receipt of this news Strombichides
hastily sailed from Chios with twenty-four Athenian ships, some
transports carrying heavy infantry being of the number, and
defeating the Lampsacenes who came out against him, took Lampsacus,
which was unfortified, at the first assault, and making prize of the
slaves and goods restored the freemen to their homes, and went on to
Abydos. The inhabitants, however, refusing to capitulate, and his
assaults failing to take the place, he sailed over to the coast
opposite, and appointed Sestos, the town in the Chersonese held by the
Medes at a former period in this history, as the centre for the
defence of the whole Hellespont.
In the meantime the Chians commanded the sea more than before; and
the Peloponnesians at Miletus and Astyochus, hearing of the
sea-fight and of the departure of the squadron with Strombichides,
took fresh courage. Coasting along with two vessels to Chios,
Astyochus took the ships from that place, and now moved with the whole
fleet upon Samos, from whence, however, he sailed back to Miletus,
as the Athenians did not put out against him, owing to their
suspicions of one another. For it was about this time, or even before,
that the democracy was put down at Athens. When Pisander and the
envoys returned from Tissaphernes to Samos they at once strengthened
still further their interest in the army itself, and instigated the
upper class in Samos to join them in establishing an oligarchy, the
very form of government which a party of them had lately risen to
avoid. At the same time the Athenians at Samos, after a consultation
among themselves, determined to let Alcibiades alone, since he refused
to join them, and besides was not the man for an oligarchy; and now
that they were once embarked, to see for themselves how they could
best prevent the ruin of their cause, and meanwhile to sustain the
war, and to contribute without stint money and all else that might
be required from their own private estates, as they would henceforth
labour for themselves alone.
After encouraging each other in these resolutions, they now at
once sent off half the envoys and Pisander to do what was necessary at
Athens (with instructions to establish oligarchies on their way in all
the subject cities which they might touch at), and dispatched the
other half in different directions to the other dependencies.
Diitrephes also, who was in the neighbourhood of Chios, and had been
elected to the command of the Thracian towns, was sent off to his
government, and arriving at Thasos abolished the democracy there.
Two months, however, had not elapsed after his departure before the
Thasians began to fortify their town, being already tired of an
aristocracy with Athens, and in daily expectation of freedom from
Lacedaemon. Indeed there was a party of them (whom the Athenians had
banished), with the Peloponnesians, who with their friends in the town
were already making every exertion to bring a squadron, and to
effect the revolt of Thasos; and this party thus saw exactly what they
most wanted done, that is to say, the reformation of the government
without risk, and the abolition of the democracy which would have
opposed them. Things at Thasos thus turned out just the contrary to
what the oligarchical conspirators at Athens expected; and the same in
my opinion was the case in many of the other dependencies; as the
cities no sooner got a moderate government and liberty of action, than
they went on to absolute freedom without being at all seduced by the
show of reform offered by the Athenians.
Pisander and his colleagues on their voyage alongshore abolished, as
had been determined, the democracies in the cities, and also took some
heavy infantry from certain places as their allies, and so came to
Athens. Here they found most of the work already done by their
associates. Some of the younger men had banded together, and
secretly assassinated one Androcles, the chief leader of the
commons, and mainly responsible for the banishment of Alcibiades;
Androcles being singled out both because he was a popular leader and
because they sought by his death to recommend themselves to
Alcibiades, who was, as they supposed, to be recalled, and to make
Tissaphernes their friend. There were also some other obnoxious
persons whom they secretly did away with in the same manner. Meanwhile
their cry in public was that no pay should be given except to
persons serving in the war, and that not more than five thousand
should share in the government, and those such as were most able to
serve the state in person and in purse.
But this was a mere catchword for the multitude, as the authors of
the revolution were really to govern. However, the Assembly and the
Council of the Bean still met notwithstanding, although they discussed
nothing that was not approved of by the conspirators, who both
supplied the speakers and reviewed in advance what they were to say.
Fear, and the sight of the numbers of the conspirators, closed the
mouths of the rest; or if any ventured to rise in opposition, he was
presently put to death in some convenient way, and there was neither
search for the murderers nor justice to be had against them if
suspected; but the people remained motionless, being so thoroughly
cowed that men thought themselves lucky to escape violence, even
when they held their tongues. An exaggerated belief in the numbers
of the conspirators also demoralized the people, rendered helpless
by the magnitude of the city, and by their want of intelligence with
each other, and being without means of finding out what those
numbers really were. For the same reason it was impossible for any one
to open his grief to a neighbour and to concert measures to defend
himself, as he would have had to speak either to one whom he did not
know, or whom he knew but did not trust. Indeed all the popular
party approached each other with suspicion, each thinking his
neighbour concerned in what was going on, the conspirators having in
their ranks persons whom no one could ever have believed capable of
joining an oligarchy; and these it was who made the many so
suspicious, and so helped to procure impunity for the few, by
confirming the commons in their mistrust of one another.
