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The History of the Peloponnesian War
Book 4 - Chapter XIV
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Eighth and Ninth Years of the War - Invasion of Boeotia -
Fall of Amphipolis - Brilliant Successes of Brasidas
The same summer the Mitylenians were about to fortify Antandrus,
as they had intended, when Demodocus and Aristides, the commanders
of the Athenian squadron engaged in levying subsidies, heard on the
Hellespont of what was being done to the place (Lamachus their
colleague having sailed with ten ships into the Pontus) and
conceived fears of its becoming a second Anaia-the place in which
the Samian exiles had established themselves to annoy Samos, helping
the Peloponnesians by sending pilots to their navy, and keeping the
city in agitation and receiving all its outlaws. They accordingly
got together a force from the allies and set sail, defeated in
battle the troops that met them from Antandrus, and retook the
place. Not long after, Lamachus, who had sailed into the Pontus,
lost his ships at anchor in the river Calex, in the territory of
Heraclea, rain having fallen in the interior and the flood coming
suddenly down upon them; and himself and his troops passed by land
through the Bithynian Thracians on the Asiatic side, and arrived at
Chalcedon, the Megarian colony at the mouth of the Pontus.
The same summer the Athenian general, Demosthenes, arrived at
Naupactus with forty ships immediately after the return from the
Megarid. Hippocrates and himself had had overtures made to them by
certain men in the cities in Boeotia, who wished to change the
constitution and introduce a democracy as at Athens; Ptoeodorus, a
Theban exile, being the chief mover in this intrigue. The seaport
town of Siphae, in the bay of Crisae, in the Thespian territory, was
to be betrayed to them by one party; Chaeronea (a dependency of what
was formerly called the Minyan, now the Boeotian, Orchomenus) to be put into
their hands by another from that town, whose exiles were very active
in the business, hiring men in Peloponnese.
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Some Phocians
also were in the plot, Chaeronea being the frontier town of Boeotia
and close to Phanotis in Phocia. Meanwhile the Athenians were to
seize Delium, the sanctuary of Apollo, in the territory of Tanagra
looking towards Euboea; and all these events were to take place
simultaneously upon a day appointed, in order that the Boeotians
might be unable to unite to oppose them at Delium, being everywhere
detained by disturbances at home. Should the enterprise succeed, and
Delium be fortified, its authors confidently expected that even if no
revolution should immediately follow in Boeotia, yet with these
places in their hands, and the country being harassed by incursions,
and a refuge in each instance near for the partisans engaged in them,
things would not remain as they were, but that the rebels being
supported by the Athenians and the forces of the oligarchs divided,
it would be possible after a while to settle matters according to
their wishes.
Such was the plot in contemplation. Hippocrates with a force
raised at home awaited the proper moment to take the field against the
Boeotians; while he sent on Demosthenes with the forty ships above
mentioned to Naupactus, to raise in those parts an army of Acarnanians
and of the other allies, and sail and receive Siphae from the
conspirators; a day having been agreed on for the simultaneous
execution of both these operations. Demosthenes on his arrival found
Oeniadae already compelled by the united Acarnanians to join the
Athenian confederacy, and himself raising all the allies in those
countries marched against and subdued Salynthius and the Agraeans;
after which he devoted himself to the preparations necessary to enable
him to be at Siphae by the time appointed.
About the same time in the summer, Brasidas set out on his march for
the Thracian places with seventeen hundred heavy infantry, and
arriving at Heraclea in Trachis, from thence sent on a messenger to
his friends at Pharsalus, to ask them to conduct himself and his
army through the country. Accordingly there came to Melitia in
Achaia Panaerus, Dorus, Hippolochidas, Torylaus, and Strophacus, the
Chalcidian proxenus, under whose escort he resumed his march, being
accompanied also by other Thessalians, among whom was Niconidas from
Larissa, a friend of Perdiccas. It was never very easy to traverse
Thessaly without an escort; and throughout all Hellas for an armed
force to pass without leave through a neighbour's country was a
delicate step to take. Besides this the Thessalian people had always
sympathized with the Athenians. Indeed if instead of the customary
close oligarchy there had been a constitutional government in
Thessaly, he would never have been able to proceed; since even as it
was, he was met on his march at the river Enipeus by certain of the
opposite party who forbade his further progress, and complained of his
making the attempt without the consent of the nation. To this his
escort answered that they had no intention of taking him through
against their will; they were only friends in attendance on an
unexpected visitor. Brasidas himself added that he came as a friend to
Thessaly and its inhabitants, his arms not being directed against them
but against the Athenians, with whom he was at war, and that although
he knew of no quarrel between the Thessalians and Lacedaemonians to
prevent the two nations having access to each other's territory, he
neither would nor could proceed against their wishes; he could only
beg them not to stop him. With this answer they went away, and he took
the advice of his escort, and pushed on without halting, before a
greater force might gather to prevent him. Thus in the day that he set
out from Melitia he performed the whole distance to Pharsalus, and
encamped on the river Apidanus; and so to Phacium and from thence to
Perrhaebia. Here his Thessalian escort went back, and the
Perrhaebians, who are subjects of Thessaly, set him down at Dium in
the dominions of Perdiccas, a Macedonian town under Mount Olympus,
looking towards Thessaly.
In this way Brasidas hurried through Thessaly before any one could
be got ready to stop him, and reached Perdiccas and Chalcidice. The
departure of the army from Peloponnese had been procured by the
Thracian towns in revolt against Athens and by Perdiccas, alarmed at
the successes of the Athenians. The Chalcidians thought that they
would be the first objects of an Athenian expedition, not that the
neighbouring towns which had not yet revolted did not also secretly
join in the invitation; and Perdiccas also had his apprehensions on
account of his old quarrels with the Athenians, although not openly at
war with them, and above all wished to reduce Arrhabaeus, king of
the Lyncestians. It had been less difficult for them to get an army to
leave Peloponnese, because of the ill fortune of the Lacedaemonians at
the present moment. The attacks of the Athenians upon Peloponnese, and
in particular upon Laconia, might, it was hoped, be diverted most
effectually by annoying them in return, and by sending an army to
their allies, especially as they were willing to maintain it and asked
for it to aid them in revolting. The Lacedaemonians were also glad
to have an excuse for sending some of the Helots out of the country,
for fear that the present aspect of affairs and the occupation of
Pylos might encourage them to move. Indeed fear of their numbers and
obstinacy even persuaded the Lacedaemonians to the action which I
shall now relate, their policy at all times having been governed by
the necessity of taking precautions against them. The Helots were
invited by a proclamation to pick out those of their number who
claimed to have most distinguished themselves against the enemy, in
order that they might receive their freedom; the object being to
test them, as it was thought that the first to claim their freedom
would be the most high-spirited and the most apt to rebel. As many
as two thousand were selected accordingly, who crowned themselves
and went round the temples, rejoicing in their new freedom. The
Spartans, however, soon afterwards did away with them, and no one ever
knew how each of them perished. The Spartans now therefore gladly sent
seven hundred as heavy infantry with Brasidas, who recruited the
rest of his force by means of money in Peloponnese.
Brasidas himself was sent out by the Lacedaemonians mainly at his
own desire, although the Chalcidians also were eager to have a man
so thorough as he had shown himself whenever there was anything to
be done at Sparta, and whose after-service abroad proved of the utmost
use to his country. At the present moment his just and moderate
conduct towards the towns generally succeeded in procuring their
revolt, besides the places which he managed to take by treachery;
and thus when the Lacedaemonians desired to treat, as they
ultimately did, they had places to offer in exchange, and the burden
of war meanwhile shifted from Peloponnese. Later on in the war,
after the events in Sicily, the present valour and conduct of
Brasidas, known by experience to some, by hearsay to others, was
what mainly created in the allies of Athens a feeling for the
Lacedaemonians. He was the first who went out and showed himself so
good a man at all points as to leave behind him the conviction that
the rest were like him.
