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The History of the Peloponnesian War
Book 2 - Chapter VIII
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Third Year of the War - Investment of Plataea - Naval Victories
of Phormio - Thracian Irruption into Macedonia under Sitalces
The next summer the Peloponnesians and their allies, instead of
invading Attica, marched against Plataea, under the command of
Archidamus, son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. He had
encamped his army and was about to lay waste the country, when the
Plataeans hastened to send envoys to him, and spoke as follows:
"Archidamus and Lacedaemonians, in invading the Plataean territory,
you do what is wrong in itself, and worthy neither of yourselves nor
of the fathers who begot you. Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus, your
countryman, after freeing Hellas from the Medes with the help of
those Hellenes who were willing to undertake the risk of the battle
fought near our city, offered sacrifice to Zeus the Liberator in the
marketplace of Plataea, and calling all the allies together restored
to the Plataeans their city and territory, and declared it
independent and inviolate against aggression or conquest. Should any
such be attempted, the allies present were to help according to their
power. Your fathers rewarded us thus for the courage and patriotism
that we displayed at that perilous epoch; but you do just the
contrary, coming with our bitterest enemies, the Thebans, to enslave
us. We appeal, therefore, to the gods to whom the oaths were then
made, to the gods of your ancestors, and lastly to those of our
country, and call upon you to refrain from violating our territory
or transgressing the oaths, and to let us live independent, as
Pausanias decreed."
The Plataeans had got thus far when they were cut short by
Archidamus saying: "There is justice, Plataeans, in what you say, if you act up
to your words.
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According, to the grant of Pausanias, continue to be independent
yourselves, and join in freeing those of your fellow countrymen who,
after sharing in the perils of that period, joined in the oaths to
you, and are now subject to the Athenians; for it is to free them
and the rest that all this provision and war has been made. I could
wish that you would share our labours
and abide by the oaths yourselves; if this is impossible, do what we
have already required of you--remain neutral, enjoying your own; join
neither side, but receive both as friends, neither as allies for the
war. With this we shall be satisfied." Such were the words of
Archidamus. The Plataeans, after hearing what he had to say, went into
the city and acquainted the people with what had passed, and presently
returned for answer that it was impossible for them to do what he
proposed without consulting the Athenians, with whom their children
and wives now were; besides which they had their fears for the town.
After his departure, what was to prevent the Athenians from coming and
taking it out of their hands, or the Thebans, who would be included in
the oaths, from taking advantage of the proposed neutrality to make
a second attempt to seize the city? Upon these points he tried to
reassure them by saying: "You have only to deliver over the city and
houses to us Lacedaemonians, to point out the boundaries of your land,
the number of your fruit-trees, and whatever else can be numerically
stated, and yourselves to withdraw wherever you like as long as the
war shall last. When it is over we will restore to you whatever we
received, and in the interim hold it in trust and keep it in
cultivation, paying you a sufficient allowance."
When they had heard what he had to say, they re-entered the city,
and after consulting with the people said that they wished first to
acquaint the Athenians with this proposal, and in the event of their
approving to accede to it; in the meantime they asked him to grant
them a truce and not to lay waste their territory. He accordingly
granted a truce for the number of days requisite for the journey,
and meanwhile abstained from ravaging their territory. The Plataean
envoys went to Athens, and consulted with the Athenians, and
returned with the following message to those in the city: "The
Athenians say, Plataeans, that they never hitherto, since we became
their allies, on any occasion abandoned us to an enemy, nor will
they now neglect us, but will help us according to their ability;
and they adjure you by the oaths which your fathers swore, to keep the
alliance unaltered."
On the delivery of this message by the envoys, the Plataeans
resolved not to be unfaithful to the Athenians but to endure, if it
must be, seeing their lands laid waste and any other trials that might
come to them, and not to send out again, but to answer from the wall
that it was impossible for them to do as the Lacedaemonians
proposed. As soon as he had received this answer, King Archidamus
proceeded first to make a solemn appeal to the gods and heroes of
the country in words following: "Ye gods and heroes of the Plataean
territory, be my witnesses that not as aggressors originally, nor
until these had first departed from the common oath, did we invade
this land, in which our fathers offered you their prayers before
defeating the Medes, and which you made auspicious to the Hellenic
arms; nor shall we be aggressors in the measures to which we may now
resort, since we have made many fair proposals but have not been
successful. Graciously accord that those who were the first to
offend may be punished for it, and that vengeance may be attained by
those who would righteously inflict it."
After this appeal to the gods Archidamus put his army in motion.
First he enclosed the town with a palisade formed of the fruit-trees
which they cut down, to prevent further egress from Plataea; next they
threw up a mound against the city, hoping that the largeness of the
force employed would ensure the speedy reduction of the place. They
accordingly cut down timber from Cithaeron, and built it up on
either side, laying it like lattice-work to serve as a wall to keep
the mound from spreading abroad, and carried to it wood and stones and
earth and whatever other material might help to complete it. They
continued to work at the mound for seventy days and nights without
intermission, being divided into relief parties to allow of some being
employed in carrying while others took sleep and refreshment; the
Lacedaemonian officer attached to each contingent keeping the men to
the work. But the Plataeans, observing the progress of the mound,
constructed a wall of wood and fixed it upon that part of the city
wall against which the mound was being erected, and built up bricks
inside it which they took from the neighbouring houses. The timbers
served to bind the building together, and to prevent its becoming weak
as it advanced in height; it had also a covering of skins and hides,
which protected the woodwork against the attacks of burning missiles
and allowed the men to work in safety. Thus the wall was raised to a
great height, and the mound opposite made no less rapid progress.
