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The History of the Peloponnesian War
Book 6 - Chapter XIX
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Seventeenth Year of the War - Parties at Syracuse - Story of
Harmodius and Aristogiton - Disgrace of Alcibiades
Meanwhile at Syracuse news came in from many quarters of the
expedition, but for a long while met with no credence whatever.
Indeed, an assembly was held in which speeches, as will be seen,
were delivered by different orators, believing or contradicting the
report of the Athenian expedition; among whom Hermocrates, son of
Hermon, came forward, being persuaded that he knew the truth of the
matter, and gave the following counsel:
"Although I shall perhaps be no better believed than others have
been when I speak upon the reality of the expedition, and although I
know that those who either make or repeat statements thought not
worthy of belief not only gain no converts but are thought fools for
their pains, I shall certainly not be frightened into holding my
tongue when the state is in danger, and when I am persuaded that I can
speak with more authority on the matter than other persons. Much as
you wonder at it, the Athenians nevertheless have set out against us
with a large force, naval and military, professedly to help the
Egestaeans and to restore Leontini, but really to conquer Sicily, and above all
our city, which once gained, the rest, they think, will easily
follow. Make up your minds, therefore, to see them speedily here,
and see how you can best repel them with the means under your hand,
and do be taken off your guard through despising the news, or
neglect the common weal through disbelieving it. Meanwhile those who
believe me need not be dismayed at the force or daring of the enemy.
They will not be able to do us more hurt than we shall do them; nor
is the greatness of their armament altogether without advantage to
us. Indeed, the greater it is the better, with regard to the rest of
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the Siceliots, whom dismay will make more
ready to join us; and if we defeat or drive them away, disappointed of
the objects of their ambition (for I do not fear for a moment that
they will get what they want), it will be a most glorious exploit
for us, and in my judgment by no means an unlikely one. Few indeed
have been the large armaments, either Hellenic or barbarian, that have
gone far from home and been successful. They cannot be more numerous
than the people of the country and their neighbours, all of whom
fear leagues together; and if they miscarry for want of supplies in
a foreign land, to those against whom their plans were laid none the
less they leave renown, although they may themselves have been the
main cause of their own discomfort. Thus these very Athenians rose
by the defeat of the Mede, in a great measure due to accidental
causes, from the mere fact that Athens had been the object of his
attack; and this may very well be the case with us also.
"Let us, therefore, confidently begin preparations here; let us send
and confirm some of the Sicels, and obtain the friendship and alliance
of others, and dispatch envoys to the rest of Sicily to show that
the danger is common to all, and to Italy to get them to become our
allies, or at all events to refuse to receive the Athenians. I also
think that it would be best to send to Carthage as well; they are by
no means there without apprehension, but it is their constant fear
that the Athenians may one day attack their city, and they may perhaps
think that they might themselves suffer by letting Sicily be
sacrificed, and be willing to help us secretly if not openly, in one
way if not in another. They are the best able to do so, if they
will, of any of the present day, as they possess most gold and silver,
by which war, like everything else, flourishes. Let us also send to
Lacedaemon and Corinth, and ask them to come here and help us as
soon as possible, and to keep alive the war in Hellas. But the true
thing of all others, in my opinion, to do at the present moment, is
what you, with your constitutional love of quiet, will be slow to see,
and what I must nevertheless mention. If we Siceliots, all together,
or at least as many as possible besides ourselves, would only launch
the whole of our actual navy with two months' provisions, and meet the
Athenians at Tarentum and the Iapygian promontory, and show them
that before fighting for Sicily they must first fight for their
passage across the Ionian Sea, we should strike dismay into their
army, and set them on thinking that we have a base for our
defensive--for Tarentum is ready to receive us--while they have a wide
sea to cross with all their armament, which could with difficulty keep
its order through so long a voyage, and would be easy for us to attack
as it came on slowly and in small detachments. On the other hand, if
they were to lighten their vessels, and draw together their fast
sailers and with these attack us, we could either fall upon them
when they were wearied with rowing, or if we did not choose to do