Meanwhile his arrival in the Thracian country no sooner became known
to the Athenians than they declared war against Perdiccas, whom they
regarded as the author of the expedition, and kept a closer watch on
their allies in that quarter.
Upon the arrival of Brasidas and his army, Perdiccas immediately
started with them and with his own forces against Arrhabaeus, son of
Bromerus, king of the Lyncestian Macedonians, his neighbour, with whom
he had a quarrel and whom he wished to subdue. However, when he
arrived with his army and Brasidas at the pass leading into Lyncus,
Brasidas told him that before commencing hostilities he wished to go
and try to persuade Arrhabaeus to become the ally of Lacedaemon,
this latter having already made overtures intimating his willingness
to make Brasidas arbitrator between them, and the Chalcidian envoys
accompanying him having warned him not to remove the apprehensions
of Perdiccas, in order to ensure his greater zeal in their cause.
Besides, the envoys of Perdiccas had talked at Lacedaemon about his
bringing many of the places round him into alliance with them; and
thus Brasidas thought he might take a larger view of the question of
Arrhabaeus. Perdiccas however retorted that he had not brought him
with him to arbitrate in their quarrel, but to put down the enemies
whom he might point out to him; and that while he, Perdiccas,
maintained half his army it was a breach of faith for Brasidas to
parley with Arrhabaeus. Nevertheless Brasidas disregarded the wishes
of Perdiccas and held the parley in spite of him, and suffered himself
to be persuaded to lead off the army without invading the country of
Arrhabaeus; after which Perdiccas, holding that faith had not been
kept with him, contributed only a third instead of half of the support
of the army.
The same summer, without loss of time, Brasidas marched with the
Chalcidians against Acanthus, a colony of the Andrians, a little
before vintage. The inhabitants were divided into two parties on the
question of receiving him; those who had joined the Chalcidians in
inviting him, and the popular party. However, fear for their fruit,
which was still out, enabled Brasidas to persuade the multitude to
admit him alone, and to hear what he had to say before making a
decision; and he was admitted accordingly and appeared before the
people, and not being a bad speaker for a Lacedaemonian, addressed
them as follows:
"Acanthians, the Lacedaemonians have sent out me and my army to make
good the reason that we gave for the war when we began it, viz.,
that we were going to war with the Athenians in order to free
Hellas. Our delay in coming has been caused by mistaken expectations
as to the war at home, which led us to hope, by our own unassisted
efforts and without your risking anything, to effect the speedy
downfall of the Athenians; and you must not blame us for this, as we
are now come the moment that we were able, prepared with your aid to
do our best to subdue them. Meanwhile I am astonished at finding
your gates shut against me, and at not meeting with a better
welcome. We Lacedaemonians thought of you as allies eager to have
us, to whom we should come in spirit even before we were with you in
body; and in this expectation undertook all the risks of a march of
many days through a strange country, so far did our zeal carry us.
It will be a terrible thing if after this you have other intentions,
and mean to stand in the way of your own and Hellenic freedom. It is
not merely that you oppose me yourselves; but wherever I may go people
will be less inclined to join me, on the score that you, to whom I
first came--an important town like Acanthus, and prudent men like the
Acanthians--refused to admit me. I shall have nothing to prove that
the reason which I advance is the true one; it will be said either
that there is something unfair in the freedom which I offer, or that
I am in insufficient force and unable to protect you against an
attack from Athens. Yet when I went with the army which I now have to
the relief of Nisaea, the Athenians did not venture to engage me
although in greater force than I; and it is not likely they will
ever send across sea against you an army as numerous as they had at
Nisaea. And for myself, I have come here not to hurt but to free the
Hellenes, witness the solemn oaths by which I have bound my government
that the allies that I may bring over shall be independent; and
besides my object in coming is not by force or fraud to obtain your
alliance, but to offer you mine to help you against your Athenian
masters. I protest, therefore, against any suspicions of my intentions
after the guarantees which I offer, and equally so against doubts of
my ability to protect you, and I invite you to join me without
hesitation.
"Some of you may hang back because they have private enemies, and
fear that I may put the city into the hands of a party: none need be
more tranquil than they. I am not come here to help this party or
that; and I do not consider that I should be bringing you freedom in
any real sense, if I should disregard your constitution, and enslave
the many to the few or the few to the many. This would be heavier than
a foreign yoke; and we Lacedaemonians, instead of being thanked for
our pains, should get neither honour nor glory, but, contrariwise,
reproaches. The charges which strengthen our hands in the war
against the Athenians would on our own showing be merited by
ourselves, and more hateful in us than in those who make no
pretensions to honesty; as it is more disgraceful for persons of
character to take what they covet by fair-seeming fraud than by open
force; the one aggression having for its justification the might which
fortune gives, the other being simply a piece of clever roguery. A
matter which concerns us thus nearly we naturally look to most
jealously; and over and above the oaths that I have mentioned, what
stronger assurance can you have, when you see that our words, compared
with the actual facts, produce the necessary conviction that it is our
interest to act as we say?
"If to these considerations of mine you put in the plea of
inability, and claim that your friendly feeling should save you from
being hurt by your refusal; if you say that freedom, in your
opinion, is not without its dangers, and that it is right to offer
it to those who can accept it, but not to force it on any against
their will, then I shall take the gods and heroes of your country to
witness that I came for your good and was rejected, and shall do my
best to compel you by laying waste your land. I shall do so without
scruple, being justified by the necessity which constrains me,
first, to prevent the Lacedaemonians from being damaged by you,
their friends, in the event of your nonadhesion, through the moneys
that you pay to the Athenians; and secondly, to prevent the Hellenes
from being hindered by you in shaking off their servitude. Otherwise
indeed we should have no right to act as we propose; except in the
name of some public interest, what call should we Lacedaemonians
have to free those who do not wish it? Empire we do not aspire to:
it is what we are labouring to put down; and we should wrong the
greater number if we allowed you to stand in the way of the
independence that we offer to all. Endeavour, therefore, to decide
wisely, and strive to begin the work of liberation for the Hellenes,
and lay up for yourselves endless renown, while you escape private
loss, and cover your commonwealth with glory."
Such were the words of Brasidas. The Acanthians, after much had been
said on both sides of the question, gave their votes in secret, and
the majority, influenced by the seductive arguments of Brasidas and by
fear for their fruit, decided to revolt from Athens; not however
admitting the army until they had taken his personal security for
the oaths sworn by his government before they sent him out, assuring
the independence of the allies whom he might bring over. Not long
after, Stagirus, a colony of the Andrians, followed their example
and revolted.
Such were the events of this summer. It was in the first days of the
winter following that the places in Boeotia were to be put into the
hands of the Athenian generals, Hippocrates and Demosthenes, the
latter of whom was to go with his ships to Siphae, the former to
Delium. A mistake, however, was made in the days on which they were
each to start; and Demosthenes, sailing first to Siphae, with the
Acarnanians and many of the allies from those parts on board, failed
to effect anything, through the plot having been betrayed by
Nicomachus, a Phocian from Phanotis, who told the Lacedaemonians,
and they the Boeotians. Succours accordingly flocked in from all parts
of Boeotia, Hippocrates not being yet there to make his diversion, and
Siphae and Chaeronea were promptly secured, and the conspirators,
informed of the mistake, did not venture on any movement in the towns.
Meanwhile Hippocrates made a levy in mass of the citizens,
resident aliens, and foreigners in Athens, and arrived at his
destination after the Boeotians had already come back from Siphae, and
encamping his army began to fortify Delium, the sanctuary of Apollo,
in the following manner. A trench was dug all round the temple and the
consecrated ground, and the earth thrown up from the excavation was
made to do duty as a wall, in which stakes were also planted, the
vines round the sanctuary being cut down and thrown in, together
with stones and bricks pulled down from the houses near; every
means, in short, being used to run up the rampart. Wooden towers
were also erected where they were wanted, and where there was no
part of the temple buildings left standing, as on the side where the
gallery once existing had fallen in. The work was begun on the third
day after leaving home, and continued during the fourth, and till
dinnertime on the fifth, when most of it being now finished the army
removed from Delium about a mile and a quarter on its way home. From
this point most of the light troops went straight on, while the
heavy infantry halted and remained where they were; Hippocrates having
stayed behind at Delium to arrange the posts, and to give directions
for the completion of such part of the outworks as had been left
unfinished.