The Plataeans also thought of another expedient; they pulled out
part of the wall upon which the mound abutted, and carried the earth
into the city.
Discovering this the Peloponnesians twisted up clay in wattles of
reed and threw it into the breach formed in the mound, in order to
give it consistency and prevent its being carried away like the
soil. Stopped in this way the Plataeans changed their mode of
operation, and digging a mine from the town calculated their way under
the mound, and began to carry off its material as before. This went on
for a long while without the enemy outside finding it out, so that for
all they threw on the top their mound made no progress in
proportion, being carried away from beneath and constantly settling
down in the vacuum. But the Plataeans, fearing that even thus they
might not be able to hold out against the superior numbers of the
enemy, had yet another invention. They stopped working at the large
building in front of the mound, and starting at either end of it
inside from the old low wall, built a new one in the form of a
crescent running in towards the town; in order that in the event of
the great wall being taken this might remain, and the enemy have to
throw up a fresh mound against it, and as they advanced within might
not only have their trouble over again, but also be exposed to
missiles on their flanks. While raising the mound the Peloponnesians
also brought up engines against the city, one of which was brought
up upon the mound against the great building and shook down a good
piece of it, to the no small alarm of the Plataeans. Others were
advanced against different parts of the wall but were lassoed and
broken by the Plataeans; who also hung up great beams by long iron
chains from either extremity of two poles laid on the wall and
projecting over it, and drew them up at an angle whenever any point
was threatened by the engine, and loosing their hold let the beam go
with its chains slack, so that it fell with a run and snapped off
the nose of the battering ram.
After this the Peloponnesians, finding that their engines effected
nothing, and that their mound was met by the counterwork, concluded
that their present means of offence were unequal to the taking of
the city, and prepared for its circumvallation. First, however, they
determined to try the effects of fire and see whether they could
not, with the help of a wind, burn the town, as it was not a large
one; indeed they thought of every possible expedient by which the
place might be reduced without the expense of a blockade. They
accordingly brought faggots of brushwood and threw them from the
mound, first into the space between it and the wall; and this soon
becoming full from the number of hands at work, they next heaped the
faggots up as far into the town as they could reach from the top,
and then lighted the wood by setting fire to it with sulphur and
pitch. The consequence was a fire greater than any one had ever yet
seen produced by human agency, though it could not of course be
compared to the spontaneous conflagrations sometimes known to occur
through the wind rubbing the branches of a mountain forest together.
And this fire was not only remarkable for its magnitude, but was also,
at the end of so many perils, within an ace of proving fatal to the
Plataeans; a great part of the town became entirely inaccessible,
and had a wind blown upon it, in accordance with the hopes of the
enemy, nothing could have saved them. As it was, there is also a story
of heavy rain and thunder having come on by which the fire was put out
and the danger averted.
Failing in this last attempt the Peloponnesians left a portion of
their forces on the spot, dismissing the rest, and built a wall of
circumvallation round the town, dividing the ground among the
various cities present; a ditch being made within and without the
lines, from which they got their bricks. All being finished by about
the rising of Arcturus, they left men enough to man half the wall, the
rest being manned by the Boeotians, and drawing off their army
dispersed to their several cities. The Plataeans had before sent off
their wives and children and oldest men and the mass of the
non-combatants to Athens; so that the number of the besieged left in
the place comprised four hundred of their own citizens, eighty
Athenians, and a hundred and ten women to bake their bread. This was
the sum total at the commencement of the siege, and there was no one
else within the walls, bond or free. Such were the arrangements made
for the blockade of Plataea.
The same summer and simultaneously with the expedition against
Plataea, the Athenians marched with two thousand heavy infantry and
two hundred horse against the Chalcidians in the direction of Thrace
and the Bottiaeans, just as the corn was getting ripe, under the
command of Xenophon, son of Euripides, with two colleagues. Arriving
before Spartolus in Bottiaea, they destroyed the corn and had some
hopes of the city coming over through the intrigues of a faction
within. But those of a different way of thinking had sent to Olynthus;
and a garrison of heavy infantry and other troops arrived accordingly.
These issuing from Spartolus were engaged by the Athenians in front of
the town: the Chalcidian heavy infantry, and some auxiliaries with
them, were beaten and retreated into Spartolus; but the Chalcidian
horse and light troops defeated the horse and light troops of the
Athenians. The Chalcidians had already a few targeteers from Crusis,
and presently after the battle were joined by some others from
Olynthus; upon seeing whom the light troops from Spartolus, emboldened
by this accession and by their previous success, with the help of
the Chalcidian horse and the reinforcement just arrived again attacked
the Athenians, who retired upon the two divisions which they had
left with their baggage. Whenever the Athenians advanced, their
adversary gave way, pressing them with missiles the instant they began
to retire. The Chalcidian horse also, riding up and charging them just
as they pleased, at last caused a panic amongst them and routed and
pursued them to a great distance. The Athenians took refuge in
Potidaea, and afterwards recovered their dead under truce, and
returned to Athens with the remnant of their army; four hundred and
thirty men and all the generals having fallen. The Chalcidians and
Bottiaeans set up a trophy, took up their dead, and dispersed to their
several cities.
