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The History of the Peloponnesian War
Book 7 - Chapter XXIII
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Nineteenth Year of the War - Battles in the Great Harbour -
Retreat and Annihilation of the Athenian Army
While the Athenians lingered on in this way without moving from
where they were, Gylippus and Sicanus now arrived at Syracuse. Sicanus
had failed to gain Agrigentum, the party friendly to the Syracusans
having been driven out while he was still at Gela; but Gylippus was
accompanied not only by a large number of troops raised in Sicily, but
by the heavy infantry sent off in the spring from Peloponnese in the
merchantmen, who had arrived at Selinus from Libya. They had been
carried to Libya by a storm, and having obtained two galleys and
pilots from the Cyrenians, on their voyage alongshore had taken
sides with the Euesperitae and had defeated the Libyans who were
besieging them, and from thence coasting on to Neapolis, a
Carthaginian mart, and the nearest point to Sicily, from which it is
only two days' and a night's voyage, there crossed over and came to
Selinus. Immediately upon their arrival the Syracusans prepared to
attack the Athenians again by land and sea at once. The Athenian
generals seeing a fresh army come to the aid of the enemy, and that
their own circumstances, far from improving, were becoming daily
worse, and above all distressed by the sickness of the soldiers, now
began to repent of not having removed before; and Nicias no longer
offering the same opposition, except by urging that there should be no
open voting, they gave orders as secretly as possible for all to be
prepared to sail out from the camp at a given signal. All was at
last ready, and they were on the point of sailing away, when an
eclipse of the moon, which was then at the full, took place. Most of
the Athenians, deeply impressed by this occurrence, now urged the
generals to wait; and Nicias, who was somewhat over-addicted to
divination and practices of that kind, refused from that moment even
to take the question of departure into consideration, until they had
waited the thrice nine days prescribed by the soothsayers.
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The besiegers were thus condemned to stay in the country; and the Syracusans, getting wind of what had happened, became more eager
than ever to press the Athenians, who had now themselves
acknowledged that they were no longer their superiors either by sea or
by land, as otherwise they would never have planned to sail away.
Besides which the Syracusans did not wish them to settle in any
other part of Sicily, where they would be more difficult to deal with,
but desired to force them to fight at sea as quickly as possible, in a
position favourable to themselves. Accordingly they manned their ships
and practised for as many days as they thought sufficient. When the
moment arrived they assaulted on the first day the Athenian lines, and
upon a small force of heavy infantry and horse sallying out against
them by certain gates, cut off some of the former and routed and
pursued them to the lines, where, as the entrance was narrow, the
Athenians lost seventy horses and some few of the heavy infantry.
Drawing off their troops for this day, on the next the Syracusans
went out with a fleet of seventy-six sail, and at the same time
advanced with their land forces against the lines. The Athenians put
out to meet them with eighty-six ships, came to close quarters, and
engaged. The Syracusans and their allies first defeated the Athenian
centre, and then caught Eurymedon, the commander of the right wing,
who was sailing out from the line more towards the land in order to
surround the enemy, in the hollow and recess of the harbour, and
killed him and destroyed the ships accompanying him; after which
they now chased the whole Athenian fleet before them and drove them
ashore.
Gylippus seeing the enemy's fleet defeated and carried ashore beyond
their stockades and camp, ran down to the breakwater with some of
his troops, in order to cut off the men as they landed and make it
easier for the Syracusans to tow off the vessels by the shore being
friendly ground. The Tyrrhenians who guarded this point for the
Athenians, seeing them come on in disorder, advanced out against
them and attacked and routed their van, hurling it into the marsh of
Lysimeleia. Afterwards the Syracusan and allied troops arrived in
greater numbers, and the Athenians fearing for their ships came up
also to the rescue and engaged them, and defeated and pursued them
to some distance and killed a few of their heavy infantry. They
succeeded in rescuing most of their ships and brought them down by
their camp; eighteen however were taken by the Syracusans and their
allies, and all the men killed. The rest the enemy tried to burn by
means of an old merchantman which they filled with faggots and
pine-wood, set on fire, and let drift down the wind which blew full on
the Athenians. The Athenians, however, alarmed for their ships,
contrived means for stopping it and putting it out, and checking the
flames and the nearer approach of the merchantman, thus escaped the
danger.
After this the Syracusans set up a trophy for the sea-fight and
for the heavy infantry whom they had cut off up at the lines, where
they took the horses; and the Athenians for the rout of the foot
driven by the Tyrrhenians into the marsh, and for their own victory
with the rest of the army.
The Syracusans had now gained a decisive victory at sea, where until
now they had feared the reinforcement brought by Demosthenes, and
deep, in consequence, was the despondency of the Athenians, and
great their disappointment, and greater still their regret for
having come on the expedition. These were the only cities that they
had yet encountered, similar to their own in character, under
democracies like themselves, which had ships and horses, and were of
considerable magnitude. They had been unable to divide and bring
them over by holding out the prospect of changes in their governments,
or to crush them by their great superiority in force, but had failed
in most of their attempts, and being already in perplexity, had now
been defeated at sea, where defeat could never have been expected, and
were thus plunged deeper in embarrassment than ever.