During the days thus employed the Boeotians were mustering at
Tanagra, and by the time that they had come in from all the towns,
found the Athenians already on their way home. The rest of the
eleven Boeotarchs were against giving battle, as the enemy was no
longer in Boeotia, the Athenians being just over the Oropian border,
when they halted; but Pagondas, son of Aeolidas, one of the Boeotarchs
of Thebes (Arianthides, son of Lysimachidas, being the other), and
then commander-in-chief, thought it best to hazard a battle. He
accordingly called the men to him, company after company, to prevent
their all leaving their arms at once, and urged them to attack the
Athenians, and stand the issue of a battle, speaking as follows:
"Boeotians, the idea that we ought not to give battle to the
Athenians, unless we came up with them in Boeotia, is one which should
never have entered into the head of any of us, your generals. It was
to annoy Boeotia that they crossed the frontier and built a fort in
our country; and they are therefore, I imagine, our enemies wherever
we may come up with them, and from wheresoever they may have come to
act as enemies do. And if any one has taken up with the idea in
question for reasons of safety, it is high time for him to change
his mind. The party attacked, whose own country is in danger, can
scarcely discuss what is prudent with the calmness of men who are in
full enjoyment of what they have got, and are thinking of attacking
a neighbour in order to get more. It is your national habit, in your
country or out of it, to oppose the same resistance to a foreign
invader; and when that invader is Athenian, and lives upon your
frontier besides, it is doubly imperative to do so. As between
neighbours generally, freedom means simply a determination to hold
one's own; and with neighbours like these, who are trying to enslave
near and far alike, there is nothing for it but to fight it out to the
last. Look at the condition of the Euboeans and of most of the rest of
Hellas, and be convinced that others have to fight with their
neighbours for this frontier or that, but that for us conquest means
one frontier for the whole country, about which no dispute can be
made, for they will simply come and take by force what we have. So
much more have we to fear from this neighbour than from another.
Besides, people who, like the Athenians in the present instance, are
tempted by pride of strength to attack their neighbours, usually march
most confidently against those who keep still, and only defend
themselves in their own country, but think twice before they grapple
with those who meet them outside their frontier and strike the first
blow if opportunity offers. The Athenians have shown us this
themselves; the defeat which we inflicted upon them at Coronea, at the
time when our quarrels had allowed them to occupy the country, has
given great security to Boeotia until the present day. Remembering
this, the old must equal their ancient exploits, and the young, the
sons of the heroes of that time, must endeavour not to disgrace
their native valour; and trusting in the help of the god whose
temple has been sacrilegiously fortified, and in the victims which
in our sacrifices have proved propitious, we must march against the
enemy, and teach him that he must go and get what he wants by
attacking someone who will not resist him, but that men whose glory it
is to be always ready to give battle for the liberty of their own
country, and never unjustly to enslave that of others, will not let
him go without a struggle."
By these arguments Pagondas persuaded the Boeotians to attack the
Athenians, and quickly breaking up his camp led his army forward, it
being now late in the day. On nearing the enemy, he halted in a
position where a hill intervening prevented the two armies from seeing
each other, and then formed and prepared for action. Meanwhile
Hippocrates at Delium, informed of the approach of the Boeotians, sent
orders to his troops to throw themselves into line, and himself joined
them not long afterwards, leaving about three hundred horse behind him
at Delium, at once to guard the place in case of attack, and to
watch their opportunity and fall upon the Boeotians during the battle.
The Boeotians placed a detachment to deal with these, and when
everything was arranged to their satisfaction appeared over the
hill, and halted in the order which they had determined on, to the
number of seven thousand heavy infantry, more than ten thousand
light troops, one thousand horse, and five hundred targeteers. On
their right were the Thebans and those of their province, in the
centre the Haliartians, Coronaeans, Copaeans, and the other people
around the lake, and on the left the Thespians, Tanagraeans, and
Orchomenians, the cavalry and the light troops being at the
extremity of each wing. The Thebans formed twenty-five shields deep,
the rest as they pleased. Such was the strength and disposition of the
Boeotian army.
On the side of the Athenians, the heavy infantry throughout the
whole army formed eight deep, being in numbers equal to the enemy,
with the cavalry upon the two wings. Light troops regularly armed
there were none in the army, nor had there ever been any at Athens.
Those who had joined in the invasion, though many times more
numerous than those of the enemy, had mostly followed unarmed, as part
of the levy in mass of the citizens and foreigners at Athens, and
having started first on their way home were not present in any number.
The armies being now in line and upon the point of engaging,
Hippocrates, the general, passed along the Athenian ranks, and
encouraged them as follows:
"Athenians, I shall only say a few words to you, but brave men
require no more, and they are addressed more to your understanding
than to your courage. None of you must fancy that we are going out
of our way to run this risk in the country of another. Fought in their
territory the battle will be for ours: if we conquer, the
Peloponnesians will never invade your country without the Boeotian
horse, and in one battle you will win Boeotia and in a manner free
Attica. Advance to meet them then like citizens of a country in
which you all glory as the first in Hellas, and like sons of the
fathers who beat them at Oenophyta with Myronides and thus gained
possession of Boeotia."
Hippocrates had got half through the army with his exhortation, when
the Boeotians, after a few more hasty words from Pagondas, struck up
the paean, and came against them from the hill; the Athenians
advancing to meet them, and closing at a run. The extreme wing of
neither army came into action, one like the other being stopped by the
water-courses in the way; the rest engaged with the utmost
obstinacy, shield against shield. The Boeotian left, as far as the
centre, was worsted by the Athenians. The Thespians in that part of
the field suffered most severely. The troops alongside them having
given way, they were surrounded in a narrow space and cut down
fighting hand to hand; some of the Athenians also fell into
confusion in surrounding the enemy and mistook and so killed each
other. In this part of the field the Boeotians were beaten, and
retreated upon the troops still fighting; but the right, where the
Thebans were, got the better of the Athenians and shoved them
further and further back, though gradually at first. It so happened
also that Pagondas, seeing the distress of his left, had sent two
squadrons of horse, where they could not be seen, round the hill,
and their sudden appearance struck a panic into the victorious wing of
the Athenians, who thought that it was another army coming against
them. At length in both parts of the field, disturbed by this panic,
and with their line broken by the advancing Thebans, the whole
Athenian army took to flight. Some made for Delium and the sea, some
for Oropus, others for Mount Parnes, or wherever they had hopes of
safety, pursued and cut down by the Boeotians, and in particular by
the cavalry, composed partly of Boeotians and partly of Locrians,
who had come up just as the rout began. Night however coming on to
interrupt the pursuit, the mass of the fugitives escaped more easily
than they would otherwise have done. The next day the troops at Oropus
and Delium returned home by sea, after leaving a garrison in the
latter place, which they continued to hold notwithstanding the defeat.
The Boeotians set up a trophy, took up their own dead, and
stripped those of the enemy, and leaving a guard over them retired
to Tanagra, there to take measures for attacking Delium. Meanwhile a
herald came from the Athenians to ask for the dead, but was met and
turned back by a Boeotian herald, who told him that he would effect
nothing until the return of himself the Boeotian herald, and who
then went on to the Athenians, and told them on the part of the
Boeotians that they had done wrong in transgressing the law of the
Hellenes. Of what use was the universal custom protecting the
temples in an invaded country, if the Athenians were to fortify Delium
and live there, acting exactly as if they were on unconsecrated
ground, and drawing and using for their purposes the water which they,
the Boeotians, never touched except for sacred uses? Accordingly for
the god as well as for themselves, in the name of the deities
concerned, and of Apollo, the Boeotians invited them first to evacuate
the temple, if they wished to take up the dead that belonged to them.