The same summer, not long after this, the Ambraciots and
Chaonians, being desirous of reducing the whole of Acarnania and
detaching it from Athens, persuaded the Lacedaemonians to equip a
fleet from their confederacy and send a thousand heavy infantry to
Acarnania, representing that, if a combined movement were made by land
and sea, the coast Acarnanians would be unable to march, and the
conquest of Zacynthus and Cephallenia easily following on the
possession of Acarnania, the cruise round Peloponnese would be no
longer so convenient for the Athenians. Besides which there was a hope
of taking Naupactus. The Lacedaemonians accordingly at once sent off a
few vessels with Cnemus, who was still high admiral, and the heavy
infantry on board; and sent round orders for the fleet to equip as
quickly as possible and sail to Leucas. The Corinthians were the
most forward in the business; the Ambraciots being a colony of theirs.
While the ships from Corinth, Sicyon, and the neighbourhood were
getting ready, and those from Leucas, Anactorium, and Ambracia,
which had arrived before, were waiting for them at Leucas, Cnemus
and his thousand heavy infantry had run into the gulf, giving the slip
to Phormio, the commander of the Athenian squadron stationed off
Naupactus, and began at once to prepare for the land expedition. The
Hellenic troops with him consisted of the Ambraciots, Leucadians,
and Anactorians, and the thousand Peloponnesians with whom he came;
the barbarian of a thousand Chaonians, who, belonging to a nation that
has no king, were led by Photys and Nicanor, the two members of the
royal family to whom the chieftainship for that year had been
confided. With the Chaonians came also some Thesprotians, like them
without a king, some Molossians and Atintanians led by Sabylinthus,
the guardian of King Tharyps who was still a minor, and some
Paravaeans, under their king Oroedus, accompanied by a thousand
Orestians, subjects of King Antichus and placed by him under the
command of Oroedus. There were also a thousand Macedonians sent by
Perdiccas without the knowledge of the Athenians, but they arrived too
late. With this force Cnemus set out, without waiting for the fleet
from Corinth. Passing through the territory of Amphilochian Argos, and
sacking the open village of Limnaea, they advanced to Stratus the
Acarnanian capital; this once taken, the rest of the country, they
felt convinced, would speedily follow.
The Acarnanians, finding themselves invaded by a large army by land,
and from the sea threatened by a hostile fleet, made no combined
attempt at resistance, but remained to defend their homes, and sent
for help to Phormio, who replied that, when a fleet was on the point
of sailing from Corinth, it was impossible for him to leave
Naupactus unprotected. The Peloponnesians meanwhile and their allies
advanced upon Stratus in three divisions, with the intention of
encamping near it and attempting the wall by force if they failed to
succeed by negotiation. The order of march was as follows: the
centre was occupied by the Chaonians and the rest of the barbarians,
with the Leucadians and Anactorians and their followers on the
right, and Cnemus with the Peloponnesians and Ambraciots on the
left; each division being a long way off from, and sometimes even
out of sight of, the others. The Hellenes advanced in good order,
keeping a look-out till they encamped in a good position; but the
Chaonians, filled with self-confidence, and having the highest
character for courage among the tribes of that part of the
continent, without waiting to occupy their camp, rushed on with the
rest of the barbarians, in the idea that they should take the town
by assault and obtain the sole glory of the enterprise. While they
were coming on, the Stratians, becoming aware how things stood, and
thinking that the defeat of this division would considerably
dishearten the Hellenes behind it, occupied the environs of the town
with ambuscades, and as soon as they approached engaged them at
close quarters from the city and the ambuscades. A panic seizing the
Chaonians, great numbers of them were slain; and as soon as they
were seen to give way the rest of the barbarians turned and fled.
Owing to the distance by which their allies had preceded them, neither
of the Hellenic divisions knew anything of the battle, but fancied
they were hastening on to encamp. However, when the flying
barbarians broke in upon them, they opened their ranks to receive
them, brought their divisions together, and stopped quiet where they
were for the day; the Stratians not offering to engage them, as the
rest of the Acarnanians had not yet arrived, but contenting themselves
with slinging at them from a distance, which distressed them
greatly, as there was no stirring without their armour. The
Acarnanians would seem to excel in this mode of warfare.
As soon as night fell, Cnemus hastily drew off his army to the river
Anapus, about nine miles from Stratus, recovering his dead next day
under truce, and being there joined by the friendly Oeniadae, fell
back upon their city before the enemy's reinforcements came up. From
hence each returned home; and the Stratians set up a trophy for the
battle with the barbarians.