At this juncture arrived Pisander and his colleagues, who lost no
time in doing the rest. First they assembled the people, and moved
to elect ten commissioners with full powers to frame a constitution,
and that when this was done they should on an appointed day lay before
the people their opinion as to the best mode of governing the city.
Afterwards, when the day arrived, the conspirators enclosed the
assembly in Colonus, a temple of Poseidon, a little more than a mile
outside the city; when the commissioners simply brought forward this
single motion, that any Athenian might propose with impunity
whatever measure he pleased, heavy penalties being imposed upon any
who should indict for illegality, or otherwise molest him for so
doing. The way thus cleared, it was now plainly declared that all
tenure of office and receipt of pay under the existing institutions
were at an end, and that five men must be elected as presidents, who
should in their turn elect one hundred, and each of the hundred
three apiece; and that this body thus made up to four hundred should
enter the council chamber with full powers and govern as they judged
best, and should convene the five thousand whenever they pleased.
The man who moved this resolution was Pisander, who was throughout
the chief ostensible agent in putting down the democracy. But he who
concerted the whole affair, and prepared the way for the
catastrophe, and who had given the greatest thought to the matter, was
Antiphon, one of the best men of his day in Athens; who, with a head
to contrive measures and a tongue to recommend them, did not willingly
come forward in the assembly or upon any public scene, being ill
looked upon by the multitude owing to his reputation for talent; and
who yet was the one man best able to aid in the courts, or before
the assembly, the suitors who required his opinion. Indeed, when he
was afterwards himself tried for his life on the charge of having been
concerned in setting up this very government, when the Four Hundred
were overthrown and hardly dealt with by the commons, he made what
would seem to be the best defence of any known up to my time.
Phrynichus also went beyond all others in his zeal for the
oligarchy. Afraid of Alcibiades, and assured that he was no stranger
to his intrigues with Astyochus at Samos, he held that no oligarchy
was ever likely to restore him, and once embarked in the enterprise,
proved, where danger was to be faced, by far the staunchest of them
all. Theramenes, son of Hagnon, was also one of the foremost of the
subverters of the democracy--a man as able in council as in debate.
Conducted by so many and by such sagacious heads, the enterprise,
great as it was, not unnaturally went forward; although it was no
light matter to deprive the Athenian people of its freedom, almost a
hundred years after the deposition of the tyrants, when it had been
not only not subject to any during the whole of that period, but
accustomed during more than half of it to rule over subjects of its
own.
The assembly ratified the proposed constitution, without a single
opposing voice, and was then dissolved; after which the Four Hundred
were brought into the council chamber in the following way. On account
of the enemy at Decelea, all the Athenians were constantly on the wall
or in the ranks at the various military posts. On that day the persons
not in the secret were allowed to go home as usual, while orders
were given to the accomplices of the conspirators to hang about,
without making any demonstration, at some little distance from the
posts, and in case of any opposition to what was being done, to
seize the arms and put it down. There were also some Andrians and
Tenians, three hundred Carystians, and some of the settlers in
Aegina come with their own arms for this very purpose, who had
received similar instructions. These dispositions completed, the
Four Hundred went, each with a dagger concealed about his person,
accompanied by one hundred and twenty Hellenic youths, whom they
employed wherever violence was needed, and appeared before the
Councillors of the Bean in the council chamber, and told them to
take their pay and be gone; themselves bringing it for the whole of
the residue of their term of office, and giving it to them as they
went out.
Upon the Council withdrawing in this way without venturing any
objection, and the rest of the citizens making no movement, the Four
Hundred entered the council chamber, and for the present contented
themselves with drawing lots for their Prytanes, and making their
prayers and sacrifices to the gods upon entering office, but
afterwards departed widely from the democratic system of government,
and except that on account of Alcibiades they did not recall the
exiles, ruled the city by force; putting to death some men, though not
many, whom they thought it convenient to remove, and imprisoning and
banishing others. They also sent to Agis, the Lacedaemonian king, at
Decelea, to say that they desired to make peace, and that he might
reasonably be more disposed to treat now that he had them to deal with
instead of the inconstant commons.