Meanwhile the Syracusans immediately began to sail freely along
the harbour, and determined to close up its mouth, so that the
Athenians might not be able to steal out in future, even if they
wished. Indeed, the Syracusans no longer thought only of saving
themselves, but also how to hinder the escape of the enemy;
thinking, and thinking rightly, that they were now much the
stronger, and that to conquer the Athenians and their allies by land
and sea would win them great glory in Hellas. The rest of the Hellenes
would thus immediately be either freed or released from
apprehension, as the remaining forces of Athens would be henceforth
unable to sustain the war that would be waged against her; while they,
the Syracusans, would be regarded as the authors of this
deliverance, and would be held in high admiration, not only with all
men now living but also with posterity. Nor were these the only
considerations that gave dignity to the struggle. They would thus
conquer not only the Athenians but also their numerous allies, and
conquer not alone, but with their companions in arms, commanding
side by side with the Corinthians and Lacedaemonians, having offered
their city to stand in the van of danger, and having been in a great
measure the pioneers of naval success.
Indeed, there were never so many peoples assembled before a single
city, if we except the grand total gathered together in this war under
Athens and Lacedaemon. The following were the states on either side
who came to Syracuse to fight for or against Sicily, to help to
conquer or defend the island. Right or community of blood was not
the bond of union between them, so much as interest or compulsion as
the case might be. The Athenians themselves being Ionians went against
the Dorians of Syracuse of their own free will; and the peoples
still speaking Attic and using the Athenian laws, the Lemnians,
Imbrians, and Aeginetans, that is to say the then occupants of Aegina,
being their colonists, went with them. To these must be also added the
Hestiaeans dwelling at Hestiaea in Euboea. Of the rest some joined
in the expedition as subjects of the Athenians, others as
independent allies, others as mercenaries. To the number of the
subjects paying tribute belonged the Eretrians, Chalcidians, Styrians,
and Carystians from Euboea; the Ceans, Andrians, and Tenians from
the islands; and the Milesians, Samians, and Chians from Ionia. The
Chians, however, joined as independent allies, paying no tribute,
but furnishing ships. Most of these were Ionians and descended from
the Athenians, except the Carystians, who are Dryopes, and although
subjects and obliged to serve, were still Ionians fighting against
Dorians. Besides these there were men of Aeolic race, the Methymnians,
subjects who provided ships, not tribute, and the Tenedians and
Aenians who paid tribute. These Aeolians fought against their
Aeolian founders, the Boeotians in the Syracusan army, because they
were obliged, while the Plataeans, the only native Boeotians opposed
to Boeotians, did so upon a just quarrel. Of the Rhodians and
Cytherians, both Dorians, the latter, Lacedaemonian colonists,
fought in the Athenian ranks against their Lacedaemonian countrymen
with Gylippus; while the Rhodians, Argives by race, were compelled
to bear arms against the Dorian Syracusans and their own colonists,
the Geloans, serving with the Syracusans. Of the islanders round
Peloponnese, the Cephallenians and Zacynthians accompanied the
Athenians as independent allies, although their insular position
really left them little choice in the matter, owing to the maritime
supremacy of Athens, while the Corcyraeans, who were not only
Dorians but Corinthians, were openly serving against Corinthians and
Syracusans, although colonists of the former and of the same race as
the latter, under colour of compulsion, but really out of free will
through hatred of Corinth. The Messenians, as they are now called in
Naupactus and from Pylos, then held by the Athenians, were taken
with them to the war. There were also a few Megarian exiles, whose
fate it was to be now fighting against the Megarian Selinuntines.
The engagement of the rest was more of a voluntary nature. It was
less the league than hatred of the Lacedaemonians and the immediate
private advantage of each individual that persuaded the Dorian Argives
to join the Ionian Athenians in a war against Dorians; while the
Mantineans and other Arcadian mercenaries, accustomed to go against
the enemy pointed out to them at the moment, were led by interest to
regard the Arcadians serving with the Corinthians as just as much
their enemies as any others. The Cretans and Aetolians also served for
hire, and the Cretans who had joined the Rhodians in founding Gela,
thus came to consent to fight for pay against, instead of for, their
colonists. There were also some Acarnanians paid to serve, although
they came chiefly for love of Demosthenes and out of goodwill to the
Athenians whose allies they were. These all lived on the Hellenic side
of the Ionian Gulf. Of the Italiots, there were the Thurians and
Metapontines, dragged into the quarrel by the stern necessities of a
time of revolution; of the Siceliots, the Naxians and the Catanians;
and of the barbarians, the Egestaeans, who called in the Athenians,
most of the Sicels, and outside Sicily some Tyrrhenian enemies of
Syracuse and Iapygian mercenaries.
Such were the peoples serving with the Athenians. Against these
the Syracusans had the Camarinaeans their neighbours, the Geloans
who live next to them; then passing over the neutral Agrigentines, the
Selinuntines settled on the farther side of the island. These
inhabit the part of Sicily looking towards Libya; the Himeraeans
came from the side towards the Tyrrhenian Sea, being the only Hellenic
inhabitants in that quarter, and the only people that came from thence
to the aid of the Syracusans. Of the Hellenes in Sicily the above
peoples joined in the war, all Dorians and independent, and of the
barbarians the Sicels only, that is to say, such as did not go over to
the Athenians. Of the Hellenes outside Sicily there were the
Lacedaemonians, who provided a Spartan to take the command, and a
force of Neodamodes or Freedmen, and of Helots; the Corinthians, who
alone joined with naval and land forces, with their Leucadian and
Ambraciot kinsmen; some mercenaries sent by Corinth from Arcadia; some
Sicyonians forced to serve, and from outside Peloponnese the
Boeotians. In comparison, however, with these foreign auxiliaries, the
great Siceliot cities furnished more in every department--numbers of
heavy infantry, ships, and horses, and an immense multitude besides
having been brought together; while in comparison, again, one may say,
with all the rest put together, more was provided by the Syracusans
themselves, both from the greatness of the city and from the fact that
they were in the greatest danger.