After these words from the herald, the Athenians sent their own
herald to the Boeotians to say that they had not done any wrong to the
temple, and for the future would do it no more harm than they could
help; not having occupied it originally in any such design, but to
defend themselves from it against those who were really wronging them.
The law of the Hellenes was that conquest of a country, whether more
or less extensive, carried with it possession of the temples in that
country, with the obligation to keep up the usual ceremonies, at least
as far as possible. The Boeotians and most other people who had turned
out the owners of a country, and put themselves in their places by
force, now held as of right the temples which they originally
entered as usurpers. If the Athenians could have conquered more of
Boeotia this would have been the case with them: as things stood,
the piece of it which they had got they should treat as their own, and
not quit unless obliged. The water they had disturbed under the
impulsion of a necessity which they had not wantonly incurred,
having been forced to use it in defending themselves against the
Boeotians who first invaded Attica. Besides, anything done under the
pressure of war and danger might reasonably claim indulgence even in
the eye of the god; or why, pray, were the altars the asylum for
involuntary offences? Transgression also was a term applied to
presumptuous offenders, not to the victims of adverse circumstances.
In short, which were most impious--the Boeotians who wished to barter
dead bodies for holy places, or the Athenians who refused to give up
holy places to obtain what was theirs by right? The condition of
evacuating Boeotia must therefore be withdrawn. They were no longer in
Boeotia. They stood where they stood by the right of the sword. All
that the Boeotians had to do was to tell them to take up their dead
under a truce according to the national custom.
The Boeotians replied that if they were in Boeotia, they must
evacuate that country before taking up their dead; if they were in
their own territory, they could do as they pleased: for they knew
that, although the Oropid where the bodies as it chanced were lying
(the battle having been fought on the borders) was subject to
Athens, yet the Athenians could not get them without their leave.
Besides, why should they grant a truce for Athenian ground? And what
could be fairer than to tell them to evacuate Boeotia if they wished
to get what they asked? The Athenian herald accordingly returned
with this answer, without having accomplished his object.
Meanwhile the Boeotians at once sent for darters and slingers from
the Malian Gulf, and with two thousand Corinthian heavy infantry who
had joined them after the battle, the Peloponnesian garrison which had
evacuated Nisaea, and some Megarians with them, marched against
Delium, and attacked the fort, and after divers efforts finally
succeeded in taking it by an engine of the following description. They
sawed in two and scooped out a great beam from end to end, and fitting
it nicely together again like a pipe, hung by chains a cauldron at one
extremity, with which communicated an iron tube projecting from the
beam, which was itself in great part plated with iron. This they
brought up from a distance upon carts to the part of the wall
principally composed of vines and timber, and when it was near,
inserted huge bellows into their end of the beam and blew with them.
The blast passing closely confined into the cauldron, which was filled
with lighted coals, sulphur and pitch, made a great blaze, and set
fire to the wall, which soon became untenable for its defenders, who
left it and fled; and in this way the fort was taken. Of the
garrison some were killed and two hundred made prisoners; most of
the rest got on board their ships and returned home.
Soon after the fall of Delium, which took place seventeen days after
the battle, the Athenian herald, without knowing what had happened,
came again for the dead, which were now restored by the Boeotians, who
no longer answered as at first. Not quite five hundred Boeotians
fell in the battle, and nearly one thousand Athenians, including
Hippocrates the general, besides a great number of light troops and
camp followers.
Soon after this battle Demosthenes, after the failure of his
voyage to Siphae and of the plot on the town, availed himself of the
Acarnanian and Agraean troops and of the four hundred Athenian heavy
infantry which he had on board, to make a descent on the Sicyonian
coast. Before however all his ships had come to shore, the
Sicyonians came up and routed and chased to their ships those that had
landed, killing some and taking others prisoners; after which they set
up a trophy, and gave back the dead under truce.
About the same time with the affair of Delium took place the death
of Sitalces, king of the Odrysians, who was defeated in battle, in a
campaign against the Triballi; Seuthes, son of Sparadocus, his nephew,
succeeding to the kingdom of the Odrysians, and of the rest of
Thrace ruled by Sitalces.
The same winter Brasidas, with his allies in the Thracian places,
marched against Amphipolis, the Athenian colony on the river
Strymon. A settlement upon the spot on which the city now stands was
before attempted by Aristagoras, the Milesian (when he fled from
King Darius), who was however dislodged by the Edonians; and
thirty-two years later by the Athenians, who sent thither ten thousand
settlers of their own citizens, and whoever else chose to go. These
were cut off at Drabescus by the Thracians. Twenty-nine years after,
the Athenians returned (Hagnon, son of Nicias, being sent out as
leader of the colony) and drove out the Edonians, and founded a town
on the spot, formerly called Ennea Hodoi or Nine Ways. The base from
which they started was Eion, their commercial seaport at the mouth
of the river, not more than three miles from the present town, which
Hagnon named Amphipolis, because the Strymon flows round it on two
sides, and he built it so as to be conspicuous from the sea and land
alike, running a long wall across from river to river, to complete the
circumference.
Brasidas now marched against this town, starting from Arne in
Chalcidice. Arriving about dusk at Aulon and Bromiscus, where the lake
of Bolbe runs into the sea, he supped there, and went on during the
night. The weather was stormy and it was snowing a little, which
encouraged him to hurry on, in order, if possible, to take every one
at Amphipolis by surprise, except the party who were to betray it. The
plot was carried on by some natives of Argilus, an Andrian colony,
residing in Amphipolis, where they had also other accomplices gained
over by Perdiccas or the Chalcidians. But the most active in the
matter were the inhabitants of Argilus itself, which is close by,
who had always been suspected by the Athenians, and had had designs on
the place. These men now saw their opportunity arrive with Brasidas,
and having for some time been in correspondence with their
countrymen in Amphipolis for the betrayal of the town, at once
received him into Argilus, and revolted from the Athenians, and that
same night took him on to the bridge over the river; where he found
only a small guard to oppose him, the town being at some distance from
the passage, and the walls not reaching down to it as at present. This
guard he easily drove in, partly through there being treason in
their ranks, partly from the stormy state of the weather and the
suddenness of his attack, and so got across the bridge, and
immediately became master of all the property outside; the
Amphipolitans having houses all over the quarter.
The passage of Brasidas was a complete surprise to the people in the
town; and the capture of many of those outside, and the flight of
the rest within the wall, combined to produce great confusion among
the citizens; especially as they did not trust one another. It is even
said that if Brasidas, instead of stopping to pillage, had advanced
straight against the town, he would probably have taken it. In fact,
however, he established himself where he was and overran the country
outside, and for the present remained inactive, vainly awaiting a
demonstration on the part of his friends within. Meanwhile the party
opposed to the traitors proved numerous enough to prevent the gates
being immediately thrown open, and in concert with Eucles, the
general, who had come from Athens to defend the place, sent to the
other commander in Thrace, Thucydides, son of Olorus, the author of
this history, who was at the isle of Thasos, a Parian colony, half a
day's sail from Amphipolis, to tell him to come to their relief. On
receipt of this message he at once set sail with seven ships which
he had with him, in order, if possible, to reach Amphipolis in time to
prevent its capitulation, or in any case to save Eion.
Meanwhile Brasidas, afraid of succours arriving by sea from
Thasos, and learning that Thucydides possessed the right of working
the gold mines in that part of Thrace, and had thus great influence
with the inhabitants of the continent, hastened to gain the town, if
possible, before the people of Amphipolis should be encouraged by
his arrival to hope that he could save them by getting together a
force of allies from the sea and from Thrace, and so refuse to
surrender. He accordingly offered moderate terms, proclaiming that any
of the Amphipolitans and Athenians who chose, might continue to
enjoy their property with full rights of citizenship; while those
who did not wish to stay had five days to depart, taking their
property with them.