Meanwhile the fleet from Corinth and the rest of the confederates in
the Crissaean Gulf, which was to have co-operated with Cnemus and
prevented the coast Acarnanians from joining their countrymen in the
interior, was disabled from doing so by being compelled about the same
time as the battle at Stratus to fight with Phormio and the twenty
Athenian vessels stationed at Naupactus. For they were watched, as
they coasted along out of the gulf, by Phormio, who wished to attack
in the open sea. But the Corinthians and allies had started for
Acarnania without any idea of fighting at sea, and with vessels more
like transports for carrying soldiers; besides which, they never
dreamed of the twenty Athenian ships venturing to engage their
forty-seven. However, while they were coasting along their own
shore, there were the Athenians sailing along in line with them; and
when they tried to cross over from Patrae in Achaea to the mainland on
the other side, on their way to Acarnania, they saw them again
coming out from Chalcis and the river Evenus to meet them. They
slipped from their moorings in the night, but were observed, and
were at length compelled to fight in mid passage. Each state that
contributed to the armament had its own general; the Corinthian
commanders were Machaon, Isocrates, and Agatharchidas. The
Peloponnesians ranged their vessels in as large a circle as possible
without leaving an opening, with the prows outside and the sterns
in; and placed within all the small craft in company, and their five
best sailers to issue out at a moment's notice and strengthen any
point threatened by the enemy.
The Athenians, formed in line, sailed round and round them, and
forced them to contract their circle, by continually brushing past and
making as though they would attack at once, having been previously
cautioned by Phormio not to do so till he gave the signal. His hope
was that the Peloponnesians would not retain their order like a
force on shore, but that the ships would fall foul of one another
and the small craft cause confusion; and if the wind should blow
from the gulf (in expectation of which he kept sailing round them, and
which usually rose towards morning), they would not, he felt sure,
remain steady an instant. He also thought that it rested with him to
attack when he pleased, as his ships were better sailers, and that
an attack timed by the coming of the wind would tell best. When the
wind came down, the enemy's ships were now in a narrow space, and what
with the wind and the small craft dashing against them, at once fell
into confusion: ship fell foul of ship, while the crews were pushing
them off with poles, and by their shouting, swearing, and struggling
with one another, made captains' orders and boatswains' cries alike
inaudible, and through being unable for want of practice to clear
their oars in the rough water, prevented the vessels from obeying
their helmsmen properly. At this moment Phormio gave the signal, and
the Athenians attacked. Sinking first one of the admirals, they then
disabled all they came across, so that no one thought of resistance
for the confusion, but fled for Patrae and Dyme in Achaea. The
Athenians gave chase and captured twelve ships, and taking most of the
men out of them sailed to Molycrium, and after setting up a trophy
on the promontory of Rhium and dedicating a ship to Poseidon, returned
to Naupactus. As for the Peloponnesians, they at once sailed with
their remaining ships along the coast from Dyme and Patrae to Cyllene,
the Eleian arsenal; where Cnemus, and the ships from Leucas that
were to have joined them, also arrived after the battle at Stratus.
The Lacedaemonians now sent to the fleet to Cnemus three
commissioners--Timocrates, Bradidas, and Lycophron--with orders to
prepare to engage again with better fortune, and not to be driven from
the sea by a few vessels; for they could not at all account for
their discomfiture, the less so as it was their first attempt at
sea; and they fancied that it was not that their marine was so
inferior, but that there had been misconduct somewhere, not
considering the long experience of the Athenians as compared with
the little practice which they had had themselves. The commissioners
were accordingly sent in anger. As soon as they arrived they set to
work with Cnemus to order ships from the different states, and to
put those which they already had in fighting order. Meanwhile
Phormio sent word to Athens of their preparations and his own victory,
and desired as many ships as possible to be speedily sent to him, as
he stood in daily expectation of a battle. Twenty were accordingly
sent, but instructions were given to their commander to go first to
Crete. For Nicias, a Cretan of Gortys, who was proxenus of the
Athenians, had persuaded them to sail against Cydonia, promising to
procure the reduction of that hostile town; his real wish being to
oblige the Polichnitans, neighbours of the Cydonians. He accordingly
went with the ships to Crete, and, accompanied by the Polichnitans,
laid waste the lands of the Cydonians; and, what with adverse winds
and stress of weather wasted no little time there.
While the Athenians were thus detained in Crete, the
Peloponnesians in Cyllene got ready for battle, and coasted along to
Panormus in Achaea, where their land army had come to support them.
Phormio also coasted along to Molycrian Rhium, and anchored outside it
with twenty ships, the same as he had fought with before. This Rhium
was friendly to the Athenians. The other, in Peloponnese, lies
opposite to it; the sea between them is about three-quarters of a mile
broad, and forms the mouth of the Crissaean gulf. At this, the Achaean
Rhium, not far off Panormus, where their army lay, the
Peloponnesians now cast anchor with seventy-seven ships, when they saw
the Athenians do so. For six or seven days they remained opposite each
other, practising and preparing for the battle; the one resolved not
to sail out of the Rhia into the open sea, for fear of the disaster
which had already happened to them, the other not to sail into the
straits, thinking it advantageous to the enemy, to fight in the
narrows. At last Cnemus and Brasidas and the rest of the Peloponnesian
commanders, being desirous of bringing on a battle as soon as
possible, before reinforcements should arrive from Athens, and
noticing that the men were most of them cowed by the previous defeat
and out of heart for the business, first called them together and
encouraged them as follows:
"Peloponnesians, the late engagement, which may have made some of
you afraid of the one now in prospect, really gives no just ground for
apprehension. Preparation for it, as you know, there was little
enough; and the object of our voyage was not so much to fight at sea
as an expedition by land. Besides this, the chances of war were
largely against us; and perhaps also inexperience had something to
do with our failure in our first naval action. It was not,
therefore, cowardice that produced our defeat, nor ought the
determination which force has not quelled, but which still has a
word to say with its adversary, to lose its edge from the result of an
accident; but admitting the possibility of a chance miscarriage, we
should know that brave hearts must be always brave, and while they
remain so can never put forward inexperience as an excuse for
misconduct. Nor are you so behind the enemy in experience as you are
ahead of him in courage; and although the science of your opponents
would, if valour accompanied it, have also the presence of mind to
carry out at in emergency the lesson it has learnt, yet a faint
heart will make all art powerless in the face of danger. For fear
takes away presence of mind, and without valour art is useless.