so, we could retire to Tarentum; while they, having crossed with few
provisions just to give battle, would be hard put to it in desolate
places, and would either have to remain and be blockaded, or to try to
sail along the coast, abandoning the rest of their armament, and being
further discouraged by not knowing for certain whether the cities
would receive them. In my opinion this consideration alone would be
sufficient to deter them from putting out from Corcyra; and what
with deliberating and reconnoitring our numbers and whereabouts,
they would let the season go on until winter was upon them, or,
confounded by so unexpected a circumstance, would break up the
expedition, especially as their most experienced general has, as I
hear, taken the command against his will, and would grasp at the first
excuse offered by any serious demonstration of ours. We should also be
reported, I am certain, as more numerous than we really are, and men's
minds are affected by what they hear, and besides the first to attack,
or to show that they mean to defend themselves against an attack,
inspire greater fear because men see that they are ready for the
emergency. This would just be the case with the Athenians at
present. They are now attacking us in the belief that we shall not
resist, having a right to judge us severely because we did not help
the Lacedaemonians in crushing them; but if they were to see us
showing a courage for which they are not prepared, they would be
more dismayed by the surprise than they could ever be by our actual
power. I could wish to persuade you to show this courage; but if
this cannot be, at all events lose not a moment in preparing generally
for the war; and remember all of you that contempt for an assailant is
best shown by bravery in action, but that for the present the best
course is to accept the preparations which fear inspires as giving the
surest promise of safety, and to act as if the danger was real. That
the Athenians are coming to attack us, and are already upon the
voyage, and all but here--this is what I am sure of."
Thus far spoke Hermocrates. Meanwhile the people of Syracuse were at
great strife among themselves; some contending that the Athenians
had no idea of coming and that there was no truth in what he said;
some asking if they did come what harm they could do that would not be
repaid them tenfold in return; while others made light of the whole
affair and turned it into ridicule. In short, there were few that
believed Hermocrates and feared for the future. Meanwhile Athenagoras,
the leader of the people and very powerful at that time with the
masses, came forward and spoke as follows:
"For the Athenians, he who does not wish that they may be as
misguided as they are supposed to be, and that they may come here to
become our subjects, is either a coward or a traitor to his country;
while as for those who carry such tidings and fill you with so much
alarm, I wonder less at their audacity than at their folly if they
flatter themselves that we do not see through them. The fact is that
they have their private reasons to be afraid, and wish to throw the
city into consternation to have their own terrors cast into the
shade by the public alarm. In short, this is what these reports are
worth; they do not arise of themselves, but are concocted by men who
are always causing agitation here in Sicily. However, if you are
well advised, you will not be guided in your calculation of
probabilities by what these persons tell you, but by what shrewd men
and of large experience, as I esteem the Athenians to be, would be
likely to do. Now it is not likely that they would leave the
Peloponnesians behind them, and before they have well ended the war in
Hellas wantonly come in quest of a new war quite as arduous in Sicily;
indeed, in my judgment, they are only too glad that we do not go and
attack them, being so many and so great cities as we are.
"However, if they should come as is reported, I consider Sicily
better able to go through with the war than Peloponnese, as being at
all points better prepared, and our city by itself far more than a
match for this pretended army of invasion, even were it twice as large
again. I know that they will not have horses with them, or get any
here, except a few perhaps from the Egestaeans; or be able to bring
a force of heavy infantry equal in number to our own, in ships which
will already have enough to do to come all this distance, however
lightly laden, not to speak of the transport of the other stores
required against a city of this magnitude, which will be no slight
quantity. In fact, so strong is my opinion upon the subject, that I do
not well see how they could avoid annihilation if they brought with
them another city as large as Syracuse, and settled down and carried
on war from our frontier; much less can they hope to succeed with
all Sicily hostile to them, as all Sicily will be, and with only a
camp pitched from the ships, and composed of tents and bare
necessaries, from which they would not be able to stir far for fear of
our cavalry.