Such were the auxiliaries brought together on either side, all of
which had by this time joined, neither party experiencing any
subsequent accession. It was no wonder, therefore, if the Syracusans
and their allies thought that it would win them great glory if they
could follow up their recent victory in the sea-fight by the capture
of the whole Athenian armada, without letting it escape either by
sea or by land. They began at once to close up the Great Harbour by
means of boats, merchant vessels, and galleys moored broadside
across its mouth, which is nearly a mile wide, and made all their
other arrangements for the event of the Athenians again venturing to
fight at sea. There was, in fact, nothing little either in their plans
or their ideas.
The Athenians, seeing them closing up the harbour and informed of
their further designs, called a council of war. The generals and
colonels assembled and discussed the difficulties of the situation;
the point which pressed most being that they no longer had
provisions for immediate use (having sent on to Catana to tell them
not to send any, in the belief that they were going away), and that
they would not have any in future unless they could command the sea.
They therefore determined to evacuate their upper lines, to enclose
with a cross wall and garrison a small space close to the ships,
only just sufficient to hold their stores and sick, and manning all
the ships, seaworthy or not, with every man that could be spared
from the rest of their land forces, to fight it out at sea, and, if
victorious, to go to Catana, if not, to burn their vessels, form in
close order, and retreat by land for the nearest friendly place they
could reach, Hellenic or barbarian. This was no sooner settled than
carried into effect; they descended gradually from the upper lines and
manned all their vessels, compelling all to go on board who were of
age to be in any way of use. They thus succeeded in manning about
one hundred and ten ships in all, on board of which they embarked a
number of archers and darters taken from the Acarnanians and from
the other foreigners, making all other provisions allowed by the
nature of their plan and by the necessities which imposed it. All
was now nearly ready, and Nicias, seeing the soldiery disheartened
by their unprecedented and decided defeat at sea, and by reason of the
scarcity of provisions eager to fight it out as soon as possible,
called them all together, and first addressed them, speaking as
follows:
"Soldiers of the Athenians and of the allies, we have all an equal
interest in the coming struggle, in which life and country are at
stake for us quite as much as they can be for the enemy; since if
our fleet wins the day, each can see his native city again, wherever
that city may be. You must not lose heart, or be like men without
any experience, who fail in a first essay and ever afterwards
fearfully forebode a future as disastrous. But let the Athenians among
you who have already had experience of many wars, and the allies who
have joined us in so many expeditions, remember the surprises of
war, and with the hope that fortune will not be always against us,
prepare to fight again in a manner worthy of the number which you
see yourselves to be.
"Now, whatever we thought would be of service against the crush of
vessels in such a narrow harbour, and against the force upon the decks
of the enemy, from which we suffered before, has all been considered
with the helmsmen, and, as far as our means allowed, provided. A
number of archers and darters will go on board, and a multitude that
we should not have employed in an action in the open sea, where our
science would be crippled by the weight of the vessels; but in the
present land-fight that we are forced to make from shipboard all
this will be useful. We have also discovered the changes in
construction that we must make to meet theirs; and against the
thickness of their cheeks, which did us the greatest mischief, we have
provided grappling-irons, which will prevent an assailant backing
water after charging, if the soldiers on deck here do their duty;
since we are absolutely compelled to fight a land battle from the
fleet, and it seems to be our interest neither to back water
ourselves, nor to let the enemy do so, especially as the shore, except
so much of it as may be held by our troops, is hostile ground.
"You must remember this and fight on as long as you can, and must
not let yourselves be driven ashore, but once alongside must make up
your minds not to part company until you have swept the heavy infantry
from the enemy's deck. I say this more for the heavy infantry than for
the seamen, as it is more the business of the men on deck; and our
land forces are even now on the whole the strongest. The sailors I
advise, and at the same time implore, not to be too much daunted by
their misfortunes, now that we have our decks better armed and greater
number of vessels. Bear in mind how well worth preserving is the
pleasure felt by those of you who through your knowledge of our
language and imitation of our manners were always considered
Athenians, even though not so in reality, and as such were honoured
throughout Hellas, and had your full share of the advantages of our
empire, and more than your share in the respect of our subjects and in
protection from ill treatment. You, therefore, with whom alone we
freely share our empire, we now justly require not to betray that
empire in its extremity, and in scorn of Corinthians, whom you have
often conquered, and of Siceliots, none of whom so much as presumed to
stand against us when our navy was in its prime, we ask you to repel
them, and to show that even in sickness and disaster your skill is
more than a match for the fortune and vigour of any other.
"For the Athenians among you I add once more this reflection: You
left behind you no more such ships in your docks as these, no more
heavy infantry in their flower; if you do aught but conquer, our
enemies here will immediately sail thither, and those that are left of
us at Athens will become unable to repel their home assailants,
reinforced by these new allies. Here you will fall at once into the
hands of the Syracusans--I need not remind you of the intentions with
which you attacked them--and your countrymen at home will fall into
those of the Lacedaemonians. Since the fate of both thus hangs upon
this single battle, now, if ever, stand firm, and remember, each and
all, that you who are now going on board are the army and navy of
the Athenians, and all that is left of the state and the great name of
Athens, in whose defence if any man has any advantage in skill or
courage, now is the time for him to show it, and thus serve himself
and save all."
After this address Nicias at once gave orders to man the ships.