Against their superior experience set your superior daring, and
against the fear induced by defeat the fact of your having been then
unprepared; remember, too, that you have always the advantage of
superior numbers, and of engaging off your own coast, supported by
your heavy infantry; and as a rule, numbers and equipment give
victory. At no point, therefore, is defeat likely; and as for our
previous mistakes, the very fact of their occurrence will teach us
better for the future. Steersmen and sailors may, therefore,
confidently attend to their several duties, none quitting the
station assigned to them: as for ourselves, we promise to prepare
for the engagement at least as well as your previous commanders, and
to give no excuse for any one misconducting himself. Should any insist
on doing so, he shall meet with the punishment he deserves, while
the brave shall be honoured with the appropriate rewards of valour."
The Peloponnesian commanders encouraged their men after this
fashion. Phormio, meanwhile, being himself not without fears for the
courage of his men, and noticing that they were forming in groups
among themselves and were alarmed at the odds against them, desired to
call them together and give them confidence and counsel in the present
emergency. He had before continually told them, and had accustomed
their minds to the idea, that there was no numerical superiority
that they could not face; and the men themselves had long been
persuaded that Athenians need never retire before any quantity of
Peloponnesian vessels. At the moment, however, he saw that they were
dispirited by the sight before them, and wishing to refresh their
confidence, called them together and spoke as follows:
"I see, my men, that you are frightened by the number of the
enemy, and I have accordingly called you together, not liking you to
be afraid of what is not really terrible. In the first place, the
Peloponnesians, already defeated, and not even themselves thinking
that they are a match for us, have not ventured to meet us on equal
terms, but have equipped this multitude of ships against us. Next,
as to that upon which they most rely, the courage which they suppose
constitutional to them, their confidence here only arises from the
success which their experience in land service usually gives them, and
which they fancy will do the same for them at sea. But this
advantage will in all justice belong to us on this element, if to them
on that; as they are not superior to us in courage, but we are each of
us more confident, according to our experience in our particular
department. Besides, as the Lacedaemonians use their supremacy over
their allies to promote their own glory, they are most of them being
brought into danger against their will, or they would never, after
such a decided defeat, have ventured upon a fresh engagement. You need
not, therefore, be afraid of their dash. You, on the contrary, inspire
a much greater and better founded alarm, both because of your late
victory and also of their belief that we should not face them unless
about to do something worthy of a success so signal. An adversary
numerically superior, like the one before us, comes into action
trusting more to strength than to resolution; while he who voluntarily
confronts tremendous odds must have very great internal resources to
draw upon. For these reasons the Peloponnesians fear our irrational
audacity more than they would ever have done a more commensurate
preparation. Besides, many armaments have before now succumbed to an
inferior through want of skill or sometimes of courage; neither of
which defects certainly are ours. As to the battle, it shall not be,
if I can help it, in the strait, nor will I sail in there at all;
seeing that in a contest between a number of clumsily managed
vessels and a small, fast, well-handled squadron, want of sea room
is an undoubted disadvantage. One cannot run down an enemy properly
without having a sight of him a good way off, nor can one retire at
need when pressed; one can neither break the line nor return upon
his rear, the proper tactics for a fast sailer; but the naval action
necessarily becomes a land one, in which numbers must decide the
matter. For all this I will provide as far as can be. Do you stay at
your posts by your ships, and be sharp at catching the word of
command, the more so as we are observing one another from so short a
distance; and in action think order and silence
all-important--qualities useful in war generally, and in naval
engagements in particular; and behave before the enemy in a manner
worthy of your past exploits. The issues you will fight for are
great--to destroy the naval hopes of the Peloponnesians or to bring
nearer to the Athenians their fears for the sea. And I may once more
remind you that you have defeated most of them already; and beaten men
do not face a danger twice with the same determination."
Such was the exhortation of Phormio. The Peloponnesians finding that
the Athenians did not sail into the gulf and the narrows, in order
to lead them in whether they wished it or not, put out at dawn, and
forming four abreast, sailed inside the gulf in the direction of their
own country, the right wing leading as they had lain at anchor. In
this wing were placed twenty of their best sailers; so that in the
event of Phormio thinking that their object was Naupactus, and
coasting along thither to save the place, the Athenians might not be
able to escape their onset by getting outside their wing, but might be
cut off by the vessels in question. As they expected, Phormio, in
alarm for the place at that moment emptied of its garrison, as soon as
he saw them put out, reluctantly and hurriedly embarked and sailed
along shore; the Messenian land forces moving along also to support
him. The Peloponnesians seeing him coasting along with his ships in
single file, and by this inside the gulf and close inshore as they
so much wished, at one signal tacked suddenly and bore down in line at
their best speed on the Athenians, hoping to cut off the whole
squadron. The eleven leading vessels, however, escaped the
Peloponnesian wing and its sudden movement, and reached the more
open water; but the rest were overtaken as they tried to run
through, driven ashore and disabled; such of the crews being slain
as had not swum out of them. Some of the ships the Peloponnesians
lashed to their own, and towed off empty; one they took with the men
in it; others were just being towed off, when they were saved by the
Messenians dashing into the sea with their armour and fighting from
the decks that they had boarded.