The bulk of the inhabitants, upon hearing this, began to change
their minds, especially as only a small number of the citizens were
Athenians, the majority having come from different quarters, and
many of the prisoners outside had relations within the walls. They
found the proclamation a fair one in comparison of what their fear had
suggested; the Athenians being glad to go out, as they thought they
ran more risk than the rest, and further, did not expect any speedy
relief, and the multitude generally being content at being left in
possession of their civic rights, and at such an unexpected reprieve
from danger. The partisans of Brasidas now openly advocated this
course, seeing that the feeling of the people had changed, and that
they no longer gave ear to the Athenian general present; and thus
the surrender was made and Brasidas was admitted by them on the
terms of his proclamation. In this way they gave up the city, and late
in the same day Thucydides and his ships entered the harbour of
Eion, Brasidas having just got hold of Amphipolis, and having been
within a night of taking Eion: had the ships been less prompt in
relieving it, in the morning it would have been his.
After this Thucydides put all in order at Eion to secure it
against any present or future attack of Brasidas, and received such as
had elected to come there from the interior according to the terms
agreed on. Meanwhile Brasidas suddenly sailed with a number of boats
down the river to Eion to see if he could not seize the point
running out from the wall, and so command the entrance; at the same
time he attempted it by land, but was beaten off on both sides and had
to content himself with arranging matters at Amphipolis and in the
neighbourhood. Myrcinus, an Edonian town, also came over to him; the
Edonian king Pittacus having been killed by the sons of Goaxis and his
own wife Brauro; and Galepsus and Oesime, which are Thasian
colonies, not long after followed its example. Perdiccas too came up
immediately after the capture and joined in these arrangements.
The news that Amphipolis was in the hands of the enemy caused
great alarm at Athens. Not only was the town valuable for the timber
it afforded for shipbuilding, and the money that it brought in; but
also, although the escort of the Thessalians gave the Lacedaemonians a
means of reaching the allies of Athens as far as the Strymon, yet as
long as they were not masters of the bridge but were watched on the
side of Eion by the Athenian galleys, and on the land side impeded
by a large and extensive lake formed by the waters of the river, it
was impossible for them to go any further. Now, on the contrary, the
path seemed open. There was also the fear of the allies revolting,
owing to the moderation displayed by Brasidas in all his conduct,
and to the declarations which he was everywhere making that he sent
out to free Hellas. The towns subject to the Athenians, hearing of the
capture of Amphipolis and of the terms accorded to it, and of the
gentleness of Brasidas, felt most strongly encouraged to change
their condition, and sent secret messages to him, begging him to
come on to them; each wishing to be the first to revolt. Indeed
there seemed to be no danger in so doing; their mistake in their
estimate of the Athenian power was as great as that power afterwards
turned out to be, and their judgment was based more upon blind wishing
than upon any sound prevision; for it is a habit of mankind to entrust
to careless hope what they long for, and to use sovereign reason to
thrust aside what they do not fancy. Besides the late severe blow
which the Athenians had met with in Boeotia, joined to the
seductive, though untrue, statements of Brasidas, about the
Athenians not having ventured to engage his single army at Nisaea,
made the allies confident, and caused them to believe that no Athenian
force would be sent against them. Above all the wish to do what was
agreeable at the moment, and the likelihood that they should find
the Lacedaemonians full of zeal at starting, made them eager to
venture. Observing this, the Athenians sent garrisons to the different
towns, as far as was possible at such short notice and in winter;
while Brasidas sent dispatches to Lacedaemon asking for
reinforcements, and himself made preparations for building galleys
in the Strymon. The Lacedaemonians however did not send him any,
partly through envy on the part of their chief men, partly because
they were more bent on recovering the prisoners of the island and
ending the war.
The same winter the Megarians took and razed to the foundations
the long walls which had been occupied by the Athenians; and
Brasidas after the capture of Amphipolis marched with his allies
against Acte, a promontory running out from the King's dike with an
inward curve, and ending in Athos, a lofty mountain looking towards
the Aegean Sea. In it are various towns, Sane, an Andrian colony,
close to the canal, and facing the sea in the direction of Euboea; the
others being Thyssus, Cleone, Acrothoi, Olophyxus, and Dium, inhabited
by mixed barbarian races speaking the two languages. There is also a
small Chalcidian element; but the greater number are
Tyrrheno-Pelasgians once settled in Lemnos and Athens, and Bisaltians,
Crestonians, and Edonians; the towns being all small ones. Most of
these came over to Brasidas; but Sane and Dium held out and saw
their land ravaged by him and his army.
Upon their not submitting, he at once marched against Torone in
Chalcidice, which was held by an Athenian garrison, having been
invited by a few persons who were prepared to hand over the town.
Arriving in the dark a little before daybreak, he sat down with his
army near the temple of the Dioscuri, rather more than a quarter of
a mile from the city. The rest of the town of Torone and the Athenians
in garrison did not perceive his approach; but his partisans knowing
that he was coming (a few of them had secretly gone out to meet him)
were on the watch for his arrival, and were no sooner aware of it than
they took it to them seven light-armed men with daggers, who alone
of twenty men ordered on this service dared to enter, commanded by
Lysistratus an Olynthian. These passed through the sea wall, and
without being seen went up and put to the sword the garrison of the
highest post in the town, which stands on a hill, and broke open the
postern on the side of Canastraeum.
Brasidas meanwhile came a little nearer and then halted with his
main body, sending on one hundred targeteers to be ready to rush in
first, the moment that a gate should be thrown open and the beacon
lighted as agreed. After some time passed in waiting and wondering
at the delay, the targeteers by degrees got up close to the town.
The Toronaeans inside at work with the party that had entered had by
this time broken down the postern and opened the gates leading to
the market-place by cutting through the bar, and first brought some
men round and let them in by the postern, in order to strike a panic
into the surprised townsmen by suddenly attacking them from behind and
on both sides at once; after which they raised the fire-signal as
had been agreed, and took in by the market gates the rest of the
targeteers.
Brasidas seeing the signal told the troops to rise, and dashed
forward amid the loud hurrahs of his men, which carried dismay among
the astonished townspeople. Some burst in straight by the gate, others
over some square pieces of timber placed against the wall (which has
fallen down and was being rebuilt) to draw up stones; Brasidas and the
greater number making straight uphill for the higher part of the town,
in order to take it from top to bottom, and once for all, while the
rest of the multitude spread in all directions.
The capture of the town was effected before the great body of the
Toronaeans had recovered from their surprise and confusion; but the
conspirators and the citizens of their party at once joined the
invaders. About fifty of the Athenian heavy infantry happened to be
sleeping in the market-place when the alarm reached them. A few of
these were killed fighting; the rest escaped, some by land, others
to the two ships on the station, and took refuge in Lecythus, a fort
garrisoned by their own men in the corner of the town running out into
the sea and cut off by a narrow isthmus; where they were joined by the
Toronaeans of their party.
Day now arrived, and the town being secured, Brasidas made a
proclamation to the Toronaeans who had taken refuge with the
Athenians, to come out, as many as chose, to their homes without
fearing for their rights or persons, and sent a herald to invite the
Athenians to accept a truce, and to evacuate Lecythus with their
property, as being Chalcidian ground. The Athenians refused this
offer, but asked for a truce for a day to take up their dead. Brasidas
granted it for two days, which he employed in fortifying the houses
near, and the Athenians in doing the same to their positions.