Meanwhile Gylippus and the Syracusans could perceive by the
preparations which they saw going on that the Athenians meant to fight
at sea. They had also notice of the grappling-irons, against which
they specially provided by stretching hides over the prows and much of
the upper part of their vessels, in order that the irons when thrown
might slip off without taking hold. All being now ready, the
generals and Gylippus addressed them in the following terms:
"Syracusans and allies, the glorious character of our past
achievements and the no less glorious results at issue in the coming
battle are, we think, understood by most of you, or you would never
have thrown yourselves with such ardour into the struggle; and if
there be any one not as fully aware of the facts as he ought to be, we
will declare them to him. The Athenians came to this country first
to effect the conquest of Sicily, and after that, if successful, of
Peloponnese and the rest of Hellas, possessing already the greatest
empire yet known, of present or former times, among the Hellenes. Here
for the first time they found in you men who faced their navy which
made them masters everywhere; you have already defeated them in the
previous sea-fights, and will in all likelihood defeat them again now.
When men are once checked in what they consider their special
excellence, their whole opinion of themselves suffers more than if
they had not at first believed in their superiority, the unexpected
shock to their pride causing them to give way more than their real
strength warrants; and this is probably now the case with the
Athenians.
"With us it is different. The original estimate of ourselves which
gave us courage in the days of our unskilfulness has been
strengthened, while the conviction superadded to it that we must be
the best seamen of the time, if we have conquered the best, has
given a double measure of hope to every man among us; and, for the
most part, where there is the greatest hope, there is also the
greatest ardour for action. The means to combat us which they have
tried to find in copying our armament are familiar to our warfare, and
will be met by proper provisions; while they will never be able to
have a number of heavy infantry on their decks, contrary to their
custom, and a number of darters (born landsmen, one may say,
Acarnanians and others, embarked afloat, who will not know how to
discharge their weapons when they have to keep still), without
hampering their vessels and falling all into confusion among
themselves through fighting not according to their own tactics. For
they will gain nothing by the number of their ships--I say this to
those of you who may be alarmed by having to fight against odds--as a
quantity of ships in a confined space will only be slower in executing
the movements required, and most exposed to injury from our means of
offence. Indeed, if you would know the plain truth, as we are credibly
informed, the excess of their sufferings and the necessities of
their present distress have made them desperate; they have no
confidence in their force, but wish to try their fortune in the only
way they can, and either to force their passage and sail out, or after
this to retreat by land, it being impossible for them to be worse
off than they are.
"The fortune of our greatest enemies having thus betrayed itself,
and their disorder being what I have described, let us engage in
anger, convinced that, as between adversaries, nothing is more
legitimate than to claim to sate the whole wrath of one's soul in
punishing the aggressor, and nothing more sweet, as the proverb has
it, than the vengeance upon an enemy, which it will now be ours to
take. That enemies they are and mortal enemies you all know, since
they came here to enslave our country, and if successful had in
reserve for our men all that is most dreadful, and for our children
and wives all that is most dishonourable, and for the whole city the
name which conveys the greatest reproach. None should therefore relent
or think it gain if they go away without further danger to us. This
they will do just the same, even if they get the victory; while if
we succeed, as we may expect, in chastising them, and in handing
down to all Sicily her ancient freedom strengthened and confirmed,
we shall have achieved no mean triumph. And the rarest dangers are
those in which failure brings little loss and success the greatest
advantage."
After the above address to the soldiers on their side, the Syracusan
generals and Gylippus now perceived that the Athenians were manning
their ships, and immediately proceeded to man their own also.
Meanwhile Nicias, appalled by the position of affairs, realizing the
greatness and the nearness of the danger now that they were on the
point of putting out from shore, and thinking, as men are apt to think
in great crises, that when all has been done they have still something
left to do, and when all has been said that they have not yet said
enough, again called on the captains one by one, addressing each by
his father's name and by his own, and by that of his tribe, and
adjured them not to belie their own personal renown, or to obscure the
hereditary virtues for which their ancestors were illustrious: he
reminded them of their country, the freest of the free, and of the
unfettered discretion allowed in it to all to live as they pleased;
and added other arguments such as men would use at such a crisis,
and which, with little alteration, are made to serve on all
occasions alike--appeals to wives, children, and national
gods--without caring whether they are thought commonplace, but loudly
invoking them in the belief that they will be of use in the
consternation of the moment. Having thus admonished them, not, he
felt, as he would, but as he could, Nicias withdrew and led the troops
to the sea, and ranged them in as long a line as he was able, in order
to aid as far as possible in sustaining the courage of the men afloat;
while Demosthenes, Menander, and Euthydemus, who took the command on
board, put out from their own camp and sailed straight to the
barrier across the mouth of the harbour and to the passage left
open, to try to force their way out.