Thus far victory was with the Peloponnesians, and the Athenian fleet
destroyed; the twenty ships in the right wing being meanwhile in chase
of the eleven Athenian vessels that had escaped their sudden
movement and reached the more open water. These, with the exception of
one ship, all outsailed them and got safe into Naupactus, and
forming close inshore opposite the temple of Apollo, with their
prows facing the enemy, prepared to defend themselves in case the
Peloponnesians should sail inshore against them. After a while the
Peloponnesians came up, chanting the paean for their victory as they
sailed on; the single Athenian ship remaining being chased by a
Leucadian far ahead of the rest. But there happened to be a
merchantman lying at anchor in the roadstead, which the Athenian
ship found time to sail round, and struck the Leucadian in chase
amidships and sank her. An exploit so sudden and unexpected produced a
panic among the Peloponnesians; and having fallen out of order in
the excitement of victory, some of them dropped their oars and stopped
their way in order to let the main body come up--an unsafe thing to
do considering how near they were to the enemy's prows; while others
ran aground in the shallows, in their ignorance of the localities.
Elated at this incident, the Athenians at one word gave a cheer, and
dashed at the enemy, who, embarrassed by his mistakes and the disorder
in which he found himself, only stood for an instant, and then fled
for Panormus, whence he had put out. The Athenians following on his
heels took the six vessels nearest them, and recovered those of
their own which had been disabled close inshore and taken in tow at
the beginning of the action; they killed some of the crews and took
some prisoners. On board the Leucadian which went down off the
merchantman, was the Lacedaemonian Timocrates, who killed himself when
the ship was sunk, and was cast up in the harbour of Naupactus. The
Athenians on their return set up a trophy on the spot from which
they had put out and turned the day, and picking up the wrecks and
dead that were on their shore, gave back to the enemy their dead under
truce. The Peloponnesians also set up a trophy as victors for the
defeat inflicted upon the ships they had disabled in shore, and
dedicated the vessel which they had taken at Achaean Rhium, side by
side with the trophy. After this, apprehensive of the reinforcement
expected from Athens, all except the Leucadians sailed into the
Crissaean Gulf for Corinth. Not long after their retreat, the twenty
Athenian ships, which were to have joined Phormio before the battle,
arrived at Naupactus.
Thus the summer ended. Winter was now at hand; but dispersing the
fleet, which had retired to Corinth and the Crissaean Gulf, Cnemus,
Brasidas, and the other Peloponnesian captains allowed themselves to
be persuaded by the Megarians to make an attempt upon Piraeus, the
port of Athens, which from her decided superiority at sea had been
naturally left unguarded and open. Their plan was as follows: The
men were each to take their oar, cushion, and rowlock thong, and,
going overland from Corinth to the sea on the Athenian side, to get to
Megara as quickly as they could, and launching forty vessels, which
happened to be in the docks at Nisaea, to sail at once to Piraeus.
There was no fleet on the look-out in the harbour, and no one had
the least idea of the enemy attempting a surprise; while an open
attack would, it was thought, never be deliberately ventured on, or,
if in contemplation, would be speedily known at Athens. Their plan
formed, the next step was to put it in execution. Arriving by night
and launching the vessels from Nisaea, they sailed, not to Piraeus
as they had originally intended, being afraid of the risk, besides
which there was some talk of a wind having stopped them, but to the
point of Salamis that looks towards Megara; where there was a fort and
a squadron of three ships to prevent anything sailing in or out of
Megara. This fort they assaulted, and towed off the galleys empty, and
surprising the inhabitants began to lay waste the rest of the island.
Meanwhile fire signals were raised to alarm Athens, and a panic
ensued there as serious as any that occurred during the war. The
idea in the city was that the enemy had already sailed into Piraeus:
in Piraeus it was thought that they had taken Salamis and might at any
moment arrive in the port; as indeed might easily have been done if
their hearts had been a little firmer: certainly no wind would have
prevented them. As soon as day broke, the Athenians assembled in
full force, launched their ships, and embarking in haste and uproar
went with the fleet to Salamis, while their soldiery mounted guard
in Piraeus. The Peloponnesians, on becoming aware of the coming
relief, after they had overrun most of Salamis, hastily sailed off
with their plunder and captives and the three ships from Fort
Budorum to Nisaea; the state of their ships also causing them some
anxiety, as it was a long while since they had been launched, and they
were not water-tight. Arrived at Megara, they returned back on foot to
Corinth. The Athenians finding them no longer at Salamis, sailed
back themselves; and after this made arrangements for guarding Piraeus
more diligently in future, by closing the harbours, and by other
suitable precautions.