Meanwhile he called a meeting of the Toronaeans, and said very much
what he had said at Acanthus, namely, that they must not look upon
those who had negotiated with him for the capture of the town as bad
men or as traitors, as they had not acted as they had done from
corrupt motives or in order to enslave the city, but for the good
and freedom of Torone; nor again must those who had not shared in
the enterprise fancy that they would not equally reap its fruits, as
he had not come to destroy either city or individual. This was the
reason of his proclamation to those that had fled for refuge to the
Athenians: he thought none the worse of them for their friendship
for the Athenians; he believed that they had only to make trial of the
Lacedaemonians to like them as well, or even much better, as acting
much more justly: it was for want of such a trial that they were now
afraid of them. Meanwhile he warned all of them to prepare to be
staunch allies, and for being held responsible for all faults in
future: for the past, they had not wronged the Lacedaemonians but
had been wronged by others who were too strong for them, and any
opposition that they might have offered him could be excused.
Having encouraged them with this address, as soon as the truce
expired he made his attack upon Lecythus; the Athenians defending
themselves from a poor wall and from some houses with parapets. One
day they beat him off; the next the enemy were preparing to bring up
an engine against them from which they meant to throw fire upon the
wooden defences, and the troops were already coming up to the point
where they fancied they could best bring up the engine, and where
place was most assailable; meanwhile the Athenians put a wooden
tower upon a house opposite, and carried up a quantity of jars and
casks of water and big stones, and a large number of men also
climbed up. The house thus laden too heavily suddenly broke down
with a loud crash; at which the men who were near and saw it were more
vexed than frightened; but those not so near, and still more those
furthest off, thought that the place was already taken at that
point, and fled in haste to the sea and the ships.
Brasidas, perceiving that they were deserting the parapet, and
seeing what was going on, dashed forward with his troops, and
immediately took the fort, and put to the sword all whom he found in
it. In this way the place was evacuated by the Athenians, who went
across in their boats and ships to Pallene. Now there is a temple of
Athene in Lecythus, and Brasidas had proclaimed in the moment of
making the assault that he would give thirty silver minae to the man
first on the wall. Being now of opinion that the capture was
scarcely due to human means, he gave the thirty minae to the goddess
for her temple, and razed and cleared Lecythus, and made the whole
of it consecrated ground. The rest of the winter he spent in
settling the places in his hands, and in making designs upon the rest;
and with the expiration of the winter the eighth year of this war
ended.
In the spring of the summer following, the Lacedaemonians and
Athenians made an armistice for a year; the Athenians thinking that
they would thus have full leisure to take their precautions before
Brasidas could procure the revolt of any more of their towns, and
might also, if it suited them, conclude a general peace; the
Lacedaemonians divining the actual fears of the Athenians, and
thinking that after once tasting a respite from trouble and misery
they would be more disposed to consent to a reconciliation, and to
give back the prisoners, and make a treaty for the longer period.
The great idea of the Lacedaemonians was to get back their men while
Brasidas's good fortune lasted: further successes might make the
struggle a less unequal one in Chalcidice, but would leave them
still deprived of their men, and even in Chalcidice not more than a
match for the Athenians and by no means certain of victory. An
armistice was accordingly concluded by Lacedaemon and her allies
upon the terms following:
1. As to the temple and oracle of the Pythian Apollo, we are
agreed that whosoever will shall have access to it, without fraud or
fear, according to the usages of his forefathers. The Lacedaemonians
and the allies present agree to this, and promise to send heralds to
the Boeotians and Phocians, and to do their best to persuade them to
agree likewise.
2. As to the treasure of the god, we agree to exert ourselves to
detect all malversators, truly and honestly following the customs of
our forefathers, we and you and all others willing to do so, all
following the customs of our forefathers. As to these points the
Lacedaemonians and the other allies are agreed as has been said.
3. As to what follows, the Lacedaemonians and the other allies
agree, if the Athenians conclude a treaty, to remain, each of us in
our own territory, retaining our respective acquisitions: the garrison
in Coryphasium keeping within Buphras and Tomeus: that in Cythera
attempting no communication with the Peloponnesian confederacy,
neither we with them, nor they with us: that in Nisaea and Minoa not
crossing the road leading from the gates of the temple of Nisus to
that of Poseidon and from thence straight to the bridge at Minoa:
the Megarians and the allies being equally bound not to cross this
road, and the Athenians retaining the island they have taken,
without any communication on either side: as to Troezen, each side
retaining what it has, and as was arranged with the Athenians.
4. As to the use of the sea, so far as refers to their own coast
and to that of their confederacy, that the Lacedaemonians and their
allies may voyage upon it in any vessel rowed by oars and of not
more than five hundred talents tonnage, not a vessel of war.
5. That all heralds and embassies, with as many attendants as they
please, for concluding the war and adjusting claims, shall have free
passage, going and coming, to Peloponnese or Athens by land and by
sea.
6. That during the truce, deserters whether bond or free shall
be received neither by you, nor by us.
7. Further, that satisfaction shall be given by you to us and by
us to you according to the public law of our several countries, all
disputes being settled by law without recourse to hostilities.
The Lacedaemonians and allies agree to these articles; but if
you have anything fairer or juster to suggest, come to Lacedaemon
and let us know: whatever shall be just will meet with no objection
either from the Lacedaemonians or from the allies. Only let those
who come come with full powers, as you desire us. The truce shall be
for one year.
Approved by the people.
The tribe of Acamantis had the prytany, Phoenippus was
secretary, Niciades chairman. Laches moved, in the name of the good
luck of the Athenians, that they should conclude the armistice upon
the terms agreed upon by the Lacedaemonians and the allies. It was
agreed accordingly in the popular assembly that the armistice should
be for one year, beginning that very day, the fourteenth of the
month of Elaphebolion; during which time ambassadors and heralds
should go and come between the two countries to discuss the bases of a
pacification. That the generals and prytanes should call an assembly
of the people, in which the Athenians should first consult on the
peace, and on the mode in which the embassy for putting an end to
the war should be admitted. That the embassy now present should at
once take the engagement before the people to keep well and truly this
truce for one year.
On these terms the Lacedaemonians concluded with the Athenians and
their allies on the twelfth day of the Spartan month Gerastius; the
allies also taking the oaths. Those who concluded and poured the
libation were Taurus, son of Echetimides, Athenaeus, son of
Pericleidas, and Philocharidas, son of Eryxidaidas, Lacedaemonians;
Aeneas, son of Ocytus, and Euphamidas, son of Aristonymus,
Corinthians; Damotimus, son of Naucrates, and Onasimus, son of
Megacles, Sicyonians; Nicasus, son of Cecalus, and Menecrates, son
of Amphidorus, Megarians; and Amphias, son of Eupaidas, an Epidaurian;
and the Athenian generals Nicostratus, son of Diitrephes, Nicias,
son of Niceratus, and Autocles, son of Tolmaeus. Such was the
armistice, and during the whole of it conferences went on on the
subject of a pacification.
In the days in which they were going backwards and forwards to these
conferences, Scione, a town in Pallene, revolted from Athens, and went
over to Brasidas. The Scionaeans say that they are Pallenians from
Peloponnese, and that their first founders on their voyage from Troy
were carried in to this spot by the storm which the Achaeans were
caught in, and there settled. The Scionaeans had no sooner revolted
than Brasidas crossed over by night to Scione, with a friendly
galley ahead and himself in a small boat some way behind; his idea
being that if he fell in with a vessel larger than the boat he would
have the galley to defend him, while a ship that was a match for the
galley would probably neglect the small vessel to attack the large
one, and thus leave him time to escape. His passage effected, he
called a meeting of the Scionaeans and spoke to the same effect as
at Acanthus and Torone, adding that they merited the utmost
commendation, in that, in spite of Pallene within the isthmus being
cut off by the Athenian occupation of Potidaea and of their own
practically insular position, they had of their own free will gone
forward to meet their liberty instead of timorously waiting until they
had been by force compelled to their own manifest good. This was a
sign that they would valiantly undergo any trial, however great; and
if he should order affairs as he intended, he should count them
among the truest and sincerest friends of the Lacedaemonians, and
would in every other way honour them.