"But the Athenians see this as I tell you, and as I have reason to
know are looking after their possessions at home, while persons here
invent stories that neither are true nor ever will be. Nor is this the
first time that I see these persons, when they cannot resort to deeds,
trying by such stories and by others even more abominable to
frighten your people and get into their hands the government: it is
what I see always. And I cannot help fearing that trying so often they
may one day succeed, and that we, as long as we do not feel the smart,
may prove too weak for the task of prevention, or, when the
offenders are known, of pursuit. The result is that our city is rarely
at rest, but is subject to constant troubles and to contests as
frequent against herself as against the enemy, not to speak of
occasional tyrannies and infamous cabals. However, I will try, if
you will support me, to let nothing of this happen in our time, by
gaining you, the many, and by chastising the authors of such
machinations, not merely when they are caught in the act--a difficult
feat to accomplish--but also for what they have the wish though not
the power to do; as it is necessary to punish an enemy not only for
what he does, but also beforehand for what he intends to do, if the
first to relax precaution would not be also the first to suffer. I
shall also reprove, watch, and on occasion warn the few--the most
effectual way, in my opinion, of turning them from their evil courses.
And after all, as I have often asked, what would you have, young men?
Would you hold office at once? The law forbids it, a law enacted
rather because you are not competent than to disgrace you when
competent. Meanwhile you would not be on a legal equality with the
many! But how can it be right that citizens of the same state should
be held unworthy of the same privileges?
"It will be said, perhaps, that democracy is neither wise nor
equitable, but that the holders of property are also the best fitted
to rule. I say, on the contrary, first, that the word demos, or
people, includes the whole state, oligarchy only a part; next, that if
the best guardians of property are the rich, and the best
counsellors the wise, none can hear and decide so well as the many;
and that all these talents, severally and collectively, have their
just place in a democracy. But an oligarchy gives the many their share
of the danger, and not content with the largest part takes and keeps
the whole of the profit; and this is what the powerful and young among
you aspire to, but in a great city cannot possibly obtain.
"But even now, foolish men, most senseless of all the Hellenes
that I know, if you have no sense of the wickedness of your designs,
or most criminal if you have that sense and still dare to pursue
them--even now, if it is not a case for repentance, you may still
learn wisdom, and thus advance the interest of the country, the common
interest of us all. Reflect that in the country's prosperity the men
of merit in your ranks will have a share and a larger share than the
great mass of your fellow countrymen, but that if you have other
designs you run a risk of being deprived of all; and desist from
reports like these, as the people know your object and will not put up
with it. If the Athenians arrive, this city will repulse them in a
manner worthy of itself; we have moreover, generals who will see to
this matter. And if nothing of this be true, as I incline to
believe, the city will not be thrown into a panic by your
intelligence, or impose upon itself a self-chosen servitude by
choosing you for its rulers; the city itself will look into the
matter, and will judge your words as if they were acts, and, instead
of allowing itself to be deprived of its liberty by listening to
you, will strive to preserve that liberty, by taking care to have
always at hand the means of making itself respected."
Such were the words of Athenagoras. One of the generals now stood up
and stopped any other speakers coming forward, adding these words of
his own with reference to the matter in hand: "It is not well for
speakers to utter calumnies against one another, or for their
hearers to entertain them; we ought rather to look to the intelligence
that we have received, and see how each man by himself and the city as
a whole may best prepare to repel the invaders. Even if there be no
need, there is no harm in the state being furnished with horses and
arms and all other insignia of war; and we will undertake to see to
and order this, and to send round to the cities to reconnoitre and
do all else that may appear desirable. Part of this we have seen to
already, and whatever we discover shall be laid before you." After
these words from the general, the Syracusans departed from the
assembly.