About the same time, at the beginning of this winter, Sitalces,
son of Teres, the Odrysian king of Thrace, made an expedition
against Perdiccas, son of Alexander, king of Macedonia, and the
Chalcidians in the neighbourhood of Thrace; his object being to
enforce one promise and fulfil another. On the one hand Perdiccas
had made him a promise, when hard pressed at the commencement of the
war, upon condition that Sitalces should reconcile the Athenians to
him and not attempt to restore his brother and enemy, the pretender
Philip, but had not offered to fulfil his engagement; on the other he,
Sitalces, on entering into alliance with the Athenians, had agreed
to put an end to the Chalcidian war in Thrace. These were the two
objects of his invasion. With him he brought Amyntas, the son of
Philip, whom he destined for the throne of Macedonia, and some
Athenian envoys then at his court on this business, and Hagnon as
general; for the Athenians were to join him against the Chalcidians
with a fleet and as many soldiers as they could get together.
Beginning with the Odrysians, he first called out the Thracian
tribes subject to him between Mounts Haemus and Rhodope and the Euxine
and Hellespont; next the Getae beyond Haemus, and the other hordes
settled south of the Danube in the neighbourhood of the Euxine, who,
like the Getae, border on the Scythians and are armed in the same
manner, being all mounted archers. Besides these he summoned many of
the hill Thracian independent swordsmen, called Dii and mostly
inhabiting Mount Rhodope, some of whom came as mercenaries, others
as volunteers; also the Agrianes and Laeaeans, and the rest of the
Paeonian tribes in his empire, at the confines of which these lay,
extending up to the Laeaean Paeonians and the river Strymon, which
flows from Mount Scombrus through the country of the Agrianes and
Laeaeans; there the empire of Sitalces ends and the territory of the
independent Paeonians begins. Bordering on the Triballi, also
independent, were the Treres and Tilataeans, who dwell to the north of
Mount Scombrus and extend towards the setting sun as far as the
river Oskius. This river rises in the same mountains as the Nestus and
Hebrus, a wild and extensive range connected with Rhodope.
The empire of the Odrysians extended along the seaboard from
Abdera to the mouth of the Danube in the Euxine. The navigation of
this coast by the shortest route takes a merchantman four days and
four nights with a wind astern the whole way: by land an active man,
travelling by the shortest road, can get from Abdera to the Danube
in eleven days. Such was the length of its coast line. Inland from
Byzantium to the Laeaeans and the Strymon, the farthest limit of its
extension into the interior, it is a journey of thirteen days for an
active man. The tribute from all the barbarian districts and the
Hellenic cities, taking what they brought in under Seuthes, the
successor of Sitalces, who raised it to its greatest height,
amounted to about four hundred talents in gold and silver. There
were also presents in gold and silver to a no less amount, besides
stuff, plain and embroidered, and other articles, made not only for
the king, but also for the Odrysian lords and nobles. For there was
here established a custom opposite to that prevailing in the Persian
kingdom, namely, of taking rather than giving; more disgrace being
attached to not giving when asked than to asking and being refused;
and although this prevailed elsewhere in Thrace, it was practised most
extensively among the powerful Odrysians, it being impossible to get
anything done without a present. It was thus a very powerful
kingdom; in revenue and general prosperity surpassing all in Europe
between the Ionian Gulf and the Euxine, and in numbers and military
resources coming decidedly next to the Scythians, with whom indeed
no people in Europe can bear comparison, there not being even in
Asia any nation singly a match for them if unanimous, though of course
they are not on a level with other races in general intelligence and
the arts of civilized life.
It was the master of this empire that now prepared to take the
field. When everything was ready, he set out on his march for
Macedonia, first through his own dominions, next over the desolate
range of Cercine that divides the Sintians and Paeonians, crossing
by a road which he had made by felling the timber on a former campaign
against the latter people. Passing over these mountains, with the
Paeonians on his right and the Sintians and Maedians on the left, he
finally arrived at Doberus, in Paeonia, losing none of his army on the
march, except perhaps by sickness, but receiving some augmentations,
many of the independent Thracians volunteering to join him in the hope
of plunder; so that the whole is said to have formed a grand total
of a hundred and fifty thousand. Most of this was infantry, though
there was about a third cavalry, furnished principally by the
Odrysians themselves and next to them by the Getae. The most warlike
of the infantry were the independent swordsmen who came down from
Rhodope; the rest of the mixed multitude that followed him being
chiefly formidable by their numbers.
Assembling in Doberus, they prepared for descending from the heights
upon Lower Macedonia, where the dominions of Perdiccas lay; for the
Lyncestae, Elimiots, and other tribes more inland, though
Macedonians by blood, and allies and dependants of their kindred,
still have their own separate governments. The country on the sea
coast, now called Macedonia, was first acquired by Alexander, the
father of Perdiccas, and his ancestors, originally Temenids from
Argos. This was effected by the expulsion from Pieria of the Pierians,
who afterwards inhabited Phagres and other places under Mount
Pangaeus, beyond the Strymon (indeed the country between Pangaeus
and the sea is still called the Pierian Gulf); of the Bottiaeans, at
present neighbours of the Chalcidians, from Bottia, and by the
acquisition in Paeonia of a narrow strip along the river Axius
extending to Pella and the sea; the district of Mygdonia, between
the Axius and the Strymon, being also added by the expulsion of the
Edonians. From Eordia also were driven the Eordians, most of whom
perished, though a few of them still live round Physca, and the
Almopians from Almopia. These Macedonians also conquered places
belonging to the other tribes, which are still theirs--Anthemus,
Crestonia, Bisaltia, and much of Macedonia proper. The whole is now
called Macedonia, and at the time of the invasion of Sitalces,
Perdiccas, Alexander's son, was the reigning king.