The Syracusans and their allies had already put out with about the
same number of ships as before, a part of which kept guard at the
outlet, and the remainder all round the rest of the harbour, in
order to attack the Athenians on all sides at once; while the land
forces held themselves in readiness at the points at which the vessels
might put into the shore. The Syracusan fleet was commanded by Sicanus
and Agatharchus, who had each a wing of the whole force, with Pythen
and the Corinthians in the centre. When the rest of the Athenians came
up to the barrier, with the first shock of their charge they
overpowered the ships stationed there, and tried to undo the
fastenings; after this, as the Syracusans and allies bore down upon
them from all quarters, the action spread from the barrier over the
whole harbour, and was more obstinately disputed than any of the
preceding ones. On either side the rowers showed great zeal in
bringing up their vessels at the boatswains' orders, and the
helmsmen great skill in manoeuvring, and great emulation one with
another; while the ships once alongside, the soldiers on board did
their best not to let the service on deck be outdone by the others; in
short, every man strove to prove himself the first in his particular
department. And as many ships were engaged in a small compass (for
these were the largest fleets fighting in the narrowest space ever
known, being together little short of two hundred), the regular
attacks with the beak were few, there being no opportunity of
backing water or of breaking the line; while the collisions caused
by one ship chancing to run foul of another, either in flying from
or attacking a third, were more frequent. So long as a vessel was
coming up to the charge the men on the decks rained darts and arrows
and stones upon her; but once alongside, the heavy infantry tried to
board each other's vessel, fighting hand to hand. In many quarters
it happened, by reason of the narrow room, that a vessel was
charging an enemy on one side and being charged herself on another,
and that two or sometimes more ships had perforce got entangled
round one, obliging the helmsmen to attend to defence here, offence
there, not to one thing at once, but to many on all sides; while the
huge din caused by the number of ships crashing together not only
spread terror, but made the orders of the boatswains inaudible. The
boatswains on either side in the discharge of their duty and in the
heat of the conflict shouted incessantly orders and appeals to their
men; the Athenians they urged to force the passage out, and now if
ever to show their mettle and lay hold of a safe return to their
country; to the Syracusans and their allies they cried that it would
be glorious to prevent the escape of the enemy, and, conquering, to
exalt the countries that were theirs. The generals, moreover, on
either side, if they saw any in any part of the battle backing
ashore without being forced to do so, called out to the captain by
name and asked him--the Athenians, whether they were retreating
because they thought the thrice hostile shore more their own than
that sea which had cost them so much labour to win; the Syracusans,
whether they were flying from the flying Athenians, whom they well
knew to be eager to escape in whatever way they could.
Meanwhile the two armies on shore, while victory hung in the
balance, were a prey to the most agonizing and conflicting emotions;
the natives thirsting for more glory than they had already won,
while the invaders feared to find themselves in even worse plight than
before. The all of the Athenians being set upon their fleet, their
fear for the event was like nothing they had ever felt; while their
view of the struggle was necessarily as chequered as the battle
itself. Close to the scene of action and not all looking at the same
point at once, some saw their friends victorious and took courage
and fell to calling upon heaven not to deprive them of salvation,
while others who had their eyes turned upon the losers, wailed and
cried aloud, and, although spectators, were more overcome than the
actual combatants. Others, again, were gazing at some spot where the
battle was evenly disputed; as the strife was protracted without
decision, their swaying bodies reflected the agitation of their minds,
and they suffered the worst agony of all, ever just within reach of
safety or just on the point of destruction. In short, in that one
Athenian army as long as the sea-fight remained doubtful there was
every sound to be heard at once, shrieks, cheers, "We win," "We lose,"
and all the other manifold exclamations that a great host would
necessarily utter in great peril; and with the men in the fleet it was
nearly the same; until at last the Syracusans and their allies,
after the battle had lasted a long while, put the Athenians to flight,
and with much shouting and cheering chased them in open rout to the
shore. The naval force, one one way, one another, as many as were
not taken afloat now ran ashore and rushed from on board their ships
to their camp; while the army, no more divided, but carried away by
one impulse, all with shrieks and groans deplored the event, and ran
down, some to help the ships, others to guard what was left of their
wall, while the remaining and most numerous part already began to
consider how they should save themselves. Indeed, the panic of the
present moment had never been surpassed. They now suffered very nearly
what they had inflicted at Pylos; as then the Lacedaemonians with
the loss of their fleet lost also the men who had crossed over to
the island, so now the Athenians had no hope of escaping by land,
without the help of some extraordinary accident.
The sea-fight having been a severe one, and many ships and lives
having been lost on both sides, the victorious Syracusans and their
allies now picked up their wrecks and dead, and sailed off to the city
and set up a trophy. The Athenians, overwhelmed by their misfortune,
never even thought of asking leave to take up their dead or wrecks,
but wished to retreat that very night. Demosthenes, however, went to
Nicias and gave it as his opinion that they should man the ships
they had left and make another effort to force their passage out
next morning; saying that they had still left more ships fit for
service than the enemy, the Athenians having about sixty remaining
as against less than fifty of their opponents. Nicias was quite of his
mind; but when they wished to man the vessels, the sailors refused
to go on board, being so utterly overcome by their defeat as no longer
to believe in the possibility of success.
Accordingly they all now made up their minds to retreat by land.
Meanwhile the Syracusan Hermocrates--suspecting their intention, and
impressed by the danger of allowing a force of that magnitude to
retire by land, establish itself in some other part of Sicily, and
from thence renew the war--went and stated his views to the
authorities, and pointed out to them that they ought not to let the
enemy get away by night, but that all the Syracusans and their
allies should at once march out and block up the roads and seize and
guard the passes. The authorities were entirely of his opinion, and
thought that it ought to be done, but on the other hand felt sure that
the people, who had given themselves over to rejoicing, and were
taking their ease after a great battle at sea, would not be easily
brought to obey; besides, they were celebrating a festival, having
on that day a sacrifice to Heracles, and most of them in their rapture
at the victory had fallen to drinking at the festival, and would
probably consent to anything sooner than to take up their arms and
march out at that moment. For these reasons the thing appeared
impracticable to the magistrates; and Hermocrates, finding himself
unable to do anything further with them, had now recourse to the
following stratagem of his own. What he feared was that the
Athenians might quietly get the start of them by passing the most
difficult places during the night; and he therefore sent, as soon as
it was dusk, some friends of his own to the camp with some horsemen
who rode up within earshot and called out to some of the men, as
though they were well-wishers of the Athenians, and told them to
tell Nicias (who had in fact some correspondents who informed him of
what went on inside the town) not to lead off the army by night as the
Syracusans were guarding the roads, but to make his preparations at
his leisure and to retreat by day. After saying this they departed;
and their hearers informed the Athenian generals, who put off going
for that night on the strength of this message, not doubting its
sincerity.