The Scionaeans were elated by his language, and even those who had
at first disapproved of what was being done catching the general
confidence, they determined on a vigorous conduct of the war, and
welcomed Brasidas with all possible honours, publicly crowning him
with a crown of gold as the liberator of Hellas; while private persons
crowded round him and decked him with garlands as though he had been
an athlete. Meanwhile Brasidas left them a small garrison for the
present and crossed back again, and not long afterwards sent over a
larger force, intending with the help of the Scionaeans to attempt
Mende and Potidaea before the Athenians should arrive; Scione, he
felt, being too like an island for them not to relieve it. He had
besides intelligence in the above towns about their betrayal.
In the midst of his designs upon the towns in question, a galley
arrived with the commissioners carrying round the news of the
armistice, Aristonymus for the Athenians and Athenaeus for the
Lacedaemonians. The troops now crossed back to Torone, and the
commissioners gave Brasidas notice of the convention. All the
Lacedaemonian allies in Thrace accepted what had been done; and
Aristonymus made no difficulty about the rest, but finding, on
counting the days, that the Scionaeans had revolted after the date
of the convention, refused to include them in it. To this Brasidas
earnestly objected, asserting that the revolt took place before, and
would not give up the town. Upon Aristonymus reporting the case to
Athens, the people at once prepared to send an expedition to Scione.
Upon this, envoys arrived from Lacedaemon, alleging that this would be
a breach of the truce, and laying claim to the town upon the faith
of the assertion of Brasidas, and meanwhile offering to submit the
question to arbitration. Arbitration, however, was what the
Athenians did not choose to risk; being determined to send troops at
once to the place, and furious at the idea of even the islanders now
daring to revolt, in a vain reliance upon the power of the
Lacedaemonians by land. Besides the facts of the revolt were rather as
the Athenians contended, the Scionaeans having revolted two days after
the convention. Cleon accordingly succeeded in carrying a decree to
reduce and put to death the Scionaeans; and the Athenians employed the
leisure which they now enjoyed in preparing for the expedition.
Meanwhile Mende revolted, a town in Pallene and a colony of the
Eretrians, and was received without scruple by Brasidas, in spite of
its having evidently come over during the armistice, on account of
certain infringements of the truce alleged by him against the
Athenians. This audacity of Mende was partly caused by seeing Brasidas
forward in the matter and by the conclusions drawn from his refusal to
betray Scione; and besides, the conspirators in Mende were few, and,
as I have already intimated, had carried on their practices too long
not to fear detection for themselves, and not to wish to force the
inclination of the multitude. This news made the Athenians more
furious than ever, and they at once prepared against both towns.
Brasidas, expecting their arrival, conveyed away to Olynthus in
Chalcidice the women and children of the Scionaeans and Mendaeans, and
sent over to them five hundred Peloponnesian heavy infantry and
three hundred Chalcidian targeteers, all under the command of
Polydamidas.
Leaving these two towns to prepare together against the speedy
arrival of the Athenians, Brasidas and Perdiccas started on a second
joint expedition into Lyncus against Arrhabaeus; the latter with the
forces of his Macedonian subjects, and a corps of heavy infantry
composed of Hellenes domiciled in the country; the former with the
Peloponnesians whom he still had with him and the Chalcidians,
Acanthians, and the rest in such force as they were able. In all there
were about three thousand Hellenic heavy infantry, accompanied by
all the Macedonian cavalry with the Chalcidians, near one thousand
strong, besides an immense crowd of barbarians. On entering the
country of Arrhabaeus, they found the Lyncestians encamped awaiting
them, and themselves took up a position opposite. The infantry on
either side were upon a hill, with a plain between them, into which
the horse of both armies first galloped down and engaged a cavalry
action. After this the Lyncestian heavy infantry advanced from their
hill to join their cavalry and offered battle; upon which Brasidas and
Perdiccas also came down to meet them, and engaged and routed them
with heavy loss; the survivors taking refuge upon the heights and
there remaining inactive. The victors now set up a trophy and waited
two or three days for the Illyrian mercenaries who were to join
Perdiccas. Perdiccas then wished to go on and attack the villages of
Arrhabaeus, and to sit still no longer; but Brasidas, afraid that
the Athenians might sail up during his absence, and of something
happening to Mende, and seeing besides that the Illyrians did not
appear, far from seconding this wish was anxious to return.
While they were thus disputing, the news arrived that the
Illyrians had actually betrayed Perdiccas and had joined Arrhabaeus;
and the fear inspired by their warlike character made both parties now
think it best to retreat. However, owing to the dispute, nothing had
been settled as to when they should start; and night coming on, the
Macedonians and the barbarian crowd took fright in a moment in one
of those mysterious panics to which great armies are liable; and
persuaded that an army many times more numerous than that which had
really arrived was advancing and all but upon them, suddenly broke and
fled in the direction of home, and thus compelled Perdiccas, who at
first did not perceive what had occurred, to depart without seeing
Brasidas, the two armies being encamped at a considerable distance
from each other. At daybreak Brasidas, perceiving that the Macedonians
had gone on, and that the Illyrians and Arrhabaeus were on the point
of attacking him, formed his heavy infantry into a square, with the
light troops in the centre, and himself also prepared to retreat.
Posting his youngest soldiers to dash out wherever the enemy should
attack them, he himself with three hundred picked men in the rear
intended to face about during the retreat and beat off the most
forward of their assailants, Meanwhile, before the enemy approached,
he sought to sustain the courage of his soldiers with the following
hasty exhortation:
"Peloponnesians, if I did not suspect you of being dismayed at being
left alone to sustain the attack of a numerous and barbarian enemy,
I should just have said a few words to you as usual without further
explanation. As it is, in the face of the desertion of our friends and
the numbers of the enemy, I have some advice and information to offer,
which, brief as they must be, will, I hope, suffice for the more
important points. The bravery that you habitually display in war
does not depend on your having allies at your side in this or that
encounter, but on your native courage; nor have numbers any terrors
for citizens of states like yours, in which the many do not rule the
few, but rather the few the many, owing their position to nothing else
than to superiority in the field. Inexperience now makes you afraid of
barbarians; and yet the trial of strength which you had with the
Macedonians among them, and my own judgment, confirmed by what I
hear from others, should be enough to satisfy you that they will not
prove formidable. Where an enemy seems strong but is really weak, a
true knowledge of the facts makes his adversary the bolder, just as
a serious antagonist is encountered most confidently by those who do
not know him. Thus the present enemy might terrify an inexperienced
imagination; they are formidable in outward bulk, their loud yelling
is unbearable, and the brandishing of their weapons in the air has a
threatening appearance. But when it comes to real fighting with an
opponent who stands his ground, they are not what they seemed; they
have no regular order that they should be ashamed of deserting their
positions when hard pressed; flight and attack are with them equally
honourable, and afford no test of courage; their independent mode of
fighting never leaving any one who wants to run away without a fair
excuse for so doing. In short, they think frightening you at a
secure distance a surer game than meeting you hand to hand;
otherwise they would have done the one and not the other. You can thus
plainly see that the terrors with which they were at first invested
are in fact trifling enough, though to the eye and ear very prominent.
Stand your ground therefore when they advance, and again wait your
opportunity to retire in good order, and you will reach a place of
safety all the sooner, and will know for ever afterwards that rabble
such as these, to those who sustain their first attack, do but show
off their courage by threats of the terrible things that they are
going to do, at a distance, but with those who give way to them are
quick enough to display their heroism in pursuit when they can do so
without danger."
With this brief address Brasidas began to lead off his army.