These Macedonians, unable to take the field against so numerous an
invader, shut themselves up in such strong places and fortresses as
the country possessed. Of these there was no great number, most of
those now found in the country having been erected subsequently by
Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, on his accession, who also cut
straight roads, and otherwise put the kingdom on a better footing as
regards horses, heavy infantry, and other war material than had been
done by all the eight kings that preceded him. Advancing from Doberus,
the Thracian host first invaded what had been once Philip's
government, and took Idomene by assault, Gortynia, Atalanta, and
some other places by negotiation, these last coming over for love of
Philip's son, Amyntas, then with Sitalces. Laying siege to Europus,
and failing to take it, he next advanced into the rest of Macedonia to
the left of Pella and Cyrrhus, not proceeding beyond this into
Bottiaea and Pieria, but staying to lay waste Mygdonia, Crestonia, and
Anthemus.
The Macedonians never even thought of meeting him with infantry; but
the Thracian host was, as opportunity offered, attacked by handfuls of
their horse, which had been reinforced from their allies in the
interior. Armed with cuirasses, and excellent horsemen, wherever these
charged they overthrew all before them, but ran considerable risk in
entangling themselves in the masses of the enemy, and so finally
desisted from these efforts, deciding that they were not strong enough
to venture against numbers so superior.
Meanwhile Sitalces opened negotiations with Perdiccas on the objects
of his expedition; and finding that the Athenians, not believing
that he would come, did not appear with their fleet, though they
sent presents and envoys, dispatched a large part of his army
against the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans, and shutting them up inside
their walls laid waste their country. While he remained in these
parts, the people farther south, such as the Thessalians, Magnetes,
and the other tribes subject to the Thessalians, and the Hellenes as
far as Thermopylae, all feared that the army might advance against
them, and prepared accordingly. These fears were shared by the
Thracians beyond the Strymon to the north, who inhabited the plains,
such as the Panaeans, the Odomanti, the Droi, and the Dersaeans, all
of whom are independent. It was even matter of conversation among
the Hellenes who were enemies of Athens whether he might not be
invited by his ally to advance also against them. Meanwhile he held
Chalcidice and Bottice and Macedonia, and was ravaging them all; but
finding that he was not succeeding in any of the objects of his
invasion, and that his army was without provisions and was suffering
from the severity of the season, he listened to the advice of Seuthes,
son of Spardacus, his nephew and highest officer, and decided to
retreat without delay. This Seuthes had been secretly gained by
Perdiccas by the promise of his sister in marriage with a rich
dowry. In accordance with this advice, and after a stay of thirty days
in all, eight of which were spent in Chalcidice, he retired home as
quickly as he could; and Perdiccas afterwards gave his sister
Stratonice to Seuthes as he had promised. Such was the history of
the expedition of Sitalces.
In the course of this winter, after the dispersion of the
Peloponnesian fleet, the Athenians in Naupactus, under Phormio,
coasted along to Astacus and disembarked, and marched into the
interior of Acarnania with four hundred Athenian heavy infantry and
four hundred Messenians. After expelling some suspected persons from
Stratus, Coronta, and other places, and restoring Cynes, son of
Theolytus, to Coronta, they returned to their ships, deciding that
it was impossible in the winter season to march against Oeniadae, a
place which, unlike the rest of Acarnania, had been always hostile
to them; for the river Achelous flowing from Mount Pindus through
Dolopia and the country of the Agraeans and Amphilochians and the
plain of Acarnania, past the town of Stratus in the upper part of
its course, forms lakes where it falls into the sea round Oeniadae,
and thus makes it impracticable for an army in winter by reason of the
water. Opposite to Oeniadae lie most of the islands called
Echinades, so close to the mouths of the Achelous that that powerful
stream is constantly forming deposits against them, and has already
joined some of the islands to the continent, and seems likely in no
long while to do the same with the rest. For the current is strong,
deep, and turbid, and the islands are so thick together that they
serve to imprison the alluvial deposit and prevent its dispersing,
lying, as they do, not in one line, but irregularly, so as to leave no
direct passage for the water into the open sea. The islands in
question are uninhabited and of no great size. There is also a story
that Alcmaeon, son of Amphiraus, during his wanderings after the
murder of his mother was bidden by Apollo to inhabit this spot,
through an oracle which intimated that he would have no release from
his terrors until he should find a country to dwell in which had not
been seen by the sun, or existed as land at the time he slew his
mother; all else being to him polluted ground. Perplexed at this,
the story goes on to say, he at last observed this deposit of the
Achelous, and considered that a place sufficient to support life upon,
might have been thrown up during the long interval that had elapsed
since the death of his mother and the beginning of his wanderings.
Settling, therefore, in the district round Oeniadae, he founded a
dominion, and left the country its name from his son Acarnan. Such
is the story we have received concerning Alcmaeon.
The Athenians and Phormio putting back from Acarnania and arriving
at Naupactus, sailed home to Athens in the spring, taking with them
the ships that they had captured, and such of the prisoners made in
the late actions as were freemen; who were exchanged, man for man. And
so ended this winter, and the third year of this war, of which
Thucydides was the historian.
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