Since after all they had not set out at once, they now determined to
stay also the following day to give time to the soldiers to pack up as
well as they could the most useful articles, and, leaving everything
else behind, to start only with what was strictly necessary for
their personal subsistence. Meanwhile the Syracusans and Gylippus
marched out and blocked up the roads through the country by which
the Athenians were likely to pass, and kept guard at the fords of
the streams and rivers, posting themselves so as to receive them and
stop the army where they thought best; while their fleet sailed up
to the beach and towed off the ships of the Athenians. Some few were
burned by the Athenians themselves as they had intended; the rest
the Syracusans lashed on to their own at their leisure as they had
been thrown up on shore, without any one trying to stop them, and
conveyed to the town.
After this, Nicias and Demosthenes now thinking that enough had been
done in the way of preparation, the removal of the army took place
upon the second day after the sea-fight. It was a lamentable scene,
not merely from the single circumstance that they were retreating
after having lost all their ships, their great hopes gone, and
themselves and the state in peril; but also in leaving the camp
there were things most grievous for every eye and heart to
contemplate. The dead lay unburied, and each man as he recognized a
friend among them shuddered with grief and horror; while the living
whom they were leaving behind, wounded or sick, were to the living far
more shocking than the dead, and more to be pitied than those who
had perished. These fell to entreating and bewailing until their
friends knew not what to do, begging them to take them and loudly
calling to each individual comrade or relative whom they could see,
hanging upon the necks of their tent-fellows in the act of
departure, and following as far as they could, and, when their
bodily strength failed them, calling again and again upon heaven and
shrieking aloud as they were left behind. So that the whole army being
filled with tears and distracted after this fashion found it not
easy to go, even from an enemy's land, where they had already suffered
evils too great for tears and in the unknown future before them feared
to suffer more. Dejection and self-condemnation were also rife among
them. Indeed they could only be compared to a starved-out town, and
that no small one, escaping; the whole multitude upon the march
being not less than forty thousand men. All carried anything they
could which might be of use, and the heavy infantry and troopers,
contrary to their wont, while under arms carried their own victuals,
in some cases for want of servants, in others through not trusting
them; as they had long been deserting and now did so in greater
numbers than ever. Yet even thus they did not carry enough, as there
was no longer food in the camp. Moreover their disgrace generally, and
the universality of their sufferings, however to a certain extent
alleviated by being borne in company, were still felt at the moment
a heavy burden, especially when they contrasted the splendour and
glory of their setting out with the humiliation in which it had ended.
For this was by far the greatest reverse that ever befell an
Hellenic army. They had come to enslave others, and were departing
in fear of being enslaved themselves: they had sailed out with
prayer and paeans, and now started to go back with omens directly
contrary; travelling by land instead of by sea, and trusting not in
their fleet but in their heavy infantry. Nevertheless the greatness of
the danger still impending made all this appear tolerable.
Nicias seeing the army dejected and greatly altered, passed along
the ranks and encouraged and comforted them as far as was possible
under the circumstances, raising his voice still higher and higher
as he went from one company to another in his earnestness, and in
his anxiety that the benefit of his words might reach as many as
possible:
"Athenians and allies, even in our present position we must still
hope on, since men have ere now been saved from worse straits than
this; and you must not condemn yourselves too severely either
because of your disasters or because of your present unmerited
sufferings. I myself who am not superior to any of you in
strength--indeed you see how I am in my sickness--and who in the gifts
of fortune am, I think, whether in private life or otherwise, the
equal of any, am now exposed to the same danger as the meanest among
you; and yet my life has been one of much devotion toward the gods,
and of much justice and without offence toward men. I have, therefore,
still a strong hope for the future, and our misfortunes do not terrify
me as much as they might. Indeed we may hope that they will be
lightened: our enemies have had good fortune enough; and if any of the
gods was offended at our expedition, we have been already amply
punished. Others before us have attacked their neighbours and have
done what men will do without suffering more than they could bear; and
we may now justly expect to find the gods more kind, for we have
become fitter objects for their pity than their jealousy. And then
look at yourselves, mark the numbers and efficiency of the heavy
infantry marching in your ranks, and do not give way too much to
despondency, but reflect that you are yourselves at once a city
wherever you sit down, and that there is no other in Sicily that could
easily resist your attack, or expel you when once established. The
safety and order of the march is for yourselves to look to; the one
thought of each man being that the spot on which he may be forced to
fight must be conquered and held as his country and stronghold.
Meanwhile we shall hasten on our way night and day alike, as our
provisions are scanty; and if we can reach some friendly place of
the Sicels, whom fear of the Syracusans still keeps true to us, you
may forthwith consider yourselves safe. A message has been sent on
to them with directions to meet us with supplies of food. To sum up,
be convinced, soldiers, that you must be brave, as there is no place
near for your cowardice to take refuge in, and that if you now
escape from the enemy, you may all see again what your hearts
desire, while those of you who are Athenians will raise up again the
great power of the state, fallen though it be. Men make the city and
not walls or ships without men in them."