In the meantime the Athenians with all their allies had now
arrived at Corcyra. Here the generals began by again reviewing the
armament, and made arrangements as to the order in which they were
to anchor and encamp, and dividing the whole fleet into three
divisions, allotted one to each of their number, to avoid sailing
all together and being thus embarrassed for water, harbourage, or
provisions at the stations which they might touch at, and at the
same time to be generally better ordered and easier to handle, by each
squadron having its own commander. Next they sent on three ships to
Italy and Sicily to find out which of the cities would receive them,
with instructions to meet them on the way and let them know before
they put in to land.
After this the Athenians weighed from Corcyra, and proceeded to
cross to Sicily with an armament now consisting of one hundred and
thirty-four galleys in all (besides two Rhodian fifty-oars), of
which one hundred were Athenian vessels--sixty men-of-war, and forty
troopships--and the remainder from Chios and the other allies; five
thousand and one hundred heavy infantry in all, that is to say,
fifteen hundred Athenian citizens from the rolls at Athens and seven
hundred Thetes shipped as marines, and the rest allied troops, some of
them Athenian subjects, and besides these five hundred Argives, and
two hundred and fifty Mantineans serving for hire; four hundred and
eighty archers in all, eighty of whom were Cretans, seven hundred
slingers from Rhodes, one hundred and twenty light-armed exiles from
Megara, and one horse-transport carrying thirty horses.
Such was the strength of the first armament that sailed over for the
war. The supplies for this force were carried by thirty ships of
burden laden with corn, which conveyed the bakers, stone-masons, and
carpenters, and the tools for raising fortifications, accompanied by
one hundred boats, like the former pressed into the service, besides
many other boats and ships of burden which followed the armament
voluntarily for purposes of trade; all of which now left Corcyra and
struck across the Ionian Sea together. The whole force making land
at the Iapygian promontory and Tarentum, with more or less good
fortune, coasted along the shores of Italy, the cities shutting
their markets and gates against them, and according them nothing but
water and liberty to anchor, and Tarentum and Locri not even that,
until they arrived at Rhegium, the extreme point of Italy. Here at
length they reunited, and not gaining admission within the walls
pitched a camp outside the city in the precinct of Artemis, where a
market was also provided for them, and drew their ships on shore and
kept quiet. Meanwhile they opened negotiations with the Rhegians,
and called upon them as Chalcidians to assist their Leontine
kinsmen; to which the Rhegians replied that they would not side with
either party, but should await the decision of the rest of the
Italiots, and do as they did. Upon this the Athenians now began to
consider what would be the best action to take in the affairs of
Sicily, and meanwhile waited for the ships sent on to come back from
Egesta, in order to know whether there was really there the money
mentioned by the messengers at Athens.
In the meantime came in from all quarters to the Syracusans, as well
as from their own officers sent to reconnoitre, the positive tidings
that the fleet was at Rhegium; upon which they laid aside their
incredulity and threw themselves heart and soul into the work of
preparation. Guards or envoys, as the case might be, were sent round
to the Sicels, garrisons put into the posts of the Peripoli in the
country, horses and arms reviewed in the city to see that nothing
was wanting, and all other steps taken to prepare for a war which
might be upon them at any moment.
Meanwhile the three ships that had been sent on came from Egesta
to the Athenians at Rhegium, with the news that so far from there
being the sums promised, all that could be produced was thirty
talents. The generals were not a little disheartened at being thus
disappointed at the outset, and by the refusal to join in the
expedition of the Rhegians, the people they had first tried to gain
and had had had most reason to count upon, from their relationship
to the Leontines and constant friendship for Athens. If Nicias was
prepared for the news from Egesta, his two colleagues were taken
completely by surprise. The Egestaeans had had recourse to the
following stratagem, when the first envoys from Athens came to inspect
their resources. They took the envoys in question to the temple of
Aphrodite at Eryx and showed them the treasures deposited there:
bowls, wine-ladles, censers, and a large number of other pieces of
plate, which from being in silver gave an impression of wealth quite
out of proportion to their really small value. They also privately
entertained the ships' crews, and collected all the cups of gold and
silver that they could find in Egesta itself or could borrow in the
neighbouring Phoenician and Hellenic towns, and each brought them to
the banquets as their own; and as all used pretty nearly the same, and
everywhere a great quantity of plate was shown, the effect was most
dazzling upon the Athenian sailors, and made them talk loudly of the
riches they had seen when they got back to Athens. The dupes in
question--who had in their turn persuaded the rest--when the news got
abroad that there was not the money supposed at Egesta, were much
blamed by the soldiers.