Agis, however, did not believe in the tranquillity of the city, or
that the commons would thus in a moment give up their ancient liberty,
but thought that the sight of a large Lacedaemonian force would be
sufficient to excite them if they were not already in commotion, of
which he was by no means certain. He accordingly gave to the envoys of
the Four Hundred an answer which held out no hopes of an
accommodation, and sending for large reinforcements from
Peloponnese, not long afterwards, with these and his garrison from
Decelea, descended to the very walls of Athens; hoping either that
civil disturbances might help to subdue them to his terms, or that, in
the confusion to be expected within and without the city, they might
even surrender without a blow being struck; at all events he thought
he would succeed in seizing the Long Walls, bared of their
defenders. However, the Athenians saw him come close up, without
making the least disturbance within the city; and sending out their
cavalry, and a number of their heavy infantry, light troops, and
archers, shot down some of his soldiers who approached too near, and
got possession of some arms and dead. Upon this Agis, at last
convinced, led his army back again and, remaining with his own
troops in the old position at Decelea, sent the reinforcement back
home, after a few days' stay in Attica. After this the Four Hundred
persevering sent another embassy to Agis, and now meeting with a
better reception, at his suggestion dispatched envoys to Lacedaemon to
negotiate a treaty, being desirous of making peace.
They also sent ten men to Samos to reassure the army, and to explain
that the oligarchy was not established for the hurt of the city or the
citizens, but for the salvation of the country at large; and that
there were five thousand, not four hundred only, concerned;
although, what with their expeditions and employments abroad, the
Athenians had never yet assembled to discuss a question important
enough to bring five thousand of them together. The emissaries were
also told what to say upon all other points, and were so sent off
immediately after the establishment of the new government, which
feared, as it turned out justly, that the mass of seamen would not
be willing to remain under the oligarchical constitution, and, the
evil beginning there, might be the means of their overthrow.
Indeed at Samos the question of the oligarchy had already entered
upon a new phase, the following events having taken place just at
the time that the Four Hundred were conspiring. That part of the
Samian population which has been mentioned as rising against the upper
class, and as being the democratic party, had now turned round, and
yielding to the solicitations of Pisander during his visit, and of the
Athenians in the conspiracy at Samos, had bound themselves by oaths to
the number of three hundred, and were about to fall upon the rest of
their fellow citizens, whom they now in their turn regarded as the
democratic party. Meanwhile they put to death one Hyperbolus, an
Athenian, a pestilent fellow that had been ostracized, not from fear
of his influence or position, but because he was a rascal and a
disgrace to the city; being aided in this by Charminus, one of the
generals, and by some of the Athenians with them, to whom they had
sworn friendship, and with whom they perpetrated other acts of the
kind, and now determined to attack the people. The latter got wind
of what was coming, and told two of the generals, Leon and Diomedon,
who, on account of the credit which they enjoyed with the commons,
were unwilling supporters of the oligarchy; and also Thrasybulus and
Thrasyllus, the former a captain of a galley, the latter serving
with the heavy infantry, besides certain others who had ever been
thought most opposed to the conspirators, entreating them not to
look on and see them destroyed, and Samos, the sole remaining stay
of their empire, lost to the Athenians. Upon hearing this, the persons
whom they addressed now went round the soldiers one by one, and
urged them to resist, especially the crew of the Paralus, which was
made up entirely of Athenians and freemen, and had from time out of
mind been enemies of oligarchy, even when there was no such thing
existing; and Leon and Diomedon left behind some ships for their
protection in case of their sailing away anywhere themselves.
Accordingly, when the Three Hundred attacked the people, all these
came to the rescue, and foremost of all the crew of the Paralus; and
the Samian commons gained the victory, and putting to death some
thirty of the Three Hundred, and banishing three others of the
ringleaders, accorded an amnesty to the rest, and lived together under
a democratic government for the future.
The ship Paralus, with Chaereas, son of Archestratus, on board, an
Athenian who had taken an active part in the revolution, was now
without loss of time sent off by the Samians and the army to Athens to
report what had occurred; the fact that the Four Hundred were in power
not being yet known. When they sailed into harbour the Four Hundred
immediately arrested two or three of the Parali and, taking the vessel
from the rest, shifted them into a troopship and set them to keep
guard round Euboea. Chaereas, however, managed to secrete himself as
soon as he saw how things stood, and returning to Samos, drew a
picture to the soldiers of the horrors enacting at Athens, in which
everything was exaggerated; saying that all were punished with
stripes, that no one could say a word against the holders of power,
that the soldiers' wives and children were outraged, and that it was
intended to seize and shut up the relatives of all in the army at
Samos who were not of the government's way of thinking, to be put to
death in case of their disobedience; besides a host of other injurious
inventions.
On hearing this the first thought of the army was to fall upon the
chief authors of the oligarchy and upon all the rest concerned.