As he made this address, Nicias went along the ranks, and brought
back to their place any of the troops that he saw straggling out of
the line; while Demosthenes did as much for his part of the army,
addressing them in words very similar. The army marched in a hollow
square, the division under Nicias leading, and that of Demosthenes
following, the heavy infantry being outside and the baggage-carriers
and the bulk of the army in the middle. When they arrived at the
ford of the river Anapus there they found drawn up a body of the
Syracusans and allies, and routing these, made good their passage
and pushed on, harassed by the charges of the Syracusan horse and by
the missiles of their light troops. On that day they advanced about
four miles and a half, halting for the night upon a certain hill. On
the next they started early and got on about two miles further, and
descended into a place in the plain and there encamped, in order to
procure some eatables from the houses, as the place was inhabited, and
to carry on with them water from thence, as for many furlongs in
front, in the direction in which they were going, it was not
plentiful. The Syracusans meanwhile went on and fortified the pass
in front, where there was a steep hill with a rocky ravine on each
side of it, called the Acraean cliff. The next day the Athenians
advancing found themselves impeded by the missiles and charges of
the horse and darters, both very numerous, of the Syracusans and
allies; and after fighting for a long while, at length retired to
the same camp, where they had no longer provisions as before, it being
impossible to leave their position by reason of the cavalry.
Early next morning they started afresh and forced their way to the
hill, which had been fortified, where they found before them the
enemy's infantry drawn up many shields deep to defend the
fortification, the pass being narrow. The Athenians assaulted the
work, but were greeted by a storm of missiles from the hill, which
told with the greater effect through its being a steep one, and unable
to force the passage, retreated again and rested. Meanwhile occurred
some claps of thunder and rain, as often happens towards autumn, which
still further disheartened the Athenians, who thought all these things
to be omens of their approaching ruin. While they were resting,
Gylippus and the Syracusans sent a part of their army to throw up
works in their rear on the way by which they had advanced; however,
the Athenians immediately sent some of their men and prevented them;
after which they retreated more towards the plain and halted for the
night. When they advanced the next day the Syracusans surrounded and
attacked them on every side, and disabled many of them, falling back
if the Athenians advanced and coming on if they retired, and in
particular assaulting their rear, in the hope of routing them in
detail, and thus striking a panic into the whole army. For a long
while the Athenians persevered in this fashion, but after advancing
for four or five furlongs halted to rest in the plain, the
Syracusans also withdrawing to their own camp.
During the night Nicias and Demosthenes, seeing the wretched
condition of their troops, now in want of every kind of necessary, and
numbers of them disabled in the numerous attacks of the enemy,
determined to light as many fires as possible, and to lead off the
army, no longer by the same route as they had intended, but towards
the sea in the opposite direction to that guarded by the Syracusans.
The whole of this route was leading the army not to Catana but to
the other side of Sicily, towards Camarina, Gela, and the other
Hellenic and barbarian towns in that quarter. They accordingly lit a
number of fires and set out by night. Now all armies, and the greatest
most of all, are liable to fears and alarms, especially when they
are marching by night through an enemy's country and with the enemy
near; and the Athenians falling into one of these panics, the
leading division, that of Nicias, kept together and got on a good
way in front, while that of Demosthenes, comprising rather more than
half the army, got separated and marched on in some disorder. By
morning, however, they reached the sea, and getting into the
Helorine road, pushed on in order to reach the river Cacyparis, and to
follow the stream up through the interior, where they hoped to be
met by the Sicels whom they had sent for. Arrived at the river, they
found there also a Syracusan party engaged in barring the passage of
the ford with a wall and a palisade, and forcing this guard, crossed
the river and went on to another called the Erineus, according to
the advice of their guides.
Meanwhile, when day came and the Syracusans and allies found that
the Athenians were gone, most of them accused Gylippus of having let
them escape on purpose, and hastily pursuing by the road which they
had no difficulty in finding that they had taken, overtook them
about dinner-time. They first came up with the troops under
Demosthenes, who were behind and marching somewhat slowly and in
disorder, owing to the night panic above referred to, and at once
attacked and engaged them, the Syracusan horse surrounding them with
more ease now that they were separated from the rest and hemming
them in on one spot. The division of Nicias was five or six miles on
in front, as he led them more rapidly, thinking that under the
circumstances their safety lay not in staying and fighting, unless
obliged, but in retreating as fast as possible, and only fighting when
forced to do so. On the other hand, Demosthenes was, generally
speaking, harassed more incessantly, as his post in the rear left
him the first exposed to the attacks of the enemy; and now, finding
that the Syracusans were in pursuit, he omitted to push on, in order
to form his men for battle, and so lingered until he was surrounded by
his pursuers and himself and the Athenians with him placed in the most
distressing position, being huddled into an enclosure with a wall
all round it, a road on this side and on that, and olive-trees in
great number, where missiles were showered in upon them from every
quarter. This mode of attack the Syracusans had with good reason
adopted in preference to fighting at close quarters, as to risk a
struggle with desperate men was now more for the advantage of the
Athenians than for their own; besides, their success had now become so
certain that they began to spare themselves a little in order not to
be cut off in the moment of victory, thinking too that, as it was,
they would be able in this way to subdue and capture the enemy.
In fact, after plying the Athenians and allies all day long from
every side with missiles, they at length saw that they were worn out
with their wounds and other sufferings; and Gylippus and the
Syracusans and their allies made a proclamation, offering their
liberty to any of the islanders who chose to come over to them; and
some few cities went over. Afterwards a capitulation was agreed upon
for all the rest with Demosthenes, to lay down their arms on condition
that no one was to be put to death either by violence or
imprisonment or want of the necessaries of life. Upon this they
surrendered to the number of six thousand in all, laying down all
the money in their possession, which filled the hollows of four
shields, and were immediately conveyed by the Syracusans to the town.