Meanwhile the generals consulted upon what was to be done. The
opinion of Nicias was to sail with all the armament to Selinus, the
main object of the expedition, and if the Egestaeans could provide
money for the whole force, to advise accordingly; but if they could
not, to require them to supply provisions for the sixty ships that
they had asked for, to stay and settle matters between them and the
Selinuntines either by force or by agreement, and then to coast past
the other cities, and after displaying the power of Athens and proving
their zeal for their friends and allies, to sail home again (unless
they should have some sudden and unexpected opportunity of serving the
Leontines, or of bringing over some of the other cities), and not to
endanger the state by wasting its home resources.
Alcibiades said that a great expedition like the present must not
disgrace itself by going away without having done anything; heralds
must be sent to all the cities except Selinus and Syracuse, and
efforts be made to make some of the Sicels revolt from the Syracusans,
and to obtain the friendship of others, in order to have corn and
troops; and first of all to gain the Messinese, who lay right in the
passage and entrance to Sicily, and would afford an excellent
harbour and base for the army. Thus, after bringing over the towns and
knowing who would be their allies in the war, they might at length
attack Syracuse and Selinus; unless the latter came to terms with
Egesta and the former ceased to oppose the restoration of Leontini.
Lamachus, on the other hand, said that they ought to sail straight
to Syracuse, and fight their battle at once under the walls of the
town while the people were still unprepared, and the panic at its
height. Every armament was most terrible at first; if it allowed
time to run on without showing itself, men's courage revived, and they
saw it appear at last almost with indifference. By attacking suddenly,
while Syracuse still trembled at their coming, they would have the
best chance of gaining a victory for themselves and of striking a
complete panic into the enemy by the aspect of their numbers--which
would never appear so considerable as at present--by the anticipation
of coming disaster, and above all by the immediate danger of the
engagement. They might also count upon surprising many in the fields
outside, incredulous of their coming; and at the moment that the enemy
was carrying in his property the army would not want for booty if it
sat down in force before the city. The rest of the Siceliots would
thus be immediately less disposed to enter into alliance with the
Syracusans, and would join the Athenians, without waiting to see which
were the strongest. They must make Megara their naval station as a
place to retreat to and a base from which to attack: it was an
uninhabited place at no great distance from Syracuse either by land or
by sea.
After speaking to this effect, Lamachus nevertheless gave his
support to the opinion of Alcibiades. After this Alcibiades sailed
in his own vessel across to Messina with proposals of alliance, but
met with no success, the inhabitants answering that they could not
receive him within their walls, though they would provide him with a
market outside. Upon this he sailed back to Rhegium. Immediately
upon his return the generals manned and victualled sixty ships out
of the whole fleet and coasted along to Naxos, leaving the rest of the
armament behind them at Rhegium with one of their number. Received
by the Naxians, they then coasted on to Catana, and being refused
admittance by the inhabitants, there being a Syracusan party in the
town, went on to the river Terias. Here they bivouacked, and the
next day sailed in single file to Syracuse with all their ships except
ten which they sent on in front to sail into the great harbour and see
if there was any fleet launched, and to proclaim by herald from
shipboard that the Athenians were come to restore the Leontines to
their country, as being their allies and kinsmen, and that such of
them, therefore, as were in Syracuse should leave it without fear
and join their friends and benefactors the Athenians. After making
this proclamation and reconnoitring the city and the harbours, and the
features of the country which they would have to make their base of
operations in the war, they sailed back to Catana.