Eventually, however, they desisted from this idea upon the men of
moderate views opposing it and warning them against ruining their
cause, with the enemy close at hand and ready for battle. After
this, Thrasybulus, son of Lycus, and Thrasyllus, the chief leaders
in the revolution, now wishing in the most public manner to change the
government at Samos to a democracy, bound all the soldiers by the most
tremendous oaths, and those of the oligarchical party more than any,
to accept a democratic government, to be united, to prosecute actively
the war with the Peloponnesians, and to be enemies of the Four
Hundred, and to hold no communication with them. The same oath was
also taken by all the Samians of full age; and the soldiers associated
the Samians in all their affairs and in the fruits of their dangers,
having the conviction that there was no way of escape for themselves
or for them, but that the success of the Four Hundred or of the
enemy at Miletus must be their ruin.
The struggle now was between the army trying to force a democracy
upon the city, and the Four Hundred an oligarchy upon the camp.
Meanwhile the soldiers forthwith held an assembly, in which they
deposed the former generals and any of the captains whom they
suspected, and chose new captains and generals to replace them,
besides Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, whom they had already. They also
stood up and encouraged one another, and among other things urged that
they ought not to lose heart because the city had revolted from
them, as the party seceding was smaller and in every way poorer in
resources than themselves. They had the whole fleet with which to
compel the other cities in their empire to give them money just as
if they had their base in the capital, having a city in Samos which,
so far from wanting strength, had when at war been within an ace of
depriving the Athenians of the command of the sea, while as far as the
enemy was concerned they had the same base of operations as before.
Indeed, with the fleet in their hands, they were better able to
provide themselves with supplies than the government at home. It was
their advanced position at Samos which had throughout enabled the home
authorities to command the entrance into Piraeus; and if they
refused to give them back the constitution, they would now find that
the army was more in a position to exclude them from the sea than they
were to exclude the army. Besides, the city was of little or no use
towards enabling them to overcome the enemy; and they had lost nothing
in losing those who had no longer either money to send them (the
soldiers having to find this for themselves), or good counsel, which
entitles cities to direct armies. On the contrary, even in this the
home government had done wrong in abolishing the institutions of their
ancestors, while the army maintained the said institutions, and
would try to force the home government to do so likewise. So that even
in point of good counsel the camp had as good counsellors as the city.
Moreover, they had but to grant him security for his person and his
recall, and Alcibiades would be only too glad to procure them the
alliance of the King. And above all if they failed altogether, with
the navy which they possessed, they had numbers of places to retire to
in which they would find cities and lands.
Debating together and comforting themselves after this manner,
they pushed on their war measures as actively as ever; and the ten
envoys sent to Samos by the Four Hundred, learning how matters stood
while they were still at Delos, stayed quiet there.
About this time a cry arose among the soldiers in the
Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus that Astyochus and Tissaphernes were
ruining their cause. Astyochus had not been willing to fight at
sea--either before, while they were still in full vigour and the
fleet of the Athenians small, or now, when the enemy was, as they were
informed, in a state of sedition and his ships not yet united--but
kept them waiting for the Phoenician fleet from Tissaphernes, which
had only a nominal existence, at the risk of wasting away in
inactivity. While Tissaphernes not only did not bring up the fleet in
question, but was ruining their navy by payments made irregularly, and
even then not made in full. They must therefore, they insisted, delay
no longer, but fight a decisive naval engagement. The Syracusans were
the most urgent of any.
The confederates and Astyochus, aware of these murmurs, had
already decided in council to fight a decisive battle; and when the
news reached them of the disturbance at Samos, they put to sea with
all their ships, one hundred and ten in number, and, ordering the
Milesians to move by land upon Mycale, set sail thither. The Athenians
with the eighty-two ships from Samos were at the moment lying at
Glauce in Mycale, a point where Samos approaches near to the
continent; and, seeing the Peloponnesian fleet sailing against them,
retired into Samos, not thinking themselves numerically strong
enough to stake their all upon a battle. Besides, they had notice from
Miletus of the wish of the enemy to engage, and were expecting to be
joined from the Hellespont by Strombichides, to whom a messenger had
been already dispatched, with the ships that had gone from Chios to
Abydos. The Athenians accordingly withdrew to Samos, and the
Peloponnesians put in at Mycale, and encamped with the land forces
of the Milesians and the people of the neighbourhood. The next day
they were about to sail against Samos, when tidings reached them of
the arrival of Strombichides with the squadron from the Hellespont,
upon which they immediately sailed back to Miletus. The Athenians,
thus reinforced, now in their turn sailed against Miletus with a
hundred and eight ships, wishing to fight a decisive battle, but, as
no one put out to meet them, sailed back to Samos.
More History
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