Seeing this, the barbarians came on with much shouting and hubbub,
thinking that he was flying and that they would overtake him and cut
him off. But wherever they charged they found the young men ready to
dash out against them, while Brasidas with his picked company
sustained their onset. Thus the Peloponnesians withstood the first
attack, to the surprise of the enemy, and afterwards received and
repulsed them as fast as they came on, retiring as soon as their
opponents became quiet. The main body of the barbarians ceased
therefore to molest the Hellenes with Brasidas in the open country,
and leaving behind a certain number to harass their march, the rest
went on after the flying Macedonians, slaying those with whom they
came up, and so arrived in time to occupy the narrow pass between
two hills that leads into the country of Arrhabaeus. They knew that
this was the only way by which Brasidas could retreat, and now
proceeded to surround him just as he entered the most impracticable
part of the road, in order to cut him off.
Brasidas, perceiving their intention, told his three hundred to
run on without order, each as quickly as he could, to the hill which
seemed easiest to take, and to try to dislodge the barbarians
already there, before they should be joined by the main body closing
round him. These attacked and overpowered the party upon the hill, and
the main army of the Hellenes now advanced with less difficulty
towards it--the barbarians being terrified at seeing their men on
that side driven from the height and no longer following the main
body, who, they considered, had gained the frontier and made good
their escape. The heights once gained, Brasidas now proceeded more
securely, and the same day arrived at Arnisa, the first town in the
dominions of Perdiccas. The soldiers, enraged at the desertion of
the Macedonians, vented their rage on all their yokes of oxen which
they found on the road, and on any baggage which had tumbled off (as
might easily happen in the panic of a night retreat), by unyoking
and cutting down the cattle and taking the baggage for themselves.
From this moment Perdiccas began to regard Brasidas as an enemy and to
feel against the Peloponnesians a hatred which could not be
congenial to the adversary of the Athenians. However, he departed from
his natural interests and made it his endeavour to come to terms
with the latter and to get rid of the former.
On his return from Macedonia to Torone, Brasidas found the Athenians
already masters of Mende, and remained quiet where he was, thinking it
now out of his power to cross over into Pallene and assist the
Mendaeans, but he kept good watch over Torone. For about the same time
as the campaign in Lyncus, the Athenians sailed upon the expedition
which we left them preparing against Mende and Scione, with fifty
ships, ten of which were Chians, one thousand Athenian heavy
infantry and six hundred archers, one hundred Thracian mercenaries and
some targeteers drawn from their allies in the neighbourhood, under
the command of Nicias, son of Niceratus, and Nicostratus, son of
Diitrephes. Weighing from Potidaea, the fleet came to land opposite
the temple of Poseidon, and proceeded against Mende; the men of
which town, reinforced by three hundred Scionaeans, with their
Peloponnesian auxiliaries, seven hundred heavy infantry in all,
under Polydamidas, they found encamped upon a strong hill outside
the city. These Nicias, with one hundred and twenty light-armed
Methonaeans, sixty picked men from the Athenian heavy infantry, and
all the archers, tried to reach by a path running up the hill, but
received a wound and found himself unable to force the position; while
Nicostratus, with all the rest of the army, advancing upon the hill,
which was naturally difficult, by a different approach further off,
was thrown into utter disorder; and the whole Athenian army narrowly
escaped being defeated. For that day, as the Mendaeans and their
allies showed no signs of yielding, the Athenians retreated and
encamped, and the Mendaeans at nightfall returned into the town.
The next day the Athenians sailed round to the Scione side, and took
the suburb, and all day plundered the country, without any one
coming out against them, partly because of intestine disturbances in
the town; and the following night the three hundred Scionaeans
returned home. On the morrow Nicias advanced with half the army to the
frontier of Scione and laid waste the country; while Nicostratus
with the remainder sat down before the town near the upper gate on the
road to Potidaea. The arms of the Mendaeans and of their Peloponnesian
auxiliaries within the wall happened to be piled in that quarter,
where Polydamidas accordingly began to draw them up for battle,
encouraging the Mendaeans to make a sortie. At this moment one of
the popular party answered him factiously that they would not go out
and did not want a war, and for thus answering was dragged by the
arm and knocked about by Polydamidas. Hereupon the infuriated
commons at once seized their arms and rushed at the Peloponnesians and
at their allies of the opposite faction. The troops thus assaulted
were at once routed, partly from the suddenness of the conflict and
partly through fear of the gates being opened to the Athenians, with
whom they imagined that the attack had been concerted. As many as were
not killed on the spot took refuge in the citadel, which they had held
from the first; and the whole, Athenian army, Nicias having by this
time returned and being close to the city, now burst into Mende, which
had opened its gates without any convention, and sacked it just as
if they had taken it by storm, the generals even finding some
difficulty in restraining them from also massacring the inhabitants.
After this the Athenians told the Mendaeans that they might retain
their civil rights, and themselves judge the supposed authors of the
revolt; and cut off the party in the citadel by a wall built down to
the sea on either side, appointing troops to maintain the blockade.
Having thus secured Mende, they proceeded against Scione.
The Scionaeans and Peloponnesians marched out against them,
occupying a strong hill in front of the town, which had to be captured
by the enemy before they could invest the place. The Athenians stormed
the hill, defeated and dislodged its occupants, and, having encamped
and set up a trophy, prepared for the work of circumvallation. Not
long after they had begun their operations, the auxiliaries besieged
in the citadel of Mende forced the guard by the sea-side and arrived
by night at Scione, into which most of them succeeded in entering,
passing through the besieging army.
While the investment of Scione was in progress, Perdiccas sent a
herald to the Athenian generals and made peace with the Athenians,
through spite against Brasidas for the retreat from Lyncus, from which
moment indeed he had begun to negotiate. The Lacedaemonian
Ischagoras was just then upon the point of starting with an army
overland to join Brasidas; and Perdiccas, being now required by Nicias
to give some proof of the sincerity of his reconciliation to the
Athenians, and being himself no longer disposed to let the
Peloponnesians into his country, put in motion his friends in
Thessaly, with whose chief men he always took care to have
relations, and so effectually stopped the army and its preparation
that they did not even try the Thessalians. Ischagoras himself,
however, with Ameinias and Aristeus, succeeded in reaching Brasidas;
they had been commissioned by the Lacedaemonians to inspect the
state of affairs, and brought out from Sparta (in violation of all
precedent) some of their young men to put in command of the towns,
to guard against their being entrusted to the persons upon the spot.
Brasidas accordingly placed Clearidas, son of Cleonymus, in
Amphipolis, and Pasitelidas, son of Hegesander, in Torone.
The same summer the Thebans dismantled the wall of the Thespians
on the charge of Atticism, having always wished to do so, and now
finding it an easy matter, as the flower of the Thespian youth had
perished in the battle with the Athenians. The same summer also the
temple of Hera at Argos was burnt down, through Chrysis, the
priestess, placing a lighted torch near the garlands and then
falling asleep, so that they all caught fire and were in a blaze
before she observed it. Chrysis that very night fled to Phlius for
fear of the Argives, who, agreeably to the law in such a case,
appointed another priestess named Phaeinis. Chrysis at the time of her
flight had been priestess for eight years of the present war and
half the ninth. At the close of the summer the investment of Scione
was completed, and the Athenians, leaving a detachment to maintain the
blockade, returned with the rest of their army.
During the winter following, the Athenians and Lacedaemonians were
kept quiet by the armistice; but the Mantineans and Tegeans, and their
respective allies, fought a battle at Laodicium, in the Oresthid.
The victory remained doubtful, as each side routed one of the wings
opposed to them, and both set up trophies and sent spoils to Delphi.
After heavy loss on both sides the battle was undecided, and night
interrupted the action; yet the Tegeans passed the night on the
field and set up a trophy at once, while the Mantineans withdrew to
Bucolion and set up theirs afterwards.
At the close of the same winter, in fact almost in spring,
Brasidas made an attempt upon Potidaea. He arrived by night, and
succeeded in planting a ladder against the wall without being
discovered, the ladder being planted just in the interval between
the passing round of the bell and the return of the man who brought it
back. Upon the garrison, however, taking the alarm immediately
afterwards, before his men came up, he quickly led off his troops,
without waiting until it was day. So ended the winter and the ninth
year of this war of which Thucydides is the historian.
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