An assembly being held here, the inhabitants refused to receive
the armament, but invited the generals to come in and say what they
desired; and while Alcibiades was speaking and the citizens were
intent on the assembly, the soldiers broke down an ill-walled-up
postern gate without being observed, and getting inside the town,
flocked into the marketplace. The Syracusan party in the town no
sooner saw the army inside than they became frightened and withdrew,
not being at all numerous; while the rest voted for an alliance with
the Athenians and invited them to fetch the rest of their forces
from Rhegium. After this the Athenians sailed to Rhegium, and put off,
this time with all the armament, for Catana, and fell to work at their
camp immediately upon their arrival.
Meanwhile word was brought them from Camarina that if they went
there the town would go over to them, and also that the Syracusans
were manning a fleet. The Athenians accordingly sailed alongshore with
all their armament, first to Syracuse, where they found no fleet
manning, and so always along the coast to Camarina, where they brought
to at the beach, and sent a herald to the people, who, however,
refused to receive them, saying that their oaths bound them to receive
the Athenians only with a single vessel, unless they themselves sent
for more. Disappointed here, the Athenians now sailed back again,
and after landing and plundering on Syracusan territory and losing
some stragglers from their light infantry through the coming up of the
Syracusan horse, so got back to Catana.
There they found the Salaminia come from Athens for Alcibiades, with
orders for him to sail home to answer the charges which the state
brought against him, and for certain others of the soldiers who with
him were accused of sacrilege in the matter of the mysteries and of
the Hermae. For the Athenians, after the departure of the
expedition, had continued as active as ever in investigating the facts
of the mysteries and of the Hermae, and, instead of testing the
informers, in their suspicious temper welcomed all indifferently,
arresting and imprisoning the best citizens upon the evidence of
rascals, and preferring to sift the matter to the bottom sooner than
to let an accused person of good character pass unquestioned, owing to
the rascality of the informer. The commons had heard how oppressive
the tyranny of Pisistratus and his sons had become before it ended,
and further that that had been put down at last, not by themselves and
Harmodius, but by the Lacedaemonians, and so were always in fear and
took everything suspiciously.
Indeed, the daring action of Aristogiton and Harmodius was
undertaken in consequence of a love affair, which I shall relate at
some length, to show that the Athenians are not more accurate than the
rest of the world in their accounts of their own tyrants and of the
facts of their own history. Pisistratus dying at an advanced age in
possession of the tyranny, was succeeded by his eldest son, Hippias,
and not Hipparchus, as is vulgarly believed. Harmodius was then in the
flower of youthful beauty, and Aristogiton, a citizen in the middle
rank of life, was his lover and possessed him. Solicited without
success by Hipparchus, son of Pisistratus, Harmodius told Aristogiton,
and the enraged lover, afraid that the powerful Hipparchus might
take Harmodius by force, immediately formed a design, such as his
condition in life permitted, for overthrowing the tyranny. In the
meantime Hipparchus, after a second solicitation of Harmodius,
attended with no better success, unwilling to use violence, arranged
to insult him in some covert way. Indeed, generally their government
was not grievous to the multitude, or in any way odious in practice;
and these tyrants cultivated wisdom and virtue as much as any, and
without exacting from the Athenians more than a twentieth of their
income, splendidly adorned their city, and carried on their wars,
and provided sacrifices for the temples. For the rest, the city was
left in full enjoyment of its existing laws, except that care was
always taken to have the offices in the hands of some one of the
family. Among those of them that held the yearly archonship at
Athens was Pisistratus, son of the tyrant Hippias, and named after his
grandfather, who dedicated during his term of office the altar to
the twelve gods in the market-place, and that of Apollo in the Pythian
precinct. The Athenian people afterwards built on to and lengthened
the altar in the market-place, and obliterated the inscription; but
that in the Pythian precinct can still be seen, though in faded
letters, and is to the following effect:
Pisistratus, the son of Hippias,
Sent up this record of his archonship
In precinct of Apollo Pythias.