Meanwhile Nicias with his division arrived that day at the river
Erineus, crossed over, and posted his army upon some high ground
upon the other side. The next day the Syracusans overtook him and told
him that the troops under Demosthenes had surrendered, and invited him
to follow their example. Incredulous of the fact, Nicias asked for a
truce to send a horseman to see, and upon the return of the
messenger with the tidings that they had surrendered, sent a herald to
Gylippus and the Syracusans, saying that he was ready to agree with
them on behalf of the Athenians to repay whatever money the Syracusans
had spent upon the war if they would let his army go; and offered
until the money was paid to give Athenians as hostages, one for
every talent. The Syracusans and Gylippus rejected this proposition,
and attacked this division as they had the other, standing all round
and plying them with missiles until the evening. Food and
necessaries were as miserably wanting to the troops of Nicias as
they had been to their comrades; nevertheless they watched for the
quiet of the night to resume their march. But as they were taking up
their arms the Syracusans perceived it and raised their paean, upon
which the Athenians, finding that they were discovered, laid them down
again, except about three hundred men who forced their way through the
guards and went on during the night as they were able.
As soon as it was day Nicias put his army in motion, pressed, as
before, by the Syracusans and their allies, pelted from every side
by their missiles, and struck down by their javelins. The Athenians
pushed on for the Assinarus, impelled by the attacks made upon them
from every side by a numerous cavalry and the swarm of other arms,
fancying that they should breathe more freely if once across the
river, and driven on also by their exhaustion and craving for water.
Once there they rushed in, and all order was at an end, each man
wanting to cross first, and the attacks of the enemy making it
difficult to cross at all; forced to huddle together, they fell
against and trod down one another, some dying immediately upon the
javelins, others getting entangled together and stumbling over the
articles of baggage, without being able to rise again. Meanwhile the
opposite bank, which was steep, was lined by the Syracusans, who
showered missiles down upon the Athenians, most of them drinking
greedily and heaped together in disorder in the hollow bed of the
river. The Peloponnesians also came down and butchered them,
especially those in the water, which was thus immediately spoiled, but
which they went on drinking just the same, mud and all, bloody as it
was, most even fighting to have it.
At last, when many dead now lay piled one upon another in the
stream, and part of the army had been destroyed at the river, and
the few that escaped from thence cut off by the cavalry, Nicias
surrendered himself to Gylippus, whom he trusted more than he did
the Syracusans, and told him and the Lacedaemonians to do what they
liked with him, but to stop the slaughter of the soldiers. Gylippus,
after this, immediately gave orders to make prisoners; upon which
the rest were brought together alive, except a large number secreted
by the soldiery, and a party was sent in pursuit of the three
hundred who had got through the guard during the night, and who were
now taken with the rest. The number of the enemy collected as public
property was not considerable; but that secreted was very large, and
all Sicily was filled with them, no convention having been made in
their case as for those taken with Demosthenes. Besides this, a
large portion were killed outright, the carnage being very great,
and not exceeded by any in this Sicilian war. In the numerous other
encounters upon the march, not a few also had fallen. Nevertheless
many escaped, some at the moment, others served as slaves, and then
ran away subsequently. These found refuge at Catana.
The Syracusans and their allies now mustered and took up the
spoils and as many prisoners as they could, and went back to the city.
The rest of their Athenian and allied captives were deposited in the
quarries, this seeming the safest way of keeping them; but Nicias
and Demosthenes were butchered, against the will of Gylippus, who
thought that it would be the crown of his triumph if he could take the
enemy's generals to Lacedaemon. One of them, as it happened,
Demosthenes, was one of her greatest enemies, on account of the affair
of the island and of Pylos; while the other, Nicias, was for the
same reasons one of her greatest friends, owing to his exertions to
procure the release of the prisoners by persuading the Athenians to
make peace. For these reasons the Lacedaemonians felt kindly towards
him; and it was in this that Nicias himself mainly confided when he
surrendered to Gylippus. But some of the Syracusans who had been in
correspondence with him were afraid, it was said, of his being put
to the torture and troubling their success by his revelations; others,
especially the Corinthians, of his escaping, as he was wealthy, by
means of bribes, and living to do them further mischief; and these
persuaded the allies and put him to death. This or the like was the
cause of the death of a man who, of all the Hellenes in my time, least
deserved such a fate, seeing that the whole course of his life had
been regulated with strict attention to virtue.
The prisoners in the quarries were at first hardly treated by the
Syracusans. Crowded in a narrow hole, without any roof to cover
them, the heat of the sun and the stifling closeness of the air
tormented them during the day, and then the nights, which came on
autumnal and chilly, made them ill by the violence of the change;
besides, as they had to do everything in the same place for want of
room, and the bodies of those who died of their wounds or from the
variation in the temperature, or from similar causes, were left heaped
together one upon another, intolerable stenches arose; while hunger
and thirst never ceased to afflict them, each man during eight
months having only half a pint of water and a pint of corn given him
daily. In short, no single suffering to be apprehended by men thrust
into such a place was spared them. For some seventy days they thus
lived all together, after which all, except the Athenians and any
Siceliots or Italiots who had joined in the expedition, were sold. The
total number of prisoners taken it would be difficult to state
exactly, but it could not have been less than seven thousand.
This was the greatest Hellenic achievement of any in thig war, or,
in my opinion, in Hellenic history; at once most glorious to the
victors, and most calamitous to the conquered. They were beaten at all
points and altogether; all that they suffered was great; they were
destroyed, as the saying is, with a total destruction, their fleet,
their army, everything was destroyed, and few out of many returned
home. Such were the events in Sicily.
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