That Hippias was the eldest son and succeeded to the government,
is what I positively assert as a fact upon which I have had more exact
accounts than others, and may be also ascertained by the following
circumstance. He is the only one of the legitimate brothers that
appears to have had children; as the altar shows, and the pillar
placed in the Athenian Acropolis, commemorating the crime of the
tyrants, which mentions no child of Thessalus or of Hipparchus, but
five of Hippias, which he had by Myrrhine, daughter of Callias, son of
Hyperechides; and naturally the eldest would have married first.
Again, his name comes first on the pillar after that of his father;
and this too is quite natural, as he was the eldest after him, and the
reigning tyrant. Nor can I ever believe that Hippias would have
obtained the tyranny so easily, if Hipparchus had been in power when
he was killed, and he, Hippias, had had to establish himself upon
the same day; but he had no doubt been long accustomed to overawe
the citizens, and to be obeyed by his mercenaries, and thus not only
conquered, but conquered with ease, without experiencing any of the
embarrassment of a younger brother unused to the exercise of
authority. It was the sad fate which made Hipparchus famous that got
him also the credit with posterity of having been tyrant.
To return to Harmodius; Hipparchus having been repulsed in his
solicitations insulted him as he had resolved, by first inviting a
sister of his, a young girl, to come and bear a basket in a certain
procession, and then rejecting her, on the plea that she had never
been invited at all owing to her unworthiness. If Harmodius was
indignant at this, Aristogiton for his sake now became more
exasperated than ever; and having arranged everything with those who
were to join them in the enterprise, they only waited for the great
feast of the Panathenaea, the sole day upon which the citizens forming
part of the procession could meet together in arms without
suspicion. Aristogiton and Harmodius were to begin, but were to be
supported immediately by their accomplices against the bodyguard.
The conspirators were not many, for better security, besides which
they hoped that those not in the plot would be carried away by the
example of a few daring spirits, and use the arms in their hands to
recover their liberty.
At last the festival arrived; and Hippias with his bodyguard was
outside the city in the Ceramicus, arranging how the different parts
of the procession were to proceed. Harmodius and Aristogiton had
already their daggers and were getting ready to act, when seeing one
of their accomplices talking familiarly with Hippias, who was easy
of access to every one, they took fright, and concluded that they were
discovered and on the point of being taken; and eager if possible to
be revenged first upon the man who had wronged them and for whom
they had undertaken all this risk, they rushed, as they were, within
the gates, and meeting with Hipparchus by the Leocorium recklessly
fell upon him at once, infuriated, Aristogiton by love, and
Harmodius by insult, and smote him and slew him. Aristogiton escaped
the guards at the moment, through the crowd running up, but was
afterwards taken and dispatched in no merciful way: Harmodius was
killed on the spot.
When the news was brought to Hippias in the Ceramicus, he at once
proceeded not to the scene of action, but to the armed men in the
procession, before they, being some distance away, knew anything of
the matter, and composing his features for the occasion, so as not
to betray himself, pointed to a certain spot, and bade them repair
thither without their arms. They withdrew accordingly, fancying he had
something to say; upon which he told the mercenaries to remove the
arms, and there and then picked out the men he thought guilty and
all found with daggers, the shield and spear being the usual weapons
for a procession.
In this way offended love first led Harmodius and Aristogiton to
conspire, and the alarm of the moment to commit the rash action
recounted. After this the tyranny pressed harder on the Athenians, and
Hippias, now grown more fearful, put to death many of the citizens,
and at the same time began to turn his eyes abroad for a refuge in
case of revolution. Thus, although an Athenian, he gave his
daughter, Archedice, to a Lampsacene, Aeantides, son of the tyrant
of Lampsacus, seeing that they had great influence with Darius. And
there is her tomb in Lampsacus with this inscription:
Archedice lies buried in this earth,
Hippias her sire, and Athens gave her birth;
Unto her bosom pride was never known,
Though daughter, wife, and sister to the throne.
Hippias, after reigning three years longer over the Athenians, was
deposed in the fourth by the Lacedaemonians and the banished
Alcmaeonidae, and went with a safe conduct to Sigeum, and to Aeantides
at Lampsacus, and from thence to King Darius; from whose court he
set out twenty years after, in his old age, and came with the Medes to
Marathon.
With these events in their minds, and recalling everything they knew
by hearsay on the subject, the Athenian people grow difficult of
humour and suspicious of the persons charged in the affair of the
mysteries, and persuaded that all that had taken place was part of
an oligarchical and monarchical conspiracy. In the state of irritation
thus produced, many persons of consideration had been already thrown
into prison, and far from showing any signs of abating, public feeling
grew daily more savage, and more arrests were made; until at last
one of those in custody, thought to be the most guilty of all, was
induced by a fellow prisoner to make a revelation, whether true or not
is a matter on which there are two opinions, no one having been
able, either then or since, to say for certain who did the deed.
However this may be, the other found arguments to persuade him, that
even if he had not done it, he ought to save himself by gaining a
promise of impunity, and free the state of its present suspicions;
as he would be surer of safety if he confessed after promise of
impunity than if he denied and were brought to trial. He accordingly
made a revelation, affecting himself and others in the affair of the
Hermae; and the Athenian people, glad at last, as they supposed, to
get at the truth, and furious until then at not being able to discover
those who had conspired against the commons, at once let go the
informer and all the rest whom he had not denounced, and bringing
the accused to trial executed as many as were apprehended, and
condemned to death such as had fled and set a price upon their
heads. In this it was, after all, not clear whether the sufferers
had been punished unjustly, while in any case the rest of the city
received immediate and manifest relief.
To return to Alcibiades: public feeling was very hostile to him,
being worked on by the same enemies who had attacked him before he
went out; and now that the Athenians fancied that they had got at
the truth of the matter of the Hermae, they believed more firmly
than ever that the affair of the mysteries also, in which he was
implicated, had been contrived by him in the same intention and was
connected with the plot against the democracy. Meanwhile it so
happened that, just at the time of this agitation, a small force of
Lacedaemonians had advanced as far as the Isthmus, in pursuance of
some scheme with the Boeotians. It was now thought that this had
come by appointment, at his instigation, and not on account of the
Boeotians, and that, if the citizens had not acted on the
information received, and forestalled them by arresting the prisoners,
the city would have been betrayed. The citizens went so far as to
sleep one night armed in the temple of Theseus within the walls. The
friends also of Alcibiades at Argos were just at this time suspected
of a design to attack the commons; and the Argive hostages deposited
in the islands were given up by the Athenians to the Argive people
to be put to death upon that account: in short, everywhere something
was found to create suspicion against Alcibiades. It was therefore
decided to bring him to trial and execute him, and the Salaminia was
sent to Sicily for him and the others named in the information, with
instructions to order him to come and answer the charges against
him, but not to arrest him, because they wished to avoid causing any
agitation in the army or among the enemy in Sicily, and above all to
retain the services of the Mantineans and Argives, who, it was
thought, had been induced to join by his influence. Alcibiades, with
his own ship and his fellow accused, accordingly sailed off with the
Salaminia from Sicily, as though to return to Athens, and went with
her as far as Thurii, and there they left the ship and disappeared,
being afraid to go home for trial with such a prejudice existing
against them. The crew of the Salaminia stayed some time looking for
Alcibiades and his companions, and at length, as they were nowhere
to be found, set sail and departed. Alcibiades, now an outlaw, crossed
in a boat not long after from Thurii to Peloponnese; and the Athenians
passed sentence of death by default upon him and those in his company.
More History
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